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MICHAEL W. GRAF*

The Determination of Property Rights
in Public Contracts after Winstar v.
United States: Where has the Supreme
Court Left Us?
INTRODUCTION
In the summer of 1996, the long tangled road of litigation between
a group of financial institutions and the United States government reached
its apex with the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Winstar.' In
Winstar,the Supreme Court was asked to decide whether Congress' enactment, and the agencies' subsequent enforcement, of the Financial
Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989 (FIRREA)2 had3
breached contracts between the financial institutions and the government.
FIRREA imposed uniform regulatory requirements on the thrift industry,
thus abrogating government contractual promises of special regulatory
treatment, which the government had made as an inducement for healthy
thrifts to merge with financially insolvent thrifts in order to prevent a
wholesale collapse of the savings and loan industry. Affirming the decision
of the appellate court, the Supreme Court held, in a divided decision, that
the government had assumed the risk of future regulatory change and was
thus liable to the financial institutions for breach of contract.4
In examining the contracts entered into between the banks and the
government, the Supreme Court was called upon to evaluate a number of
defenses offered by the government, most notably the "unmistakability doctrine" and the "sovereign acts doctrine." The significance of the Supreme
Court's decision lies in its treatment of these sovereign defenses and the
uncertainty the three-part majority decision portends for future practitioners in evaluating government contracts. Most importantly, Winstar

* M.S., 1996, University of California at Berkeley, Environmental Science, Policy and
Management; J.D., 1988, Georgetown University; B.A., 1983, Univerity of California at Santa
Barbara. The author would like to thank Hamilton Candee of the Natural Resources Defense
Council for introducing this topic, Professor Joseph Sax for the assistance he provided, and
Jamie Rosen for his background research and analysis. Finally, the author would like to
thank the staff at NRJ, especially Ben Iseman for their work on this manuscript.
1. United States v. Winstar Corp., 518 U.S. 339,116 S. Ct. 2432 (1996).
2. Financial Inst. Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-73,
103 Stat. 183 (codified as amended in scattered sections of U.S.C.).
3. Winstar, 116 S. Ct. at 2447-48.
4. Id. at 2440.

NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL

[Vol. 38

represents a potentially enormous contraction of the government's
traditional reserved sovereign authority over federally created property
rights. This article will examine the Court's reasoning and show how it
essentially misinterprets previous decisions of the Court regarding the role
of federal sovereign power in interpreting government contracts. The article
will conclude by arguing that such a judicial shift should occur only where
these consequences are understood and fully argued in their proper context.
BACKGROUND
During the Great Depression, the high number of failures in the
savings and loan industry prompted Congress to pass several statutes
designed to stabilize the banks, and savings and loans of the thrift industry.'
Pursuant to these statutes Congress created the Federal Home Loan Bank
Board (Bank Board) to charter and regulate federal thrifts and the Federal
Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation (FSLIC) to insure thrift deposits.6
These institutional regulatory structures stabilized the industry until high
interest rates and inflation in the late 1970s and early 1980s brought on a
new round of thrift failures.7 In response, laws were passed by both
Congress and various states easing regulatory controls on the thrifts,
including the lowering of the capital reserve levels historically required to
protect thrifts from unanticipated loan defaults.8 In an effort to avoid
depleting the insurance assets of the FSLIC, the Bank Board encouraged
healthy thrifts to take over failing institutions pursuant to special contracts
known as "forbearance agreements." 9 As an incentive to enter into these
agreements, the Board offered the healthy thrifts favorable accounting
treatments, which allowed the acquiring institutions to maintain a positive
account balance and to leverage more loans, despite the liabilities of their
new thrift assets. ° Despite these efforts, thrifts continued to fail and the

5. See Transohio Savings Bank v. Dir., Office of Thrift Supervision, 967 F.2d 598, 601
(D.C. Cir. 1992). The statutes include the Federal Home Loan Bank Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 1421-49
(1994); Home Owner's Loan Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 1461-68c (1994); and the National Housing Act,
12 U.S.C §§ 1701-50g (1994).
6. Federal Home Loan Bank Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 1421-49 (1994).
7. See Winstar, 116 S. Ct. at 2440.
8. See id. at 2440-46. In November 1980, the capital reserves requirements were
lowered from five percent of total assets to four percent, and to three percent in January
1982. See id., at 2441.
9. See David B. Toscano, ForbearanceAgreements: Invalid Contractsfor the Surrenderof
Sovereignty, 92 COLUM. L REV. 426,453, n.133 (1992); Sterling Say. Ass'n v. Ryan, 751 F. Supp.
871, 873 (E.D. Wash. 1990).
10. See Winstar, 116 S. Ct. at 2442. The essence of this favorable accounting treatment
were the provisions in most forbearance agreements that allowed the acquiring thrift
institution to treat the net liabilities of the failing thrifts (fair market value of assets minus
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FSLIC became insolvent by 1988.11
In response to the growing crisis, Congress passed FIRREA in 1989.
FIRREA abolished the Bank Board and the FSLIC and replaced these
agencies with the Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS). FIRREA also enacted
new, uniform capital standards that replaced the variable standards
promulgated by the Bank Board, including the favorable accounting
treatments agreed to in the various forbearance agreements. 1 2 As a result df
new regulations established by the OTS pursuant to the standards set forth
in FIRREA, many previously solvent thrifts fell out of compliance with
federal reserve requirements, thus becoming targets of federal sanctions,
including prohibitions on asset growth and potential seizure by OTS
officials.1 3
Winstar began as two separate lawsuits brought in the federal
claims court by three thrifts who had entered into forbearance agreements
with the Bank Board, only to see their accounting preferences eliminated by
FIRREA, leading to financial upheaval and, for two of the thrifts, federal
seizure. 4 After reviewing the thrifts' breach of contract claims, the court

overall liabilities) as "supervisory goodwill.' Id. at 2443; Toscano, supra, note 9, at 428-29.
As explained by Justice Souter, supervisory goodwill was attractive to healthy thrifts for
several reasons. First, the agreements allowed the acquiring thrifts to count supervisory
goodwill toward their reserve requirements; this treatment increased the thrift's reserve
accounts "thereby allowing the thrift to leverage more loans (and... more profits)." Winstar,
116 U.S. at 2443. Second, the healthy thrifts were permitted to amortize the supervisory
goodwill over long periods ranging typically from 25 to 40 years. Id. at 2443; Toscano, supra
note 9, at 430. Because these amortization terms greatly exceeded the terms of loan
agreements whose discounts could be counted as capital gains, the acquiring thrifts could
actually show a net paper profit in the initial years following the merger. See generally
Winstar, 116 S. Ct. at 2444 for a more detailed description of this accounting procedure.
Finally, in agreements in which the FSLIC contributed cash subsidies as a further
inducement towards merger, the acquiring thrift was not required to reduce the amount of
calculated supervisory goodwill, thus conferring, in effect, a double counting of the cash
received as a tangible and an intangible asset. Id. at 2444, citing Transohio,967 F.2d at 604.
11. Winstar,116 S. Ct. at 2441.
12. See Winstar,116 S. Ct. at 2446-47; see Toscano, supra, note 9, at 430-31.
13. In response to the enactment of FIRREA, the oTs directed savings associations to
eliminate all favorable accounting treatments conferred under the forbearance agreements
in determining whether or not they comply with the new minimum regulatory capital
standards. See Winstar, 116 S. Ct. at 2446; Financial Inst. Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement
Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-73, 103 Stat. 183 (codified as amended in scattered sections of
U.S.C. (FIRREA); see alsoSterling Say. Ass'n v. Ryan, 751 F. Supp. 871, 875-76 (E.D. Wash.
1990), vacated, 959 F.2d 241 (9th Cir. 1992); Far West Fed. Bank v. Director, Office of Thrift
Supervision, 738 F. Supp. 1564,1568 (D. Or. 1990), rev'd, 951 F.2d 1093 (9th Cir. 1991).
14. The three thrifts were Glendale Federal Bank, Winstar Corporation and The
Statesman Group, Inc. While Glendale was able to recapitalize following passage of FIRREA,
Winstar and Statesman were both seized and liquidated by federal regulators. Winstar, 116
S. Ct. at 2447.
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found that the government had breached each of the respective forbearance
agreements by enacting and enforcing FIRREA. 5 The claims court then
certified the cases for interlocutory appeal. The appellate court reversed, in
a divided decision, holding that the government had never made an
"unmistakable" promise not to change the regulatory standards set forth in
the forbearance agreements, and thus had not breached those agreements
by imposing the new FIRREA standards on the thrifts." Upon a rehearing,
the en banc court reversed this decision, essentially adopting the claims
court's analysis that the government had breached its contractual obligation
to provide favorable regulatory treatment and thus was liable to the thrifts
for damages. 7 The Supreme Court upheld the appellate court's decision,
finding by a seven to two majority that, in executing the forbearance
agreements with the thrifts, the government had assumed the risk of future
regulatory change and was thus liable for any damages that flowed from
the enactment of FIRREA. 8
SUPREME COURT'S DECISION IN WINSTAR

Winstaft a difficult decision to decipher due to the three separate
opinions that purport to represent the seven justice majority. Justice Souter
authors the main opinion, which is joined by Justices Stevens, O'Conner and
Breyer. 9 Justice Breyer adds a separate concurrence." Justice Scalia offers
his own opinion, joined by Justices Kennedy and Thomas, who concurs in
the judgment, but not the reasoning, of the main opinion.2 Justice Rhenquist

15. See Winstar Corp. v. United States, 21 Cl. Ct. 112 (1990) [hereinafter Winstar I;
Winstar Corp. v. United States, 25 Ca. Ct. 541 (1992) [hereinafter Winstar II]; Statesman Sav.
Holding Corp. v. United States, 26 Cl. Ct.904 (1992). In so holding, the Federal Claims Court
rejected the reasoning of the D.C. Court of Appeals in Transohio, 967 F.2d 598 (D.C. Cir.
1992), which had reviewed similar agreements and found the government not liable on
related statutory and due process claims. Statesman, 26 C1. Ct. at 916-23. The findings and
reasoning of the Federal Claims Court in making these decisions will be discussed, where
appropriate, later in this article.
16. See Winstar Corp.v. United States, 994 F.2d 797, 810 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
17. See Winstar Corp. v. United States, 64 F.3d 1531,1540,1545 (Fed. Cir.1995).
18. See Wrnstar, 116 S. Ct. 2432; infra notes 21-55 and accompanying discussion for a
description of the Court's reasoning in finding for the thrifts.
19. See Winstar, 116 S. Ct. at 2459. Justice O'Conner does not join in part IV of Justice
Souter's opinion, which addresses the sovereign acts doctrine.
20. See id.
21. See id. This article will normally refer to each opinion according to their three
respective authors, Souter, Breyer and Scalia. From time to time the article may refer to
Justice Souter and Justice Breyer's opinion as the "majority opinion" despite the fact that
only 4 out of 9 Justices stood behind its reasoning. The collective decision of the seven
member majority-which includes the opinions of Souter, Breyer and Scalia- may be
attributed occasionally to the "Court."
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writes a dissent, which is joined by his ideological opposite, Justice
Ginsburg.2
Justice Souter's opinion begins by examining the underlying
contracts between the government and the thrifts. The opinion finds that the
government made a promise to contractually extend favorable regulatory
treatment to each of the thrifts.' Justice Souter notes that the language of
the agreements, though lacking optimum clarity, appears to "lock in" this
favorable regulatory treatment.4 Based on this interpretation of the
contractual documents, the opinion upholds the lower court's ruling that
the government breached its respective obligations to each of the thrifts by
enacting and subsequently implementing the uniform regulatory treatment
required by FIRREA.' The opinion then addresses whether the Government
could successfully assert any of its four defenses to the thrifts' breach of
contract claims.
The first of these defenses is known as the unmistakability doctrine.
The unmistakability doctrine states that "sovereign power, even when
unexercised, is an enduring presence that governs all contracts subject to the
sovereign's jurisdiction, and will remain intact unless surrendered in
unmistakable terms."2 Based on this doctrine, the government argued that
the forbearance contracts should not be construed as limiting the government's power to impose new regulatory restrictions on the thrifts since the
government had not made an unmistakable promise to waive its sovereign
right to enact legislation in the future.' Justice Souter's opinion rejects this

22. See id. Justice Ginsburg does not join in part H of the dissent, which addresses the
sovereign acts doctrine.
23. See id. at 2452.
24. Id. at 2451. Justice Souter makes this conclusion based upon the language of the
Assistance Agreement (one of the contract documents), which states that the Bank Board's
resolutions and actions in connection with the merger (which adopt the favorable regulatory
treatment) shall prevail over contrary regulations and accounting principles. See id. A
supporting argument not addressed by the Supreme Court was the extent to which the long
amortization periods for supervisory goodwill, see supra note 10, at indicated the parties'
intent that the favorable regulatory treatment would continue into the 21st century.
25. See Winstar, 116 S. Ct. at 2452. The opinion notes that "the Government exacerbated
its breach when it seized and liquidated (the] respondents' thrifts for regulatory
noncompliance." Id. at 2453.
26. Id. at 2453. As will be shown, the majority opinion's initial finding that the
government breached the forbearance agreements, without ever applying or even considering
the applicability of the uninistakability doctrine to determine the respective rights of the
parties to the contracts, represents an error of law that sets the stage for the problems
encountered in the rest of the opinion. See infra notes 175-94 and accompanying discussion.
27. Bowen v. Public Agencies Opposed to Soc. Sec. Entrapment, 477 U.S. 41, 52 (1986),
quotingMerrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130,148 (1982), quotingSt. Louis v. United
Rys. Co., 210 U.S. 266,280 (1908).
28. Winstar,116 S. Ct. at 2453.
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argument based upon the reasoning that the unmistakability doctrine is
simply not applicable in cases where enforcement of the alleged contractual
obligation does not "block the exercise of a sovereign power of the United
States." In examining the forbearance contracts, the opinion finds that the
government's promise merely acted to shift the liability risk for future
regulatory change to the government." Since enforcement of this risk
allocation would not bar the government from exercising its sovereign
powers, the uninstakability doctrine does not apply.31
Justice Souter uses the same reasoning to dispense with two
additional defenses raised by the government. The first of these, the
reserved powers doctrine, holds that a government may not contract away
an essential attribute of its sovereignty. The second, the express delegation
doctrine, holds that the delegation of authority to contract away a sovereign
power of the government must be clearly made and all doubts must be
resolved in favor of the continuance of the power.' Neither doctrine is
applicable, according to Justice Souter, because the forbearance contracts
did not purport to surrender the Government's sovereign power to
regulate .3
The government's fourth and final defense to the breach of contract
claim was based upon the sovereign acts doctrine, which holds that the
government, in its capacity as a contractor, may not be held responsible for
its acts taken as a sovereign.' The purpose of the sovereign acts doctrine is
to place the government in the same position as a private contractor, whose
liability for unforeseen governrnent actions would be determined according

29. Winstar, 116 S. Ct. at 2457. According to Justice Souter, the question of whether an
alleged contractual term may have the effect of blocking the exercise of sovereign authority
may be answered by examining the language of the underlying contractual agreement. Id.
at 2457 n.24. One theme of this article is that this question is more likely to be answered by
the remedy sought by the private party. See infra notes 155-77 and accompanying text. For
that reason, this article will from time to time refer to Justice Souter's approach for
determining whether the unmistakability doctrine should apply as the "remedy test."
30. Winstar, 116 S. Ct. at 2457-58.

31. Id. at 2458.
32. United States Trust Co. of New York v. New Jersey, 431 U.S.1, 23 (1977); Stone v.
Mississippi, 101 US. 814, 817 (1879). Souter reaches this holding without expressly finding
that the reserved powers doctrine applies to the federal government. See Wlnstar,116 S.Ct.
at 2461 (Government's argument that the logic of reserved powers doctrine applies equally
to the federal government 'may be so but is also beside the point."). See infra notes 150-54
and accompanying text for a discussion of how the application of the reserved powers
doctrine to the federal government is relevant to a plausible interpretation of the
unmistakability doctrine.
33. Home Tel. &Tel. Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 211 U.S. 265,273 (1908).
34. IVnstar, 116 S. Ct. at 2462.
35. Horowitz v. United States, 267 U.S. 458,461 (1925).
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to the common law of contract interpretation.36 Justice Souter rejects the
government's sovereign acts defense, however, holding that the
government failed to meet the requirements for its successful assertion.
First, Souter finds that because FIRREA had a "substantial effect"37 on the
government's own contractual obligations (incurred through the many
forbearance agreements entered into during the 1980s), it does not satisfy
L ' Second,
the requirement that the legislation be a "public and general" act.
even if FIRREA were considered to be a public and general act, the
government could not avoid liability as a private party since it would not
meet the two further requirements under the common law commercial
impossibility standard, that the parties 1) neither foresaw the occurrence of
the sovereign act; nor 2) addressed such a possibility in the contract.9
According to Souter, the government would be unable to show that future
regulatory change was an unforeseeable event, given the contractual
language providing for particular regulatory treatment and given the highly
regulated nature of the thrift industry.4 Moreover, the language of the
underlying contracts that allocated the risks of future regulatory change to
the government indicated that the parties' performance obligations were not
meant to be discharged due to the enactment of new legislation.4' After
rejecting each of the government's defenses, Justice Souter's opinion affirms
the lower court's ruling finding the government liable for breach of contract

36. Winstar,116 S. Ct. at 2463; Jones v. United States, 1 Ct. C1. 383, 384 (1865).
37. For a discussion of the "substantial effect" test introduced by Winstar, 116 S. Ct.
2432, see infra, notes 344-54 and accompanying text.
38. Winstar,116 S. Ct. at 2467-69. The opinion states that, although "Congress acted to
protect the public in the FIRREA legislation... the extent to which this reform relieved the
Government from its own contractual obligations precludes a finding that the statute is a
'public and general' act for purposes of the sovereign acts defense." Id. at 2469; Financial
Inst. Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-73, 103 Stat. 183
(codified as amended in scattered sections of U.S.C.) (FIRREA).
See, e.g., Horowitz, 267 U.S. at 461; Jones, 1 Ct. Cl. at 384. See also Wilson v. United
States, 11 Ct. Cl. 514, 520 (1875) (general enactments of Congress are not to be construed as
evasions of a particular contract); Deming v. United States, 1 Ct. Cl. 190,191 (1865).
39. RESrATEMENT (SEcOND) OF CONTRACrs § 261 (1981). In other words, the government
as private contractor would be entitled, under the sovereign acts doctrine, to argue that its
performance had been rendered impossible as a result of the sovereign act.
[w]here, after a contract is made, a party's performance is made
impracticable without his fault by the occurrence of an even the nonoccurrence of which was a basic assumption on which the contract was
made, his duty to render that performance is discharged, unless the
language or the circumstances indicate the contrary. Id.
40. Winstar, 116 S.Ct. at 2469-70. The opinion supports this holding with transcripts of
the government's lawyers stating at oral argument that FIRREA's tightening of the capital
standards was "exactly the event that the parties assumed might happen when they made
their contracts." Id. at 2470 n.54.
41. Id. at 2471.
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and remands the case for a determination of the appropriate measure of
damages. 42
Justice Breyer's concurrence emphasizes that the unnistakability
doctrine should not be applied to ordinary government contracts that
allocate risks in the same manner as between two private parties.43 Breyer
rejects the government's claim that the possibility of substantial damage
awards carries the danger of limiting the exercise of sovereign power.
According to Breyer, this argument has no logical stopping point that
would prevent its application to routine government supply contracts,
agreements that instead should properly be governed by ordinary
principles of contract law."
Justice Scalia's opinion, while concurring with the Court's judgment
against the government, differs considerably in its legal analysis. Justice
Scalia disagrees that the unmistakability doctrine is not applicable to the
forbearance agreements. 45 He rejects the majority opinion's reasoning that
the application of the doctrine turns on the nature of the contract at issue,
i.e., whether the contractual provisions attempt to bind the legislative
powers of the sovereign or whether they merely allocate the monetary risk
of future regulatory change." Instead, Justice Scalia characterizes the
doctrine as "a rule of presumed intent" that "the sovereign does not
promise that none of its multifarious acts, needful for the public good, will
incidentally disable it or the other party from performing one of the
promised acts." 47 According to Scalia, only "unmistakable language" will
rebut this presumption. Scalia finds such language in the government's
contractual promises to grant the thrifts favorable regulatory treatment."
Without expressly stating, Scalia's opinion implies a close connection between the unmistakability and sovereign acts doctrines. Under
Scalia's analysis, the primary function of the unmistakability doctrine is to
establish whether the government has waived its right to assert the
sovereign acts doctrine as a defense to liability where the government's

42. Id. at 2472.
43. Id. at 2472-73. Justice Breyer notes that the doctrine was "not determinative" in the
Court's other unmistakability decisions. Id. at 2472.
44. Id. at 2475.
45. Id.at 2477.
46. Id. at 2476. Justice Scalia notes that such an approach has no basis in precedent nor
does it amount to a real distinction given the fact that all contract cases ultimately come
down to monetary liability for one party or another. Id.
47. Id. at 2477.
48. Id. at 2478. Scalia makes this finding as a matter of law based on the lower courts'
findings that the government had "plainly made promises to regulate in a certain fashion
into the future." Id.
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sovereign acts have hindered or prevented contractual performance. 49
Accordingly, Scalia rejects the proffered sovereign acts defense based on his
earlier finding that the government unmistakably waived this right.' °
Justice Rhenquist's dissent criticizes the majority opinion's narrowing of the government's sovereign defenses."1 Rhenquist objects to Justice
Souter's remedy test, noting that 1) the distinction between a claim for
money damages and a claim to be exempt from the operation of a statute
will always be tenuous; 2 and 2) the distinction is not supported by recent
Supreme Court decisions that applied the unnistakability doctrine to
interpret contract claims for money damages.53 The dissent points out the
illogic of having the application of the unmistakability doctrine turn on the
remedy sought for the government's breach when, in fact, the doctrine has
been historically used to determine whether a breach occurred in the first
instance.-'

49. Scalia notes that the unmistakability doctrine should be used to rebut the
presumption that the government made no promise that one of its future sovereign acts
would "incidentally disable it or the other party from performing one of the promised acts."
Id. at 2477. As discussed infra, however, this a narrow reading of the scope of the
unnistakability doctrine, which ignores the doctrine's importance in the determination of
existing property rights under quasi-regulatory contracts. See infra notes 175-94 and
accompanying text.
50. Winstar, 116 S. Ct. at 2478. Scalia also rejects the government's reserved powers
doctrine based on the same reasoning in the majority opinion that the thrifts were not seeking to stay the exercise of sovereign authority. Id. The potential inconsistency between this
reasoning and Justice Scalia's earlier rejection of the majority's remedy test in regards to the
unmistakability doctrine may be explained in part by the strong precedent holding that the
purpose of the reserved powers doctrine is to prevent the alienation of sovereign powers.
See, e.g., Stone v. Mississippi, 101 U.S. 814, 819 (1879) (no legislature can bargain away the
public health or the public morals); Winstar,116 S. Ct. at 2461 n.32. See infra note 154.
51. Winstar,116 S. Ct. at 2482-84.
52. Id. at 2480.
53. Id. at 2480 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (citing United States v. Cherokee Nation of
Okla., 480 U.S. 700,707 (1987)); Bowen v. Public Agencies Opposed to Soc. Sec. Entrapment,
477 U.S. 41, 51 (1986).
54. Winstar, 116 S. Ct. at 2481. Rehnquist does not elaborate on this fundamental
criticism of the majority's opinion. See infra notes 155-59 and accompanying discussion for
a more detailed critique. The dissent criticizes the majority's ruling (reached without
applying the unmistakability doctrine) that the government assumed the risk for future
regulatory change, characterizing the holding as a "finding of law" unsupported by judicial
precedent. Winstar, 116 S. Ct. at 2482. In other words, Rehnquist is asserting that this finding
is based upon the initial, legal conclusion that the unmistakability doctrine does not apply.
(Rehnquist also criticizes Justice Breyer's characterization of the majority's allocation of risk
holding as an "illusory factual finding.") Id. at 2485. Rehnquist also disagrees with Justice
Scalia's similar conclusion (reached by applying the unmistakability doctrine) that the
government made a binding promise not to change the regulatory treatment of the thrifts.
Each of these findings are erroneous, according to the dissent, since they misconstrue both
the applicability, and the substance of, the unmistakability doctrine. Id. at 2484-85.
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The dissent also objects to the Court's limiting the sovereign acts
doctrine to "public and general" acts which do not have "the substantial
effect of releasing the government from its contractual obligations," an
inquiry that necessarily involves the difficult question of whether the statute
in question was "tainted by a governmental objective of self relief."'
According to Rhenquist, the sovereign acts doctrine should be available as
a defense to government liability for all "general regulatory enactments,"
6
regardless of their specific impacts upon private contractual rights.5
ANALYSIS OF THE WNSTAR DECISION
This section will analyze the Wnstardecision, focusing in particular
on the Court's treatment of the two main defenses raised by the
government, the unmistakability and sovereign acts doctrines. These
doctrines originated from two distinct government contractual models; one
in which the government acts in a quasi-regulatory capacity and, in the
other, as a market participant. Indeed, the problems with Winstar begin
with the Court's attempt to address the government's sovereign defenses
without distinguishing between these two very different models of
government contracts. By ignoring this distinction, the Court misses its
opportunity to craft a coherent framework in which rights under federal
contracts may be addressed. Instead, the Court's separate opinions leave
gaping holes in the law of federal contract interpretation while
simultaneously blurring the respective roles of the unmistakability and
sovereign acts doctrines in resolving contract disputes. This section will
argue that the Court's failure to acknowledge the different models of
government agreements has led to a remedy test that is legally
insupportable, and to general uncertainty regarding both the appropriate
application of the two sovereign defenses and the proper interpretation of
the "unmistakability" standard. In particular, the limitations placed on the
unmistakability doctrine by Winstarcarry enormous potential consequences
for the government's ability to regulate its contractual partners without
violating the takings prohibitions of the Fifth Amendment. The effect of this
judicial shift eliminating the presumption of reserved sovereign power over
quasi-regulatory contractual rights will be discussed in a later section.
1. Backgroundon Sovereign Defenses and Government Agreements
The first part of this section will discuss the background of the
unmistakability and sovereign acts doctrines, and the distinction between

55. Winstar,116S. Ctat2483.
56. Id. See infra notes 344-54 and accompanying text for an evaluation of Winstar's
"substantial effect' test.
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"quasi-regulatory" and "market participant" agreements. This part will
conclude with a brief presentation of the relationship between the two
doctrines as applied to the different government contractual models.
a. Unmistaka1ility Doctrine
The origin of the unmistakability doctrine can be traced back to
19th century federal cases in which courts grappled with the state's
authority to abrogate existing contractual obligations entered into by
previous state legislatures. Under the Contract Clause, 7 states were
prohibited from eliminating vested rights arising out of public contracts.58
Over time, however, courts adopted rules to minimize the effect of the
Contract Clause on the exercise of state sovereign power. The first line of
cases, which established what became known as the "reserved powers
doctrine," held that the state could not contract away essential.attributes of
sovereignty such as the eminent domain or police power." Under the
reserved powers doctrine, state government contracts contain an implied
reservation of the state's authority to exercise such "essential" powers in the
future.' Because each contract incorporates the reservation into its terms,
the state's subsequent exercise of its reserved powers does not violate the
contract clause.6' The contract clause cases did not, however, consider every
aspect of the state's sovereign authority to be inalienable. A second line of
decisions held that certain "non-essential" attributes of sovereignty, such as
the state's taxing or spending powers,' could be contracted away,

57. U.S. CONST. art. I § 10, cl. 1 ("No State shall.. .pass any ... Law impairing the
Obligation of Contracts .... ").
58. See Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87,137 (1810). See Michael L. Zigler, Takings
Law and the Contract Clause: A Takings Law Approach to Legislative Modiftcations of Public
Contracts, 36 STAN. L. REv. 1447,1449-51 (1984).
59. See e.g, West River Bridge Co. v. Dix., 47 U.S. (6 How.) 507 (1848) (state may not
contract away the power of eminent domain); Stone v. Mississippi,101 U.S. at 817-18; (no
legislature can curtail the power of its successors to make such laws as they may deem
proper in matters of police); see also Manigault v. Springs, 199 U.S. 473, 480 (1905); Home
Bldg. & Loan Ass'n. v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398,434-435 (1934); Veix v. Sixth Ward Bldg. Ass'n,
310 U.S. 32, 38-39 (1940).
60. Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n, at 435-36; Veix, at 38-39.
61. Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n, at 430,435 (reservation of essential attributes of sovereign
power is incorporated in contracts as a postulate of the legal order). In United States Trust
Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 23-24 (1977), the Supreme Court reaffirmed that a state
legislative action pursuant to its reserved powers does not violate the contract clause.
62. United States Trust, 431 U.S. at 24 (state may bind itself in the future exercise of the
taxing and spending powers). In Stone v. Mississippi,101 U.S. at 820, the Court observed:
While taxation is in general necessary for the support of government, it is
not part of the government itself. Government was not organized for the
purposes of taxation, but taxation may be necessary for the purposes of
government. As suck taxation becomes an incident to the exercise of the
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providing the waiver of authority "had been specifically surrendered in
terms which admit of no other reasonable interpretation."' This requirement that such "non-reserved" powers could be surrendered pursuant to
express contractual language most closely resembles the unmistakability
doctrine as it was subsequently interpreted by the Supreme Court. 64
The forerunner to the unniistakability doctrine as applied to federal
government contracts is the Sinking-FundCases.6 In this early decision, the
Supreme Court held that Congress' amendment of the terms of federal
subsidy bonds, which required a private railroad to deposit money into a
sinking fund to pay off its obligations to the government as they came due,
did not deprive the railroad of due process or improperly interfere with any
vested rights." The Court based its holding on the language of the
underlying statute issuing the bonds, which reserved Congress' right to
subsequently "alter, amend and repeal [the] act." ' In light of this statutory
language, the Court found that the railroads did not possess contractual
rights that superseded Congress' reserved power of amendment."

legitimate functions of government, but nothing more. No government
dependent on taxation for support can bargain away its whole power of
taxation...[but for] a consideration [the government] may, in the exercise of
a reasonable discretion, and for the public good, surrender a part of its
powers in this particular.
63. St. Louis v. United Ry. Co., 210 U.S. 266,280 (1908). See also Keefe v. Clark, 322 U.S.
393, 396-97 (1944) ("obligation alleged to have been impaired must be clearly and
unequivocally expressed."); Dodge v. Bd. of Educ., 302 U.S. 74, 78-79 (1937) (presumption
is that state government has not conferred vested contractual rights to private parties);
Jefferson Branch Bank v. Skelly, 66 US. (1 Black) 436,446 (1861) (neither right of taxation nor
any other power of sovereignty will be held to have been surrendered "unless such
surrender has been expressed in terms too plain to be mistaken"); Charles River Bridge v.
Warren Bridge, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 420,548 (1837) ("continued existence of a government would
be of no great value, if, by implications and presumptions, it was disarmed of the powers
necessary to accomplish the ends of its creation").
64. See Winstar,116 S. Ct. at 2455, n.21; Toscano, supra note 9, at 453, n.133.
65. Union Pac. R.R. Co. v. United States, 99 U.S. 700 (1878).
66. See id. at 719. The Court noted that the contract clause of the Constitution preventing
the states from impairing the obligation of contracts was not applicable to the federal
government. Nevertheless, the Court observed that the federal government (as well as the
states) was still limited by the due process clause of the Constitution from impairing vested
rights acquired through contract. Id. at 719-20.
67. Id. at 720. The Court characterized this language as indicating that "Congress not
only retains, but has given special notice of its intention to retain, full and complete power
to make such alterations and amendments of the charter as come within the just scope of
legislative power." Id.
68. Id. at 719-20. The Court noted that "it is unnecessary to decide what power Congress
would have had over the charter if the right of amendment had not been reserved; for, as we
think, that reservation has been made." Id. at 719. Subsequent cases have held that
Congress's reservation of sovereign authority exists even in the absence of express statutory
language. See, e.g., Peterson v. U.S. Dep't of Interior, 899 F.2d 799, 808 (9th Cir. 1990);
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The unmistakability doctrine was not officially enunciated by the
Supreme Court until over 100 years later, in Merrion v. JicarillaApache
Tribe." In Merrion, private development interests entered into oil and gas
leases with an Indian tribe, which granted free access to explore for and
develop resources in exchange for an up-front cash bonus, royalties and
rents." When the tribe taxed the lessees' activities, the lessees brought suit
alleging, among other claims, that the imposed taxes violated the terms of
the underlying leases.' The Supreme Court disagreed, holding that the tribe
did not waive its sovereign authority merely because it failed to reserve the
express right to exercise such authority in a commercial agreement.'
Instead, the Court observed that sovereign power "is an enduring presence
that governs all contracts subject to the sovereign's jurisdiction, and will
remain intact unless surrendered in unmistakable terms."'
Following Merrion, the Court decided National Railroad Passenger
Corp. v. Atchison Topeka Santa Fe Railway Co 4 In National Railroad, private
railroad companies claimed that the government had "impaired"
statutorily-based contracts by subsequently amending the statute (and consequently the underlying contracts) to require the railroads to pay a 25%
reimbursement to Amtrak for providing free rail- service to railroad
employees.' Without specifically addressing the unmistakability doctrine,

Democratic Cent. Comm. v. Washington Metro. Area Transit Comm., 38 F.3d 603, 607 (D.C.
Cir. 1994); Great Lakes Higher Educ. Corp. v. Cavazos, 911 F.2d 10, 16 (7th Cir. 1990);
Educational Assistance Corp. v. Cavazos, 902 F.2d 617, 629, n.20 (8th Cir. 1990); Ohio
Student Loan Comm'n v. Cavazos, 900 F.2d 894,901-902 (6th Cir. 1990); South Carolina State
Educ. Assistance Auth. v. Cavazos, 897 F.2d 1272,1275-76 (4th Cir. 1990).
69. See Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 US. 130 (1982). In the meantime the Court
had made two important decisions regarding property right acquired under government
contracts. In the first, Lynch v. United States, 292 U.S. 571, 577-79 (1934), the Court held that
Congress' repeal of its obligations to pay benefits under a federally operated insurance plan
violated the Fifth Amendment's takings prohibition. In the second, Perry v. United States,
294 U.S. 330, 349-54 (1935), the Court found the government's refusal to pay bondholders
in gold according to the terms of the notes violated the bond holders' contractual rights.
Perry and Lynch are routinely cited for the proposition that the government should be treated
as any other private party in the interpretation of federal contract rights. See, e.g., Winstar,
116 S. Ct. at 2473 (Breyer's concurrence). However, neither of these decisions address the
government's sovereign defenses as embodied by the ummistakability and sovereign acts
doctrines. For a discussion of how Perryand Lynch may be interpreted in the context of the
quasi-regulatory and market participant models of government contracts, see infra notes
355-63 and accompanying discussion.
70. Merrion455 U.S. at 135.
71. Id. at 148.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Atchison Topeka Santa Fe Ry. Co., 470 U.S. 451
(1985).
75. Id. at 465,477.
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the Court rejected the railroads' claims that the statute had conferred vested
contractual rights, holding that:
[A]bsent some clear indication that the legislature intends to
bind itself contractually, the presumption is that 'a law is not
intended to create private contractual or vested rights but
merely declares a policy to be pursued until the Legislature
shall ordain otherwise.'
After examining the statute and finding reservation language similar to the
Sinking-Fund Cases, the Court concluded "[t]his is hardly the
reservation
language ofincontract."'
The Court returned to the unmistakability doctrine in Bowen v.
5 Under section 418 of
PublicAgencies Opposed to Social Security Entrapment.7
the to the Social Security Act of 1935," state agencies could participate in
the social security system pursuant to agreements entered into between the
state and the federal government. Section 418(g) allowed states to withdraw
their employees from coverage upon two years notice. In response to the
threat of increasing withdrawals of state employees throughout the nation,
however, Congress amended section 418(g) in 1983 to eliminate the states'
right of withdrawal. The State of California and several of its agencies
thereupon sued, alleging several claims that were ultimately consolidated
before the Supreme court as an action against the United States for an
unconstitutional taking of property.M The Supreme Court rejected the state's

76. Id. at 465-66 (quoting Dodge v. Bd. of Educ., 302 US. 74, 79 (1937)). The notion that
government contracts contain an implied "presumption" that the government is not waiving
its right to exercise sovereign powers was adopted by Justice Scalia in Winstar. Winstar, 116
S. Ct. at 2477 (Scalia, J., concurring).
77. National R.R., 470 U.S. at 467. In determining whether a statute gives rise to a
contractual obligation, the Court noted, "it is of first importance to examine the language of
the statute." Id. at 466 (citing Dodge v. Board of Education, 302 U.S. at 78; see generally Indiana
ex. rel. Anderson v. Brand, 303 U.S. 95, 104 (1938)). After finding that the statute conferred
no vested contractual rights, the Court examined the individual agreements, which it
characterized as valid contracts between the private railroads and the private railroad
company Amtrak. Applying the less rigorous review standard appropriate to the Fifth
Amendment's due process guarantee, National R.R., 470 U.S. at 472-73 n.25 (citing Pension
Benefit Guar. Corp., 467 U.S. 717,732-733 (1984)), the Court found that the amendments had
not impaired any private contractual rights. National R.R., 470 U.S. at 478.
78. Bowen, 477 U.S. 41.
79. 42 U.S.C §§ 1301-14301.
80. The agencies claimed that their "property rights" had been taken without just
compensation in violation of the Fifth Amendment. In a separate lawsuit, the State sought
to enjoin Congress' amendment which eliminated the withdrawal provisions as well as a
declaration that the amendment was unconstitutional. These lawsuits were consolidated
before the district court, which held that the withdrawal provision created a constitutionally
protected property right whose elimination without just compensation violated the Fifth
Amendment. The district court found that the "only rational compensation" would be
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claim, holding that "contractual arrangements, including those to which a
sovereign itself is party, 'remain subject to subsequent legislation' by the
sovereign."M The Court noted that Congress had reserved the right "to alter,
amend, or repeal any provision" of the Social Security Acte2and that each
state agreement had been executed in accordance with this reservation.'
The Court went on to characterize the termination provision:
The termination clause was not unique to this Agreement; nor
was it a term over which the State had any bargaining power
or for which the State provided independent consideration.
Rather, the provision simply was part of a regulatory
program over which Congress retained authority to amend in
the exercise of its power to provide for the general welfare."
The Court concluded by holding that, since the section 418 agreement had
incorporated the government's power to amend or alter certain provisions
of the agreement, the state had no property right in the repealed withdrawal provision and thus no takings had occurred. 8s
The unmistakability doctrine was again revisited in United States v.
Cherokee Nation of Oklahoma." Cherokee Nation concerned a treaty agreement

reimbursement to the State or public agencies of the amount of money they were paying to
the United States to participate in the Social Security Program. Finding that these "just
compensation" damages would be "clearly contrary to the will of Congress" in attempting
to solve the financial crises of the Social Security System, the district court ruled the
amendment to be unconstitutional. Bowen, 477 U.S. at 51; see also Public Agencies Opposed
to Soc. Sec. Entrapment v. Heckler, 613 F.Supp. 558,575 (E.D. Cal. 1985). In Winstar,Justice
Souter seizes on the district court's reasoning to carve out an exception to the remedy test,
in which the unmistakability doctrine would be applicable to claims for money damages
whenever such claims would be "the equivalent of exemption from the terms of the
subsequent statute," as was the case in Bowen. See Winstar,116 S. Ct. at 2457. This approach
may be critiqued on two grounds. First, the approach was not adopted by the Supreme
Court's own reasoning in Bowen. Second, the approach makes an essentially superficial
distinction in quasi-regulatory takings cases between government regulations that directly
impose costs on a private party (the imposition of a tax or the increase in a royalty rate for
example) versus regulations that reduce the value of the alleged property right by means
other than increased payments to the government. See infra notes 160-68 and accompanying
text.
81. Bowen, 477 U.S. at 52, quoting Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 147
(1982).
82. Bowen, 477 U.S. at 51, n.18; see 42 U.S.C. § 1304 (1994).
83. Bowen, 477 U.S. at 54. The agreement provided that its terms "were in conformity
with § 418." Id.
84. Id. at 55. The Court thus distinguished its decision from Lynch v. United States, 292
U.S. 571 (1934), on the basis that unlike the plaintiffs in Lynch, the state had not paid a
monetary premium for the "right" eliminated by the Congressional statute. Bowen, 477 U.S.
at 55.
85. Id. at 55-56.
86. United States v. Cherokee Nation of Okla., 480 U.S. 700 (1987).
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in which the federal government had conveyed property rights in a
riverbed to an Indian tribe. When the federal government began making
navigational improvements to the river, the tribe sued, claiming just compensation damages for a Fifth Amendment taking of property. 7 The
Supreme Court held that no taking had occurred since the treaty remained
subject to the federal government's navigational easement, a sovereign
power that had not been conveyed by the treaty."
Before turning to an examination of the sovereign acts doctrine, it
is worthwhile to note two important aspects of the Supreme Court's
unnistakability doctrine decisions. First, the Court's decisions borrow
heavily from the contract clause cases in formulating the parameters under
which the federal government may surrender sovereign power, without
ever describing the relationship between federal unmistakability and state
contract clause law. Keeping in mind the settled law that the prohibitions
of the contract clause are not applicable to the federal government,8 ' the
degree to which the unmistakability doctrine adopts the standards and
reasoning underlying the contract clause nevertheless remains uncertain.90
In contrast to the contract clause cases, for example, the unmistakability
decisions make no distinction between reserved (and therefore inalienable)
and non-reserved sovereign powers." As discussed above, the lineage of
the unmistakability doctrine can be traced back to contract clause decisions
involving the permissible waiver of non-reserved powers such as taxing or
spending.' While Sinking Fund Cases, Merrion, National Railroad, and
Cherokee Nation each arguably involve the alleged waiver of such nonreserved powers, the Court does not rely on this fact in applying the unmistakability doctrine. Instead, these decisions describe federal sovereignty
only in general terms, relying on cases involving both reserved and non-re-

87. Cherokee Nation, 480 U.S. at 702.
88. Cherokee Nation, 480 U.S. at 706. Winstar distinguishes Cherokee Nation by finding that
"an order to pay compensation would have placed the Government in the same position as
if the navigational easement had been surrendered altogether. ' Winstar,116 S. Ct. at 2457
n.23. See infra notes 160-68 and accompanying discussion.
89. Pension Guar. Corp. v. R. A. Gray & Co., 467 U.S. 717,733 (1983); Union Pac. R.R.
Co. v. United States, 99 U.S. 700, 719 (1878).
90. Justice Souter notes that the "want of more developed law on limitations
independent of the Contract Clause is in part the result of applying the unmistakability
canon of construction to avoid this doctrinal thicket..." Winstar, 116 S. Ct. at 2455.
91. See infra notes 150-56 and accompanying text.
92. See supra note 63 and accompanying text. See also United States Trust Co. v. New
Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 24 (1977) (state may bind itself in the future exercise of the taxing and
spending powers); Stone v. Mississippi, 101 U.S. 814,820 (1879) (taxation is incidental to the
essential sovereign powers of government).
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served powers." Moreover, in Bowen the Court applied the unmistakability
doctrine to Congress' administration of the social security system, an
authority similar to the traditionally inalienable police power held by the
states." Numerous federal cases have followed Bowen's example and
applied the unmistakability doctrine to the alleged contractual waiver of
various "police-like" sovereign powers.9 Finally, in Winstar, Justice Souter
considers the application of the unmistakability doctrine to FTRREA, despite
his conclusion that the power to regulate thrifts is "within the police

93. In Merrion, for example, the Court cites from state contract clause cases involving
the alleged surrender of the police power (a reserved, inalienable power) Merrion v. Jicarilla
Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130,147-48 (1982) (citing Veix v. Sixth Ward Bldg. & Loan Ass'n, 310
U.S. 32 (1940); Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n. v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934)) and the taxing
power, a non-reserved power that may be surrendered pursuant to express contractual
language. JicarillaApache, 455 U.S. at 148 (citing St. Louis v. United Rys. Co., 210 U.S. 266,

280 (1908)).
94. See, e.g., Stone, 101 U.S. at 818 (inalienable police power extends to all matters
affecting the public health or morals). Blaisdell, 290 US. at 435-36; Veix, 310 US. at 38-39. An
argument can be made that the social security system is more akin to a taxing program than
an exercise of the police power. See, e.g., Heliering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619,645-46 (1936). This
point ignores the fact that the states originally had the option of joining the system (as of this
writing not all states participate) and thus their payments can be better characterized as
voluntary participation in a regulatory program. The argument also ignores the overall
public purpose of the social security system to establish an insurance program for "persons
working in industry and commerce as a long-run safeguard against the occurrence of old-age
dependency.' Bowen v. Public Agencies Opposed to Soc. Sec. Entrapment, 477 U.S. 41, 43
(1986) (citing H.R. Rep. No. 81-1300, at 3 (1949)).
95. See, e.g., Water contract cases: O'Neill v. United States, 50 P.3d 677, 686 (9th Cir.
1995) (unmistakability doctrine applied to modification of water contracts due to passage
of statute intended to restore ecological integrity to the Delta); Peterson v. U.S. Dep't of
Interior, 899 F.2d 799, 812-13 (9th Cir. 1990) (court applies unmistakability doctrine to
amendments to Reclamation Act that limit volume of subsidized water to leased lands in
order to promote family farming in western states). Mineral Leasing Cases: Western FuelsUtah, Inc. v. Lujan, 895 F.2d 780,789 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (court applies unmistakability doctrine
to amendments to Mineral Lands Leasing Act altering terms under which government allows
access to coal reserves on public lands); Western Energy Co. v. Dep't of Interior, 932 F.2d 807
(9th Cir. 1991); Trapper Mining Inc. v. Lujan, 923 F.2d 774 (10th Cir. 1991); Coastal States
Energy Co. v. Hodel, 816 F.2d 502 (10th Cir. 1987); FMC Wyoming Corp. v. Hodel, 816 F.2d
496 (10th Cir. 1987); Student Loan Cases: Association of Accredited Cosmetology v.
Alexander, 979 F.2d 859, 867 (D.C. Cir. 1992); (court applies unmistakability doctrine to
congressional amendments altering terms of the federal student loan program); Rhode Island
Higher Educ. Assistance Auth. v. Secretary, United States Dep't of Educ., 929 F.2d 844, 85051 (1st Cir. 1991); Great Lakes Higher Educ. Corp. v. Cavazos, 911 F.2d 10,16 (7th Cir. 1990);
Educational Assistance Corp. v. Cavazos, 902 F.2d 617, 629, n,20 (8th Cir. 1990); Ohio
Student Loan Comm'n v. Cavazos, 900 F.2d 894,901-902 (6th Cir. 1990); South Carolina State
Educ. Assistance Auth. v. Cavazos, 897 F.2d 1272,1275-76 (4th Cir. 1990).
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power." This article will return to this aspect of unmistakability doctrine
law in the next section. Here it is sufficient to note the tension between the
application of the unmistakability doctrine to the sovereign's continued
exercise of reserved, inalienablepowers and Justice Souter's argument that
the sole purpose of the doctrine is to prevent the implied surrender of such
powers.9
A second important aspect of the unmistakability cases is how they
illustrate the essentially interpretive role of the unmistakability doctrine in
determining the rights and duties of the federal and private parties to quasiregulatory agreements. In each case, a party claimed a "property right,"
arising under the agreement, which was allegedly harmed by an act of the
sovereign's authority. In each case, the Court found that, given the absence
of unmistakable language to the contrary, the contractual right was subject
to the continuing exercise of sovereign authority and thus the government
owed no duty of compensation for the impairment of the alleged property
right. This article will discuss this aspect of the unmistakability doctrine (as
an interpretive tool to determine property rights under quasi-regulatory
agreements) in more detail in later sections."

96. Winstar, 116 S. Ct. at 2462, n.34 (citing Veix, 310 U.S. at 38). In fact, Winstar,Bowen
and the many cases cited supra, note 94, illustrate the difficulty in distinguishing between
reserved and non-reserved powers at the federal level where taxing, spending and general
regulatory powers are often intricately intertwined.
97. See infra, notes 150-56 and accompanying text. In other words, the application of the
unmistakability doctrine (which allows for the surrender of sovereign power pursuant to
express language) to inalienable, reserved powers only makes sense if the doctrine is
interpreted to limit the government's implied assumption of contractual liability for the
exercise of such powers. The tension described above assumes, of course, that certain federal
sovereign powers akin to the police power are reserved and therefore inalienable. Clearly
one can make the common sense argument that the principle underlying the reserved
powers doctrine, -that essential sovereign powers must always be retained to allow the
functioning of government-applies with even greater force to the important regulatory
responsibilities of the federal government. While no court has directly addressed this issue,
see Toscano, supranote 9, at 460, several have cited Bowen for the authority that the federal
police power may be contracted away under the unmistakability doctrine. See, e.g., Far West
Fed. Bank v. Director, Office of Thrift Supervision, 738 F. Supp. 1564, 1570 (D. Or. 1990),
rev'd, 951 F.2d 1093 (9th Cir. 1991) (federal government can waive its police power in a
contract if it does so dearly and unmistakably); Century Federal Say. Bank v. United States,
745 F. Supp. 1363,1369 (N.D. I1. 1990) (federal government may waive its police power in
some circumstances). For an interpretation of the unmistakability doctrine which preserves
the federal reserved power, see infra, notes 149-54 and accompanying text. In response to the
government's arguments that the reserved powers doctrine should apply equally to federal
government contracts, Justice Souter notes simply, "[tihis may be so but is also beside the
point....' Winstar, 116 S. Ct. at 2461.
98. See infra notes 143-44 and 245-47 and accompanying text.
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b. Sovereign Acts Doctrine
The sovereign acts doctrine was first enunciated by the claims court
in Deming v. United States." In Deming, the government had entered into a
fixed-price contract to supply rations to the Marine Corps. Before the
contract was performed, Congress passed the Legal Tender Act, which
significantly raised the cost of the rations to be furnished. 1° The claims
court rejected the plaintiff's claim that the government had breached the
contract by imposing new terms based on the following reasoning:
[The fallacy of the plaintiff's claim is] that it supposes general
enactments of Congress are to be construed as evasions of
[the plaintiff's] particular contract. This is a grave error. A
contract between the government and a private party cannot
be specially affected by the enactment of a general law ....
[T]he government entering into a contract, stands not in the
attitude of the government exercising its sovereign power of
providing laws for the welfare of the State. The United States
as a contractor are not responsible for the United States as a
lawgiver. Were this action brought against a private citizen.
.. it could not possibly be sustained. In this court the United
States can be held to no greater liability than other contractors
in other courts. 1°1
Almost immediately following Deming, the claims court applied the
sovereign acts doctrine in Jones v. United States."°2 In Jones, civil engineers
incurred additional expenses in performing government survey contracts
due to the government's withdrawal of military protection in Indian
territory during the 1850s. As in Deming, the court rejected the plaintiffs'
breach of contract claims by holding that the United States could not be
held liable in its contractual capacity for its actions taken as a sovereign.1 3
Such actions, noted the court, "so long as they be public and general, cannot
be deemed to specially alter, modify, obstruct or violate the particular
contracts into which [the government] enters with private persons. " "
The sovereign acts doctrine was adopted by the Supreme Court in
Horowitz v. United States.Ys In Horowitz the government had entered into a
supply contract with Horowitz for the purchase of silk. Due to a subsequent
embargo placed upon silk shipments by the Railroad Administration, the

99.

Deming v. United States, 1 Ct. Cl. 190 (1865).

100. Id.
101. Id. at 191 (emphasis in original).
102. Jones v. United States, 1 Ct. Cl. 383 (1865).
103. Id. at 384.
104. Id. See also Wilson v. United States, 11 Ct. Cl. 513, 521 (1875).
105. Horowitz v. United States, 267 U.S. 458,461 (1925).
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government was unable to perform timely delivery of the silk. As a result
of falling silk prices, the delay caused damages to Horowitz , who
thereupon sued the government for breach of contract.1" The Supreme
Court agreed that the government had failed to perform its contractual
obligation but held that the government's breach was excused by the
embargo, which the Court characterized as a "public and general" act
enacted by the government in its sovereign capacity.1 7
The key to understanding the sovereign acts doctrine lies in its
essential purpose, to treat the government as any other private party in
determining liability for unexpected sovereign acts that hinder or block
contractual performance. A basic principle of contract law is that a
contracting party will be held responsible for damages caused by its own
actions. Thus, the sovereign acts doctrine asks whether the government
action impeding performance can be fairly attributed to the government in
its role as contractor.1a In Winstar, Justice Souter found that government
actions, even though general in nature and enacted in a sovereign capacity,
will be attributable to the government as contractor whenever such actions
have "the substantial effect of releasing the Government from its contractual
obligations .... "0 If the sovereign act is not attributable to the government
as contractor, the government must still show that it would not be liable
under "ordinary principles of contract law."110 In Winstar, the government
raised the sovereign acts doctrine as an excuse for its failure to perform on
its promise to provide favorable regulatory treatment. Thus, the
government was required to meet the common law standards of
commercial impossibility,"' which include a finding that the sovereign act

106. Id. at 460.
107. Id. at 461. The Court relied specifically on Deming and Jones to reach its holding.
Deming v. United States, 1 Ct. Cl. 190 (1865); Jones, 1 Cl. Ct. 383.
108. See Richard E.Speidel, Implied Duties of Cooperationand the Defense of Sovereign Acts
in Government Contracts, 51 GEO. L.J. 516 (963). Professor Speidel notes, "[t]he apparent
result of this doctrine of 'dual capacity' is that the United States as a contractor has an
implied duty of cooperation, but the United States as a 'sovereign' does not." Id. at 518.
109. Wnstar,116 S.Ct. at 2467. This holding of Winstar, which narrows the "public and
general act" standard of Horowitz, will be discussed infra, notes 339-50.

110. Id. at 2465.
111. Winstar, 116 S. Ct. at 2469. In this instance, the sovereign acts doctrine allows the
government the same right as any other private party to have its contractual nonperformance excused through commercial impossibility due to some act of the federal

government. Note that the Winstar scenario, in which the government must successfully
meet the impossibility standards, arises only in situations where the sovereign action has
prevented the government from performing on a contractual promise. Sovereign acts may
also hinder the performance of private parties as well. See e.g., Tony Downs Foods Co. v.
United States, 530 F.2d 367, 372 (Cl. Ct. 1976) (poultry supplier to Department of Agriculture
forced to incur losses as a result of government's termination of the national price freeze for
certain products); Deming, I Cf. Ct. at 190 (government food supplier forced to incur
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was an event contrary to the basic assumptions on which the parties
contractually agreed and that the language or circumstances surrounding
the agreement do not indicate otherwise." 2
c. Sovereign Defenses and Models of Government Contractual
Agreements
A review of the above-cited cases reveals that prior to their
convergence in Winstar, the unmistakability and sovereign acts doctrines
had never been addressed by the Supreme Court in the same case. This
doctrinal separation is attributable only in part to the different historical
lineages, as described above, of the two doctrines. Upon closer examination
one sees that 1) the doctrines have been applied to two contrasting models
of government contractual agreements; and 2) the Court's reasoning in
applying the two doctrines to their respective contractual models has been
fundamentally different.
The contractual model in which the Court has considered the
unmistakability doctrine might best be described as "quasi-regulatory."
Under this model, the government offers private parties the chance to enter
into contractual arrangements as part of a greater regulatory program,
while still retaining (either expressly or by implication) the authority to
amend such arrangements in the exercise of its power to provide for the
general welfare." 3 Such contractual arrangements may range from supplying water to arid areas in the west,"4 permitting access to resources on
federal property,"' insuring state student loan programs,"6 or establishing

additional expenses as a result of Congressional passage of Legal Tender Act); Jones, 1 C.
Ct. at 384 (civil engineers required to incur additional expenses as a result of government
withdrawal of military support to protect surveying crews).
112. Winstar,116 S. Ct. at 2469-72. These requirements were adopted from the language
of the RFsrATEmENT (SEcOND) oF CoNTRACTS § 261 (1981), stated supra note 39.
113. Bowen, 477 U.S. at 55. While some decisions have characterized quasi-regulatory
agreements as non-contractual in nature, see infra note 202, this article will treat such
agreements as contracts, which confer valuable, though qualified, rights on private parties.
114. See O'Neill v. United States, 50 F.3d 677,686 (9th Cir. 1995); Madera Irrig. Dist. v.
Hancock, 985 F.2d 1397,1404,1406-07 (9th Cir. 1993); Peterson v. U.S. Dep't of Interior, 899
F.2d 799,811-12 (9th Cir. 1990).
115. See Western Fuels-Utah, Inc. v. Lujan, 895 F.2d 780, 789 (D.C. Cir. 1990); see also
Western Energy Co. v. Dep't of Interior, 932 F.2d 807 (9th Cir. 1991); Trapper Mining Inc. v.
Lujan, 923 F.2d 774 (10th Cir. 1991); Coastal States Energy Co. v. Hodel, 816 F.2d 502 (10th
Cir. 1987); FMC Wyoming Corp. v. Hodel, 816 F.2d 4% (10th Cir. 1987).
116. See Association of Accredited Cosmetology v. Alexander, 979 F.2d 859,867 (D.C. Cir.
1992); Rhode Island Higher Educ. Assistance Auth. v. Secretary United States Dep't of Educ.,
929 F.2d 844,850-51 (1st Cir. 1991); Great Lakes Higher Educ. Corp. v. Cavazos, 911 F.2d 10,
16 (7th Cir. 1990); Educational Assistance Corp. v. Cavazos, 902 F.2d 617,629, n.20 (8th Cir.
1990); Ohio Student Loan Comm'n v. Cavazos, 900 F.2d 894,901-902 (6th Cir. 1990); South
Carolina State Educ. Assistance Auth. v. Cavazos, 897 F.2d 1272,1275-76 (4th Cir. 1990).
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a framework in which private parties may profitably satisfy the nation's
needs for low income housing.117 Quasi-regulatory agreements do not
generally involve the arms-length bargaining and negotiation typical of
more standard contractual arrangements. Instead, the government usually
offers an option for private parties to participate in the government's
program according to statutes and regulations with pre-established
guidelines for exchanges of consideration and terms of dealing.'18 Despite
the lack of bargained-for consideration, agreements entered into under the
quasi-regulatory model generally confer valid rights, which may be
however, by the government's exercise of sovereign regulatory
qualified, 119
authority.
In contrast, cases in which the sovereign acts doctrine has
historically been raised involve contractual agreements in which the
government acts in the role of market participant."' Typical agreements
under this model involve routine supply or service contracts, which the
government enters into in order to keep its own operations running
smoothly."2 The sovereign acts doctrine fits well with the market
participant model by treating the government as a private party, with the

117. Cisneros v. Alpine Ridge Group, 508 U.S. 10 (1993); F.H.A. v. Darlington, Inc., 358
U.S. 84 (1958); Parkridge Investors Ltd. Partnership v. Farmers Home Admin., 13 F.3d 1192
(8th Cir. 1994); Housing Auth. of Fort Collins v. United States, 980 F.2d 624 (10th Cir. 1992);
Lifgren v. Yeuter, 767 F. Supp. 1473 (D. Minn. 1991).
118. The exchange of consideration may thus distinguish quasi-regulatory agreements
from programs in which the recipients provide no consideration for receiving government
benefits. See, e.g., Bowen v. Gilliard, 483 U.S. 586, 604-05 (1987) (families receiving AFDC
payments have no protected property rights to continued benefits at same level).
119. As discussed infra, courts generally tharacterize such qualified contractual rights
as something less than 'property" as defined by the contours of the Fifth Amendment. See,
e.g., Bowen, 477 U.S. at 51-52 (contractual right at issue bears little resemblance to rights held
to constitute property within meaning of Fifth Amendment); Darlington,Inc., 358 U.S. at 90
(rights are ones that lie in the periphery where vested rights do not attach); Mitchell Arms,
Inc. v. United States, 7 F.,3d 212, 217 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (enforceable rights sufficient to support
a takings claim cannot arise in an area voluntarily entered into and one which is subject to
pervasive government control). See infra notes 203-30 -and accompanying discussion
regarding nature of property rights conferred by agreements falling within the quasiregulatory model.
120. For a more detailed description of the government's role as market participant see
Joseph Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74 YALE L.J. 36, 62-63 (1964). See also Joshua
Schwartz, Liabilityfor Sovereign Acts: Congruence and Exceptionalismin Government Contracts
Law, 64 GBO. WASH. L REV. 633 (1996); Janice C. Griffith, Local Government Contracts:Escaping
from the GovernmentalVProprietaryMaze, 75 IOWAL. REV. 277 (1990).
121. These are the contracts described by Justice Souter in Winstaras "humdrum supply
contracts," which "no one would seriously contend" might be subject to the unmistakability
doctrine. 116 S. Ct. at 2457.
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same liabilities and contractual rights that a private party would have in the
face of sovereign acts which hinder or bar contractual performance.12
Clearly not all government contracts fall readily into either the
"quasi-regulatory" or "market participant" model. This article will return
to the sometimes difficult question of how a court might differentiate
between the two models of government contracts in the last section. The
next part of this section will illustrate how these different contractual
models have influenced the courts' treatment of the unmistakability and
sovereign acts doctrines in interpreting government contract disputes.
d. Relationship Between the Unmistakabilityand Sovereign Acts
Doctrinesas Applied to Government ContractualAgreements
The unmistakability and sovereign acts doctrines both act to
minimize the constraints on the government's freedom to legislate that may
arise as a result of the government's contractual commitments. Beyond this
shared purpose, however, judicial precedent offers little guidance in
delineating the interaction between the two doctrines. The last section of
this article will propose a general comprehensive framework under which
one may apply the doctrines to federal contract dispute resolution.' The
purpose of this subsection is simply to present some basic points regarding
the relationship between the doctrines, including their respective roles in
interpreting rights under the two government contractual models described
above.
The most fundamental distinction between the unmistakability and
sovereign acts doctrines lies in their contrasting roles in resolving
governmental contract disputes. The unmistakability doctrine is used by a
court to determine the nature of the contractual obligation that has been
created and to establish the respective rights of the parties to the underlying
contract.12 In making this determination, the unmistakability doctrine
directs a court, absent unmistakable language to the contrary, to find for the
continued retention of sovereign authority." s In contrast to the

122. See supranotes 99-112 and accompanying text.
123. See infra notes 287-371 and accompanying text.
124. See, e.g., Statesman Say. Holding Corp. v. U.S., 26 Cl. Ct. 904, 920 (1992) (purpose
animating the unmistakability doctrine makes it clear that the doctrine controls how
contractual rights with the government are created). This determination may require an
analysis of whether the contract terms surrender certain specific powers (such as the power
of taxation or the navigational easement as was analyzed in Merrion v. JicarilaApache Tribe,
455 U.S. 130 (1982) or United States v. Cherokee Nation, 480 U.S. 700 (1997)), or instead,
whether the contract terms surrender the more general power to change the regulatory
structure in the future (as was analyzed in Bowen v. Public Agencies Opposed to Soc. Sec.
Entrapment,477 U.S. 41,43 (1986)).
125. See supra note 27.
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unmistakability doctrine, the sovereign acts doctrine is not an interpretive
tool, but instead a mechanism whereby the government may avoid liability
in its contractual capacity for its actions taken as a sovereign. In evaluating
the sovereign acts defense, a court will ask not whether the government has
retained its sovereign powers (this is assumed), but instead whether the
government, as market participant, should be held responsible under the
terms of the contract for the exercise of such powers.
This essential difference comes more clearly into focus upon
reviewing the cases interpreting the two doctrines. As stated in Jones, the
sovereign acts doctrine stands for the proposition that public and general
acts do not specifically alter, modify, obstruct, or violate the particular
contracts entered into between the government and a private party.' 26
Instead, the sovereign act is considered to be an event essentially beyond
the control of the contracting parties. Under this framework, the
government is treated as a private party, for whom liability will accrue
according to how the contract (and contract law) allocates such unavoidable
risks. If the government claims impossibility as a result of the sovereign act,
the successful assertion of the defense will normally result in the discharge
of each party's respective obligations to perform on the contract. 12
Consider the difference between this scenario and the application
of the unmistakability doctrine to the quasi-regulatory contracts as
described above. Under the quasi-regulatory model, subsequent sovereign
acts often modify the contractual agreements at issue, which are not
discharged but instead remain in force, albeit with potentially amended
terms.'s The best example of this is Bowen, in which the Court upheld the
Department of Health and Human Services' rejection of California's
termination request based on the legislative modification which had altered
the terms of the social security agreement by eliminating the statutory

126. Jones v. United States, 1 C1. Ct. 383,384 (1865). As discussed above, such contracts
would typically fall under the market participant model, in which the government enters
into the contract as a market participant rather than as a quasi-regulator.
127. REsrATEmE4T(SECOND)OFCONTRACS DISCHARGEBYSUPFRVENINGIMPRACT1CABILrrY
§ 261 (1981). Where one party has already rendered partial performance, that party is
entitled to recover restitution in a court of equity. RESTATE ENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACrs:
RELIEF INCLUDING RETTUTION § 272 (1981).
128. See, e.g., Bowen v. PublicAgencies, 477 U.S. at 54-56; National R.R. Passenger Corp.
v. Atchison Topeka Santa Fe Ry. Co., 470 U.S. 451,467 (1985); Union Pac. R.R. Co. v. United
States, 99 U.S. 700, 718 (1878); see also Western Fuels-Utah, Inc. v. Lujan, 895 F.2d 780, 789
(D.C. Cir. 1990) and other Mineral Lands Leasing Act cases cited supra note 95; O'Neill v.
United States, 50 F.3d 677, 686 (9th Cir. 1995); other water contract cases cited at note 95;
Association of Accredited Cosmetology v. Alexander, 979 F.2d 859, 867 (D.C. Cir. 1992);
other student loan cases cited supranote 95; Housing Auth. of Fort Collins v. United States,
980 F.2d 624, 630,631 (10th Cir. 1992).
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withdrawal option!' In Bowen, the Court used the unmistakability doctrine
to establish the terms of an agreement, on which California was still
obligated to perform by means of continued social security payments."'
In the quasi-regulatory model, the government is, quite
appropriately, not treated as a private party, but instead as a sovereign
authority, which has entered into a contractual arrangement in order to
accomplish a regulatory purpose. There is no issue of whether the sovereign
act is attributable to the government in its contracting capacity; clearly it
is.m In contrast to the analysis under the sovereign acts doctrine, however,
this convergence of governmental roles does not necessarily render the
government liable for damages to the private party. 132 Instead, a court will
examine the relationship between the contract in question and the statutory
authority for the contract's creation in order to determine whether the terms
of a subsequent sovereign act should be incorporated into the contractual
agreement." If the court finds a sufficient relationship between the organic
statute and the sovereign act, the newly enacted terms may become part of
the underlying contract, altering if necessary the contractual rights of the
private party.""
Under the sovereign acts doctrine, a court's analysis will differ
significantly. If the government's assertion of the doctrine is based on an
impossibility defense,"3 a court will inquire into whether the sovereign
"act" was an unforeseeable event from the viewpoint of the contracting
parties." In Horowitz, for example, the sovereign act found to excuse the
government's obligation for timely shipment was an embargo by the
Railroad Administration, a federal agency not involved in the shipment
contract, acting pursuant to a statute that presumably had no relation to the
statutory authority used by the government to enter into salvage contracts
for silk. 37 The analysis required to raise the sovereign acts doctrine as a

129. Bowen v. PublicAgencies, 477 U.S. at 54-56.
130. Id. at 53-55. See supranotes 78-85 and accompanying text.
131. In other words, both the execution of the quasi-regulatory agreement and the
subsequent legislative enactment are acts attributable to the government acting in a
sovereign capacity.
132. For a different view see infra note 344 and accompanying text.
133. See, e.g., Bowen, 477 U.S. at 54-56. See also National Railroad, 470 U.S. at 467; cases
cited supra note 94.
134. Id.See infra notes 307-12 and accompanying discussion regarding what constitutes
a relationship between the underlying statute and the sovereign act that is sufficient to
justify the incorporation of new contractual terms.
135. See supra notes 39,111 and accompanying text.
136. Winstar, 116 S. Ct. at 2469, citing RIsrATEMBNT (SEcoND) OF CoNTRACrS § 261 (1981)
(was the sovereign act an event contrary to the assumptions of the parties at the time the
contract was entered into?).
137. Horowitz v. United States, 267 U.S. 458,459-60 (1925).
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defense makes its successful assertion unlikely in a highly regulated field
where the "sovereign act" alleged to excuse performance is a natural (and
thus arguably foreseeable) consequence of the regulatory environment."
In contrast, when courts apply the unmistakability doctrine to interpret
quasi-regulatory agreements, the likelihood of a future exercise of sovereign
power typically strengthens the presumption that the government has
reserved its authority to amend the terms of the contract.1 39 As a result,
quasi-regulatory agreements are even more likely to be subject to
subsequent sovereign acts where the exercise of sovereign power is

138. This fact was not lost on Justice Souter who nevertheless cautioned that "we do not
say that [the conditions to satisfy the sovereign acts defense] can never be satisfied when the
Government contracts with participants in a highly regulated industry for particular
regulatory treatment." Winstar,116 S. Ct. at 2469.
139. This result is supported, in part, by the role the unmistakability doctrine plays in
determining property rights under quasi-regulatory agreements. In conducting such an
analysis, courts will borrow from regulatory takings law, asking whether the government's
amendment of the contractual terms has upset the "reasonable expectations" of the private
contracting party. See, e.g., Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104,
123-24 (1978). Predictably, the "foreseeability" of future sovereign actions, makes it all the
more likely under a reasonable expectation analysis that the private party does not possess
vested property rights vis-a-vis the government's exercise of sovereign power. See, e.g.,
Connolly v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 475 U.S. 211,227 (1986) ("Those who do business
in the regulated field cannot object if the legislative scheme is buttressed by subsequent
amendments to achieve the legislative end.") (citing Federal Housing Admin. v. Darlington,
Inc., 358 U.S. 84,146 (1958)); Parkridge Investors Ltd. Partnership v. Farmers Home Admin.,
13 F.3d 1192,1199 (8th Cir. 1994) (it was foreseeable that the government might impair the
partnership's contractual options in order to prevent the program's purposes from being
foiled); Mitchell Arms, Inc. v. United States, 7 F. 3d 212, 217 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (expectation of
selling assault rifles was not a protected property right because it was subject to
governmental regulation of firearms importation under the Gun Control Act); Charter Fed.
Say. Bank v. Office of Thrift Supervision, 976 F.2d 203, 212 (4th Cir. 1992) (intent of Bank
Board in granting favorable regulatory treatment must be interpreted in light of foreseeably
changing regulatory environment), compare with Allied-Gen. Nuclear Services v. United
States, 839 F.2d 1572, 1577 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (important public safety issues surrounding
nuclear proliferation prevents court from supposing that the government was precluded
from addressing issue through its licensing power merely because the issue was not

originally foreseen). See also Jill E. Fisch, Retroactivity and Legal Change: An Equilibrium
Approach, 110 HARv. L. REv. 1055, 1114 (1997) (change in legal regime should not apply
retroactively to contracts previously executed in a climate of regulatory equilibrium).
The question of whether reasonable expectation analysis is appropriate in
determining the existence of an underlying property interest, as compared to the use
restrictions government may impose upon a property owner is beyond the scope of this
article. Compare Peterson v. U.S. Dep't of Interior, 899 F.2d 799,813 (reasonable expectation
analysis is an inappropriate factor in establishing the existence of an underlying property
right upon which a takings claim may be based) with Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal
Council, 505 U.S. 1003,1026 (1992) (search for inherent restrictions on property owner's title
must be guided by traditional understandings of citizens regarding the content of the bundle
of rights that they acquire when they obtain title to property).

Spring 1998]

PROPERTY RIGHTS IN PUBLIC CONTRACTS

foreseeable to the parties as an action taken in furtherance of an overall
regulatory scheme."
The preceding general analysis would not be complete without
addressing two additional points regarding the unmistakability doctrine.
First, it should be apparent that the application of the unmistakability
doctrine is not inherently limited to the quasi-regulatory model of
government contracts. While courts, following the model of Bowen, have
readily adopted the doctrine to interpret quasi-regulatory agreements, the
rule that the government will be presumed to have retained its sovereign
authority in contractual dealings is equally applicable to government
contracts falling within the market participant model. In these types of
routine contracts, the unmistakability doctrine essentially informs the court
whether the government has waived its right to assert the sovereign acts
doctrine as a defense to an alleged contractual breach."4 42This article will
discuss this interaction in more detail in the last section.1
Another important aspect of the unnistakability doctrine is the
central role it plays in interpreting property rights under quasi-regulatory

140. One reason for this relationship is that comprehensive regulatory statutes often
reserve the power to amend or modify their terms. Courts will generally find such
reservations sufficient to incorporate the terms of subsequently enacted legislation into the
underlying government contract. See, e.g., Bowen v. Public Agencies Opposed to Soc. Sec.
Entrapment, 477 U.S. 41, 53 (1986); National R.R. Passeng. Corp. v. Atchison Topeka Santa
Fe Ry. Co., 470 U.S. 451,467-68, n.22 (1985); Union Pac. R.R. Co. v. United States, 99 U.S. 700,
720 (1878); O'Neill v. United States, 50 F.3d 677, 686 (9th Cir. 1995). But see Lynch v. United
States, 292 U.S. 571, 577 (1934) (contract provision subjecting insurance policy to all
amendments to the original act not sufficient to allow the government to repeal
constitutionally its statutory obligation through amendment). Where no statutory
reservation exists, courts may still find government contracts subject to the reasonable
exercise of sovereign authority. See, e.g., Peterson v. U.S. Dep't of Interior, 899 F.2d 799, 808
(9th Cir. 1990), and cases cited supranote 68.
The stark difference between the two sovereign defenses raises a challenge for
government contract practitioners as to how best to plead the government's case in a given
litigation. For example, arguments made to show that the contract was intended to
incorporate later regulatory changes may backfire when new arguments are made as part
of the sovereign acts defense regarding the unforeseeability of the subsequent regulatory
change. The government lawyers in Winstar experienced this dilemma when Justice Souter
cited their assertions- that FIRREA's regulatory amendments were anticipatedby the parties
to the contract-in denying the government's sovereign acts defense. Winstar,116 S. Ct. at
2470, n.54; FIRREA, Pub. L. No. 101-73, 103 Stat. 183 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of U.S.C.).
141. See Hills Materials Co. v. Rice, 982 F.2d 514,516, n.2 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (Sovereign Acts
Doctrine does not prevent the government from affirmatively assuming responsibility for
specific sovereign acts). See also Winstar,116 S. Ct. at 2477 (Scalia, J.concurring) (government
does not implicitly promise that none of its multifarious sovereign acts will incidentally
disable it or the other party from performing one of the promised acts).
142. See infra notes 335-38 and accompanying text.
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contracts. As discussed above, these contracts typically grant private parties
limited property rights, which may be modified by the government
according to the authorized exercise of sovereign authority. In the quasiregulatory model, courts employ the unmistakability doctrine to scrutinize
claims that the government contract has conferred a constitutionally
protected property right that is immune from subsequent exercises of the
sovereign power.W In these cases, a Fifth Amendment takings claim is
appropriate since the government's sovereign, regulatory act directly effects
the rights of the private party to the modified regulatory contract.
Conversely, Fifth Amendment claims typically do not arise under market
participant contracts involving the government's assertion of the sovereign
acts doctrine as an excuse for breach. In these cases, the government's
liability will normally be due to a court's finding that the alleged
"sovereign" act is actually attributable to the government in its
"contractual" capacity. Because the government may not "take" property
in its role as a pseudo-private contractor, no takings claim arises. Instead,
damages are awarded according to common law breach of contract
standards. This article will discuss the important potential impacts of
Winstar on Fifth Amendment takings claims arising under federal contracts
in the last section.'"
2. Critiqueof the Supreme Court's Decision in Winstar v. United States
The Supreme Court's decision in Winstar is in some respects
probably best understood in the context of the rule that bad law tends to
follow from a bad set of facts. Indeed, it is easy to understand the Winstar
decision on the merits.14s Government agencies, seeing the coming collapse
of the thrift industry and the nearing bankruptcy of the FSLIC, tried to avert
a major regulatory overall of the savings and loan industry - as well as the
incursion of significant losses to the federal treasury - by inducing solvent
banking institutions to merge with bankrupt thrifts in exchange for the
promise of favorable regulatory treatment. When that solution produced
less than satisfactory results, the government turned an about face,
unilaterally withdrew the promised treatment and began foreclosing on
their now insolvent contractual partners.

143. See cases cited supra note 94.
144. See infra, notes 246-84 and accompanying text.
145. Justice Souter's opinion, for example, concludes:
It would, indeed, have been madness for respondents to have engaged in
these transactions with no more protection than the Government's reading
would have given them, for the very existence of their institutions would
then have been in jeopardy from the moment their agreements were signed.
Winstar, 116 S. Ct. at 2472.
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While the Court's decision in favor of the thrifts against the
government may be thus applauded, the path it chooses to arrive at its
ruling is less commendable. Winstar'sproblems arise with the Court's initial
observation that the "the anterior question of whether there were contracts
at all [between the parties] dealing with regulatory treatment of supervisory
goodwill and capital credits...is not strictly before us."" Beginning from
this procedural posture, the Court considers the applicability of the unmistakability doctrine not in terms of contract formation and interpretation but
instead as a defense to the thrifts' claims for breach of contract. 147 A second
problem for the Court is its failure to make a formal distinction between
regulatory agreements and routine market-type contracts. Instead, the
Justices take on the arguably impossible task of crafting a set of rules for the
government's sovereign defenses that can be applied uniformly to the entire
spectrum of government contractual arrangements.
The Court attempts to escape from this procedural box by creating
an essentially artificial distinction between claims which attempt to limit
sovereign authority and claims for purely monetary damages, leading to the
curious - and legally insupportable - result that contractual rights are
determined, in part, by the remedy sought by the complaining party (the
"remedy test")." Applying the remedy test, Justice Souter finds the
unmistakability doctrine to be inapplicable to the thrifts' contract claims,
which the opinion characterizes as suits for monetary relief rather than
attempts to block the sovereign authority of Congress. 49 As a result, the
Court's main opinion does not discuss how the unmistakability doctrine
should be applied in resolving government contract disputes. The resulting
analytical vacuum creates confusion regarding the proper role of the
doctrine (including its relationship to the sovereign acts doctrine) and the
appropriate "unmistakability" standard. The following sub-sections will
discuss each of these problems separately.
a. Problems with the Remedy Test
There are several problems with the remedy test used by Justice
Souter to determine whether the unmistakabiity doctrine should apply to

146. Winstar, 116 S. Ct. at 2448. Justice Souter's opinion implies that this issue was not
raised in the "questions presented" in the petition for certiorari. Id.
147. Winstar, 116 S. Ct. at 2448.
148. 116 S. Ct. at 2457-61. In considering whether the unmistakability doctrine should
be available as a defense, the Court logically focuses on the policy behind the doctrine,
which is to minimize the impact of the government's contractual obligations on the free
exercise of its sovereign powers. This emphasis, while understandable, deflects attention
from the doctrine's practical function, to establish the parameters for interpretation of what
rights and duties arise out of a government contract.
149. 116 S. Ct. at 2458.
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interpret government contracts. As an initial matter, it is clear that the test
is not well supported by the contract clause precedent from which the
unmistakability doctrine is derived. As discussed above, in adopting the
unmistakability doctrine from earlier contract clause cases the Supreme
Court (and the appellate courts) have ignored the distinction between
"reserved" and "non-reserved" powers 1 and instead applied the doctrine
equally to all exercises of federal sovereignty.' s' A strong argument can be
made, nevertheless, that the reserved powers doctrine applies to the federal
government.5 2 The assumption that the federal government possesses "nonsurrenderable" powers poses a problem, however, for Justice Souter's
remedy test, which states that the unmistakability doctrine only applies to
determine the conditions under which sovereign power may be
surrendered. This reasoning conflicts with the established law of reserved
powers, which states that certain essential powers may never be
surrendered, either expressly or by implication. In the event of such a
conflict, one could always respond that the principles of the reserved
powers doctrine take precedence. But this approach renders the
unmistakability doctrine meaningless as to such reserved powers, a result
out of step with the numerous court decisions that have applied the
doctrine without making any distinction between "essential" and "nonessential" aspects of federal sovereignty.'s'
The contrary but more logical approach would assume that the
unmistakability doctrine applies to limit government assumptions of
contractual liability resulting from the exercise of its reserved (as well as its
non-reserved) powers. Under this formulation, the reserved powers and
unmistakability doctrines complement one another; the first prohibits the
actual surrender of the government's reserved power, while the second
limits the allocation of liability for the exercise of such power to express
contractual language.'s 4

150. See supranotes 57-64.
151. See supranotes 88-96.
152. As far as this Article is aware, no case has directly addressed this issue. (But see cases
cited supra note 96). It seems apparent, however, that the principles supporting the
application of the reserved powers doctrine to the retention of state sovereignty apply with
even greater force to the more far reaching sovereign responsibilities entrusted to the federal
government.
153. See cases cited supra note 94.
154. This delineation helps to explain the seeming inconsistency, noted by Justice Souter,
see Winstar, 116 S. Ct. at 2462, n.34, between Justice Scalia's adoption of the remedy test in
regards to the reserved powers doctrine, see id. at 2462, and his rejection of the same test in
regards to the unmistakability doctrine, see id. at 2476. In contrast to its application to the
unmistakability doctrine, the remedy test makes sense (at least theoretically) when applied
to the reserved powers doctrine, whose sole purpose is to prevent the surrender of the
essential sovereign power.
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A second problem, described above, is that the remedy test allows
parties' rights and duties under a government contract to be determined by
the remedy sought by the complaining party. In Bowen, for example, the
Court applied the unmistakability doctrine to find that the state did not
have a compensable property right in the statutory right of withdrawal.'5s
Under an interpretive approach less protective of retained sovereign power,
however, it is conceivable that the Court could have found the state to have
a protected property right in withdrawal from the system, compensable
under the Fifth Amendment takings clause.1 6
In this scenario, the existence of a "property right" ultimately
depends on the form of remedy sought by the state against the federal
government. Such a relationship is, however, legally insupportable. In a
contract dispute, the determination of the parties' contractual rights always
precedes the remedy analysis, which does not come into play until one
party's breach and consequential liability have been established.' 7 Justice
Souter tries to avoid this problem by stating that the application of the
unmistakability doctrine will depend not upon the remedy requested, but
rather on a court's interpretation of the terms of the underlying contract.
Under the Court's own precedent, however, such contract interpretation
requires the application of the unmistakability doctrine in order to establish
whether the government waived its right to exercise its sovereign powers

155. Bowen v. Public Agencies Opposed to Soc. Sec. Entrapment, 477 U.S. 41, 55 (1986).
The Court came to this conclusion by interpreting general provisions of the Social Security
Act and the underlying 418 agreement to find that the government had not unmistakably
waived its right to modify the terms of the state-federal social security contract. Id. at 52-56.
156. Under normal rules of contract interpretation, for example, it is possible to imagine
the Court characterizing the somewhat general language of the Social Security Act and the
§ 418 agreement to be mere boilerplate, reserving no effective rights of modification to the
government. This is especially true given the common law principle that ambiguous or
vague contracts will generally be construed against the party who drafted the contractual
provisions. See, e.g., Hills Materials Co. v. Rice, 982 F.2d 514, 516-17 (1992); Fort Vancouver
Plywood Co. v. United States, 860 F.2d 409,414 (Fed. Cir. 1988). See infra notes 254-72 and
accompanying discussion.
157. See 5 ARTHuR L. CORBIN, CORBIN oN CONTRACTS § 993 (1964), This point was made
by the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals in its first Winstardecision, Winstar Corp. v. United
States, 994 F.2d 797, 812 (Fed. Cir. 1993), but was ignored by the court's subsequent reversal,
64 F.3d 1531,1548 (Fed. Cir. 1993), and by the Supreme Court in Mnstar,116 S. Ct. 2432. The
unmistakability doctrine's role in determining the terms of the underlying contract and
whether there has been a breach also distinguishes Justice Souter's remedy test from
contracts which assign specific remedies to certain rights that exist in the contract. Such
remedy-restricted rights - a party is limited to monetary damages for example - still give rise
to a breach of contract, irrespective of whether the relief sought against the breaching party
is permitted under the contract.
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in the future regarding the subject matter of the contract. 158 By ignoring the
role played by the unmistakability doctrine in determining the existence of
property rights under a government contract, Souter's opinion backs itself
into an untenable legal comer. 159
Finally, on a less theoretical level, the remedy test fails in its most
fundamental objective, to prevent the government's contractual
commitments from interfering with the exercise of its sovereign authority.
In formulating the remedy test, Justice Souter hints that the test will only
preclude the application of the unmistakability doctrine to routine
government contracts such as the silk purchase contracts addressed in
Horowitz."W The remedy test does not ensure, however, that the
unmistakability doctrine will continue to apply to quasi-regulatory
agreements, for which the presumption of reserved sovereign power is most
appropriate. As pointed out by both Scalia and Rhenquist, nothing in the
remedy test prevents a party from pleading its claims in whatever manner
is conducive to avoid the application of the unmistakability doctrine. 6' The
Court's previous unmistakability decisions provide limited guidance; in
Bowen and Cherokee Nation, the plaintiffs' claims included actions for pure

158. See, e.g., United States v. Cherokee Nation of Okla., 480 U.S. 700, 706 (1987); Bowen,
477 U.S. at 54-56; National R.R. Passeng. Corp. v. Atcheson, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 470
U.S. 451, 467 (1985); Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130,148 (1983); Union Pac.
R.R. Co. v. United States, 99 U.S. 700, 718
(1878).
159. Justice Rehnquist's dissent points out this conundrum, noting that:
The plurality justifies its novel departure from existing law by noting that
the contracts involved in the present case... 'do not purport to bind the
Congress from enacting regulatory measures' ....

But that is precisely

what the unmistakability doctrine, as a canon of construction, is designed
to determine: Did the contract surrender the authority to enact or amend
regulatory measures as to the contracting party? If the sovereign did
surrender its power unequivocally, and the sovereign breached that
agreement to surrender, then and only then would the issue of the remedy for
that breach arise. (second emphasis added). Winstar, 116 S. Ct at 2481.
160. Winstar, 116 S. Ct. at 2457-58 (no one would seriously contend that the
unmistakability doctrine should apply to the enforcement of humdrum supply contracts);
Horowitz v. United States, 267 U.S. 458 (1925).
161. See Winstar, 116 S. Ct. at 2477 (Scalia, J., concurring) (virtually every contract
operates, in the end, as an assumption of liability in the event of non-performance); see id.
at 2481 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (sophisticated lawyers in the future need only claim money
damages based on an alleged government promise to assume the monetary risk of future
changes in legislation in order to avoid application of the doctrine). As the dissent notes, the
ability of lawyers to alter the terms of contract interpretation by merely rewording their
pleading has "an Alice in Wonderland aspect to it." Id.
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monetary damages." Justice Souter's opinion is sufficiently cognizant of
this dilemma to note that merely pleading a damages remedy will not
necessarily insulate a party from application of the unmistakability
doctrine. Instead, a court must examine whether the claim in fact amounts
to a request for an "exemption from the terms of the subsequent statute,"
tantamount to blocking its effect.1'
Justice Souter does not spell out how a court is to determine
whether a damage claim amounts to an "exemption" from the operation of
a sovereign power, nor is it likely that any easy formula is on the horizon.
The opinion's own examples, Cherkee Nation and Bowen, are hardly sturdy
precedent. In neither of those cases did the Court even address the effect of
the plaintiffs' claims on the exercise of sovereign power.'" Nor does Justice
Souter's interpretation of these cases provide an overall framework of
analysis. Souter presents Bowen as a perfect example of a damage claim
which has the effect of exempting a party from the operation of a statute. In
Bowen, the lower court found that the appropriate damages for the state's
and agencies' claims were equivalent to the amount paid by these parties
into the social security fund." Since an award of such damages would have
put those parties in the same situation as would an exemption from the
statutory amendment eliminating the withdrawal provision, the
unmistakability doctrine was correctly applied. Bowen is arguably a narrow
exception to the rule that money damage claims will normally not block the
exercise of a sovereign power, limited to cases in which the appropriate

162. See Cherokee, 480 U.S. 700, 701 (1987) (Cherokee Nation seeks damages and
compensation for harm resulting from the assertion of the government's navigational
servitude). See Bowen, 477 U.S. 41, 49 (1986) (parties alleged that statutory amendment had
deprived parties of contract rights without just compensation). See also Winstar, 116 S. Ct. at
2481 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
163. According to Justice Souter, the analysis should focus on the actual terms of the
underlying contract, to establish whether the contract includes "a risk-shifting component
that may be enforced without effectively barring the exercise of [the sovereign) power." Id.
at 2457-58. Souter attempts to characterize Bowen as not having relied upon the
unmistakability doctrine to reach its holding. See infra note 278. A close reading of Bowen,
however, shows that the Court thought it appropriate to apply the unmistakability doctrine
in establishing the "terms" of the state-federal agreement. See Bowen, 477 U.S. at 52.
164. In ruling the statutory amendment unconstitutional, the district court in Bowen did
observe that the state's and state agencies' claims for damages would be "contrary to the
will" of Congress. Public Agencies Opposed to Soc. Sec. Entrapment v. Heckler, 613 F. Supp.
558, 575 (E.D. Calif. 1985), rev'd, 477 U.S. 41 (1986).
165. As an initial matter, it is not clear why the amounts paid by these parties as social
security premiums would be the appropriate measure of damages since, presumably, the
parties would still be receiving a reciprocal benefit in the form of social security payments
from the federal government.
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award of damages corresponds exactly to the requirements that a party
would otherwise have to meet under the new regulatory regime.'"
Souter appears to go further, however, when he characterizes the
use of the unmistakability presumption in Cherokee Nation as appropriate
since "there could be no claim to harm unless the right to be free of the
sovereign power to control navigation had been conveyed away by the
Government. "167 Taken at face value, this distinction arguably allows the
unmistakability doctrine to return (through the backdoor) to the
interpretation of quasi-regulatory contracts since, of course, there can never
be a claim to harm unless the overriding sovereign power has been
conveyed away.16 However the interpretations fall, Souter's
characterization of CherokeeNation shows that a majority on the Court have
at least some reservations about simply doing away with the
unmistakability presumption in regards to government agreements that
clearly implicate the use of sovereign powers. This apparent inclination of
the Court does not save the unmistakability doctrine, however, for two
reasons.
First, it is unlikely that lower courts, confused as they already will
be regarding how to interpret sovereign defenses after Winstar,16 will
manage to finesse the subtlety of the Court's language in a manner that
consistently preserves the unmistakability presumption for quasi-regulatory
contracts. Instead, if one considers the wide variety of legal analyses that
make up the federal court decisions that interpreted the effect of FIRREA

166. Other examples which arguably fall within this narrow scope are cases involving
sovereign acts which increase annual license fees or royalty rates. See, e.g., Madera Irrig.Dist.
v. Hancock, 985 F.2d 1397,1404 (9th Cir. 1993) (court uses unmistakability doctrine to uphold
government increase in rates for CVP water supplied pursuant to long term contracts);
Western Fuels-Utah, Inc. v. Lujan, 895 F.2d 780, 788-89 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (court applies
unmistakability doctrine to determine whether lease agreements are subject to Congressional
amendment increasing royalty rate on coal mining).
167. Winstar,116 S. Ct. at 2457. Souter goes on to note that "[blecause an order to pay
compensation would have placed the Government in the same position as if the navigational
easement had been surrendered altogether, the holding of Cherokee Nation is on all fours
with the approach we describe today." Id. at 2457 n.23. Clearly one may anticipate litigation
over the meaning of this language in Souter's opinion, which arguably offers the best hope
for retaining the unmistakability presumption in quasi-regulatory agreements after Winstar.
168. In other words, contract rights that are subject to sovereign authority cannot be
"harmed" in a contractual sense by the exercise of such sovereign authority. See infra notes
237-41 and accompanying discussion regarding the preliminary requirement of establishing
a property interest in order to pursue a takings claim.
169. See infra notes 188-93 and accompanying discussion.
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on rights under forbearance agreements, it is clear the opposite result is a
near certainty.'"
Second, regardless of how the federal judiciary interprets Winstar,
the mechanics of damage claims brought by private parties under quasiregulatory agreements will almost surely serve to undermine the
unmistakability doctrine. In fact, the WinstarCourt does not appear to have
acknowledged a fairly evident truth; cases involving the determination of
property rights arising out of quasi-regulatory contracts almost invariably
involve a takings claim for just compensation under the Fifth
Amendment."' A Fifth Amendment claim for just compensation is exactly
the sort of action that, according to Justice Souter, does not require
application of the unnistakability doctrine."z The sovereign power of
eminent domain is preserved; the government is simply required to pay out
"damages" to the private property owner.ln7 Indeed, only if just

170. Compare the following cases finding for the government: Winstar Corp. v. United
States, 994 F.2d 797, 813 (Fed. Cir. 1993); Transohio Say. Bank v. Office of Thrift Supervision,
967 F.2d 598 (D.C. Cir. 1992); Security Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Director, Office of Thrift
Supervision, 960 F.2d 1318 (5th Cir. 1992); Carteret Savings Bank, FA v. Office of Thrift
Supervision, 963 F.2d 567 (3rd. Cir. 1992); Far West Fed. Bank v. Office of Thrift Supervision,
951 F.2d 1093 (9th Cir. 1991); Guar. Financial Servs. Inc. v. Ryan, 928 F.2d 994 (11th Cir.
1991); Franklin Fed. Say. Bank v. Office of Thrift Supervision, 927 F.2d 1332 (6th Cir. 1991);
with the following cases finding for the thrifts: Winstar Corp. v. United States, 64 F.3d 1531
(Fed. Cir. 1993); Transcapital Fin. Corp. v. Office of Thrift Supervision, 44 F.3d 1023 (D.C.
Cir. 1994); Resolution Trust v. Federal Say. & Loan Ins., 25 F.3d 1493 (10th Cir. 1995);
Statesman Say. Holding Corp. v. U.S., 26 Cl. Ct. 904, 920 (Cl. Ct. 1992); Wmnstar 11, 25 Cl. Ct.
541; Winstar I,21 l. Ct. 112.
171. See, e.g., Bowen v. Public Agencies Opposed to Soc. Sec. Entrapment, 477 U.S. 41,
49 (1986); Western Fuels-Utah,Inc., 895 F.2d at 788; Cateret Say. Bank, 963 F.2d at 583; AlliedGeneral Nuclear Services v. United States, 839 F.2d 1572, 1577 (Fed. Cir. 1988); Parkridge
Investors Ltd. Partnership v. Farmers Home Admin., 13 F.3d 1192,1198-99 (1994). Mitchell
Arms, Inc. v. United States, 7 F.3d 312, 217 (Fed. Cir. 1993); Housing Auth. of Fort Collins
v. United States, 980 F.2d 624,630-31 (10th Cir. 1992); Alpine Ridge Group v. Kemp, 955 F.2d
1382,1385-86 (9th Cir. 1992), rev'd, 508 U.S. 10 (1993); Peterson v. U.S. Dep't of Interior, 899
F.2d 799,810-11 (9th Cir. 1990); Hughes CommunicationsGalaxy, Inc. v. United States, 998 F.2d
953, 957 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
172. Several decisions have viewed takings cases as the perfect illustration of how the
remedy test may be applied. See, e.g., Winstar1,21 Cl. Ct. at 116 (analogy to remedy test may
be found in regulatory takings law, in which the government has the clear authority to
regulate extensively, but must pay compensation where such regulation has the result of
effectively condemning a property right). See also First English Evangelical Lutheran Church
v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304, 315 (1987) (Fifth Amendment does not limit the
governmental interference with property rights per se, but rather secures compensation in
the event of an otherwise proper interference amounting to a taking).
173. See Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto, 467 U.S. 986, 1016 (1983) (equitable relief is not
available to enjoin an alleged taking of private property for public use when a suit for
compensation can be brought against the sovereign subsequent to the taking). Accord
ParkridgeInvestors Ltd. Partnership,13 F.3d at 1201. This conclusion is supported by the
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compensation damages are found to be inadequate does a private party
even have a right to bring an enjoinment action under the Fifth Amendment
against the federal government."7
One might argue that, in establishing the remedy test, the Court is
simply assuming that the threat of just compensation awards will not act as
a significant limitation on the exercise of the government's sovereign
powers. This assumption is contradicted, however, by the overwhelming
anecdotal evidence that the threat of successful takings claims is a strong
deterrence to the government's exercise of its regulatory powers."m Justice

realization that, to the extent the reserved powers doctrine applies to the federal
government, a government contract could never act to "block the exercise" of the
traditionally reserved power of eminent domain. West River Bridge Co. v. Dix, 47 U.S. (6
How.) 507 (1848) (holding that eminent domain is a non-surrenderable, reserved power). See
also Winstar, 116 S. Ct. at 2457 (application of unmistakability doctrine turns on whether
enforcement of alleged contractual obligation would block the exercise of the sovereign
power). This approach is muddled somewhat by the fact that a government regulatory
actions usually "take" property inadvertently, typically according to a legislative authority
such as the commerce clause. While it is unclear how a court might untangle this issue, the
reserved aspect of the eminent domain power does argue, under the remedy test, against the
application of the unmistakability doctrine to takings cases.
174. Under the Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C § 1491 (1994), parties must first bring an action for
damages before the claims court before a district court may assume jurisdiction. See
Preseault v. Interstate Commerce Comm'n, 494 U.S. 1,11 (1990) (takings claims against the
federal government are premature until the property owner has availed itself of the process
provided by the Tucker Act); United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121,
127-28 (1985) (equitable relief is not available to enjoin an alleged taking when a suit for
compensation can be brought against the sovereign); Ruckelshaus, 467 U.S. at 1016.
175. See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003,1070 n.6 (1992) (Steven,
J. dissenting) (costs of increased just compensation damage awards are likely to be
substantial and therefore likely to impede the development of sound land-use policy); Nolan
v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 866 (1986) (Steven, J., dissenting) (threat of
damage awards will have unprecedented chilling effect on public officials charged with the
responsibility for drafting and implementing regulations designed to protect the
environment); First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S.
304, 340 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (cautious local officials and land use planners may
avoid taking any action that might later be challenged and thus give rise to a damage action);
Agins v. City of Tiburon, 598 P.2d 25, 30 (Cal. 1979), quoting Barbara J. Hall, Comment,
Eldridge v. City of Palo Alto: Aberration or New Directionin Land Use Law?, 28 Hastings L.J.
1569, 1597 (1977) (threat of financial liability will intimidate legislative bodies and
discourage the implementation of strict or innovative planning measures in favor of
measures which are less stringent, more traditional, and fiscally safe); Allen v. City &
County of Honolulu, 571 P.2d 328 (Haw. 1977); Charles v. Diamond, 360 N.E.2d 1295,
1305-06 (N.Y. 1977). See also Thomas G. Pelham, Innovative Growth Control Measures: The
PotentialImpacts of Recent FederalLegislationand the Lucas Decision, 25 URB. LAW. 881 (1993);
Cotton C. Harness III, Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council: Its Historical Context and
Shifting ConstitutionalPrinciples,10 PACE ENVTL. L REV. 5, 19 (1992); Charlie R. Wise, The
ChangingDoctrine of Regulatory Taking and the Executive Branch: Will Takings Impact Analysis
Enhance or Damage the FederalGovernment's Ability to Regulate? 44 ADMIN. L. REv. 403, 426
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Souter attempts to dodge this objection by stating "the Constitution 'bar[s]
Government from forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which,
in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole."'176 The
Court does not elaborate on how this general principle of takings law
applies to the federal creation of property rights,'" in which the government
and private parties enter into voluntary quasi-regulatory agreements
governed by generally well settled (at least before Winstar) rules of
government contract interpretation.
In the final analysis, it is questionable whether the Court considered
the potential effect of the remedy test on the determination of property
rights under government contracts falling within the quasi-regulatory
model. While Justice Souter's opinion may have intended to preserve the
unmistakability presumption for the interpretation of quasi-regulatory
agreements, the remedy test does not achieve this objective.
Winstar's application of the remedy test effectively precludes a
coherent analysis of how the unmistakability doctrine applies to
government contract interpretation, how the doctrine relates to the
sovereign acts doctrine, and what the substantive "unmistakability"
standard should be. The next two subsections will discuss the problems that

(1992); Lynda L. Butler, State Environmental Programs: A Study in Political Influence and
Regulatory Failure, 31 WM. & MARY L. REV., 823, 829 (1990); Craig J. Doran, First English
Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles and Nollan v. California
Coastal Commission; The Big Chill, 52 ALB. L REV. 325 (1987); The Supreme Court, 1986 Term
Leading Cases, 101 HARV. L REv. 119, 246 (1987); John Mixton, Compensation ClaimsAgainst
Local Governmentsfor Excessive Land-use Regulations:A Proposalfor More Effective State Level
Adjudication, 20 URB. LAw. 675,686 (1988); John E. Cribbet, Concepts in Transition:The Search
for a New Definition of Property,1986 U. ILL. L. REV. 1, 36 (1986); Norman Williams, Jr. et al.,
The White River Junction Manifesto, 9 VT. L. Ray. 193, 229 (1984); Jonathan B. Sallet, The
ProblemofMunicipal Liabilityfor Zoning and Land-use Regulation, 31 CATH. U. L. REV. 465,478
(1982); Corwin W. Johnson, Compensation for Invalid Land-Use Regulations, 15 GA. L REV.
559,594 (1981); Marshall C. Cook, Note, Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, Low Tide
for the Takings Clause, 44 MERCER L. REV. 1433, 1440 (1993); Natasha Zalkan, Comment,
Shifting Sands and Shiting Doctrines:The Supreme Court'sChangingTakings Doctrineand South
Carolina'sCoastalZone Statute, 79 CAL. L. REv. 205,234-45,266 (1991); Carl Kirk, Note, First
Church Decides Compensationis Remedy for Temporary Regulatory Takings - Local Governments
are "Singing the Blues", 21 INn. L REV. 901 (1988); Kim C. Pflueger, Comment, Takings Law - Is
Inverse Condemnation an Appropriate Remedy for Due Process Violations?-San Diego Gas &
Elec. Co. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621 (1981), 57 WASH. L. REv. 551 (1982); Alan F.
Ciamporcero, Comment, "Fair"is Fair: Valuing the Regulatory Taking, 15 U.C. DAVIS L REV.
741, 748-49 (1982); Marianne Lavelle, The PropertyRights Revolt, NATL LAW J., May 10, 1993,
at 34.
176. Winstar, 116 S. Ct. at 2459, citing Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 384 (1994),
quotingArmstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960).
177. See, e.g., Statesman Say. Holding Corp. v. United States, 26 C. Ct. at 920 (purpose
animating the unmistakability doctrine makes it clear that the doctrine controls how
contractual rights with the government are created.") (emphasis added).
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arise from this lack of analysis, which is further confounded by the three
disparate opinions offered by Justices Souter, Breyer and Scalia.
b. Winstar's UncertaintyRegarding the ProperRole of the
UnmistakabilityDoctrine and its Relationship to the Sovereign
Acts Doctrine
At no point in the Winstar decision does the Court directly address
the function of the unmistakability doctrine, except to characterize the
doctrine as a "canon" of contract construction.1 78 Belying this
characterization, the Court considers the application of the doctrine to
contracts whose breach by the government is already assumed, based
primarily on factual findings made by the lower court.'" Since the purpose
of the unmistakability doctrine is to determine the existence of underlying
contractual rights, the Court's assumption that the thrifts contractual rights
have been breached essentially negates any meaningful application of the
doctrine. Instead, the Court asks whether the unmistakability doctrine may
be applied to excuse the government's breach.' Justice Souter's opinion
avoids the confusion likely to follow from such an analysis by finding the
doctrine inapplicable to the forbearance agreements. The analysis is taken
up instead by Justice Scalia who characterizes the doctrine as a rebuttable
presumption that the sovereign has made no promise that one of its future
acts will prevent it from performing on its contractual obligations."s Rather
than explicitly stating how he believes the unmistakability doctrine should
be applied, Scalia simply upholds the lower court's ruling of breach based
upon his own legal conclusion that the government's promises to assume
the risk of any future regulatory changes were unmistakable' s2
The Court's failure to directly address how the unnistakability
doctrine should be applied, particularly in a case where the underlying
contractual breach is not technically subject to the Court's review,"s invites
uncertainty regarding the doctrine's proper role in resolving government

178.

Winstar, 116 S. Ct. at 2455.

179. Id. at 2452-53 (court accepts Federal Circuit's conclusion that the Government
breached the underlying contracts).
180, Id,
at 2448,2453.
181. Id. at 2477,
182. Id. at 2478 (Scalia, J. concurring) ("To be sure, those courts were not looking for
"unmistakable" promises... but unmistakability is an issue of law that we can determine
here."). As a result, Justice Scalia's opinion offers the only guidance to practitioners as to
what the Supreme Court might consider the proper "unmistakability standard" to be. See
infra notes 294-306 and accompanying text.
183. Winstar,116 S. Ct. at 2448 ("[A]nterior question of whether there were contracts at
all between the Government and respondents dealing with regulatory treatment of
supervisory goodwill.., is not strictly before us.").

Spring 1998]

PROPERTY RIGHTS IN PUBLIC CONTRACTS

contract disputes.'" This uncertainty is exacerbated by the Court's failure
to distinguish between quasi-regulatory and market participant government
contract models, a failure that inevitably blurs the somewhat intricate
relationship, as described above, between the uninstakability and
sovereign acts doctrines Both Justice Breyer and Scalia imply that the two
doctrines are generally interchangeable. In considering the two doctrines,
Scalia observes:
the 'sovereign acts' doctrine adds little, if anything at all, to
the 'unmistakability' doctrine, and is avoided whenever that
one would be-i.e., whenever it is clear from the contract in
question that the Government was committing itself not to
rely upon its sovereign acts in asserting... the doctrine of
impossibility, which is another way of saying that the
Government had assumed the risk of a change in the laws. 87
The type of confusion that can trickle down from such language may be
observed in the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals decision in Resolution Trust

184. The claims court decisions in Wmnstar illustrate the uncertainty engendered by the
unmistakability doctrine (as well as setting the stage for the confusion in the Supreme
Court's ultimate analysis.) In its initial decision, WinstarI, the claims court used a remedy
analysis to find the doctrine inapplicable since the plaintiffs had not sought to enjoin
Congress from changing the regulations. 21 Cl. Ct. at 116. After the government requested
a clarification, the claims court reheard the case. Without specifically addressing the
applicability of the unmistakability doctrine, the court found the existence of a binding
contractual promise on the part of the government to provide the plaintiff thrifts with
favorable regulatory treatment. Winstar 11, 25 Cl. Ct. at 549. Subsequently, in Statesman, the
same court finally addressed the purpose of the unmistakability doctrine which it
characterized as controlling "how contractual rights with the government are created, i.e.
whether the government has agreed in unmistakable terms to be contractually bound." 26
Cl. Ct. at 920 (emphasis added). The court then went on to find that the government had
made such an unmistakable commitment. Id. at 921. The Federal Circuit Court of Appeals,
in upholding the claims court decisions in the consolidated appeal, stated "[w ]e agree with,
and adopt, the substance of [the claims courts'] analyses," without ever making its own
determination of whether the unmistakability doctrine applied. Winstar Corp. v. United
States, 64 F.3d at 1545. In the end, the Supreme Court Justices appear to believe that the
lower courts did not apply the unmistakability doctrine in interpreting the forbearance
agreements. 116 S. Ct. at 2478 (Scalia, J. concurring) (lower courts "were not looking for
unmistakable promises"); 116 S. Ct. at 2484 (Rehnquist, J. dissenting) ("the trial court and
Court of Appeals held the unmistakabiity doctrine did not apply here.').
185. See supranotes 123-40 and accompanying text.
186. Breyer considers the application of the unmistakability doctrine to interpret the
parties' respective abilities to raise the commercial impossibility defense. Winstar,116 S. Ct.
at 2471-72. He then argues that the "rights and duties" contained in a government contract
are governed generally by the law applicable to private parties. Id. at 2473. Scalia discusses
the unmistakability doctrine in terms of excusing the breach of a party's obligation to
perform. Id. at 2477.
187. Id. at 2478.
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Corp. v. Federal Say. & Loan Ins. Corp.,' decided before Winstar. In Resolution
Trust, the court held that FIRREA was not an act of general applicability, as
required by the sovereign acts doctrine, and that the sovereign acts doctrine
was therefore not available to the government as a defense.189 Based on this
holding, the court dismissed the government's arguments based on the
unmistakability doctrine, stating that "[ojnly if the sovereign acts doctrine
applied would we be required to address the issue of unmistakability."'9
As illustrated by Resolution Trust, the potential of lower courts, in
the absence of Supreme Court guidance, to merge the unmistakability
doctrine into the sovereign acts doctrine is quite real."9' Such a doctrinal
entanglement carries potentially significant consequences, however, for the
interpretation of rights under the quasi-regulatory contractual model. The
sovereign acts doctrine, which wants to treat the government as a private
party, does not readily apply to such agreements, entered into by the
government as part of a greater regulatory structure.192 When courts
mistakenly apply the sovereign acts doctrine to quasi-regulatory contracts,
the result is predictably a denial of relief for the government.1 If the
unmistakability doctrine is considered as merely a sub-part to the sovereign
acts doctrine, however, the court's rejection of the government's sovereign
act defense also has the effect of eliminating the presumption that such
contracts are subject to the exercise of the government's regulatory
authority. In a manner similar to the application of Justice Souter's remedy

188. Resolution Trust Corp. v. Federal Sav. & Loan Ins. Corp., 34 F.3d 982 (10th Cir. 1994).
189. Id. at 984.
190. Id. at 984. The court's decision freely meshes the requirements of the two doctrines
in finding the government liable for breach of contract. Id. (court applies "public and general
act" requirement of sovereign acts doctrine and remedy distinction (similar to remedy test
in Winstar)of the unmistakability doctrine). See also Benjamin v. Jacobson, 124 F.3d 162,175
(2d Cir. 1997) ("Where federal government is a party to a contract, a statute modifying the
contract will be subjected to the 'sovereign acts' doctrine .... ").
191. See also Conoco Inc. v. United States, 35 Fed. CI. 309,335-36 (1996) ("unmistakability
doctrine stands and falls with the sovereign acts doctrine" and thus does not apply where
government action is not a public and general sovereign act). Sumner Peck Ranch, Inc. v.
Bureau of Reclamation, 823 F. Supp. 715, 749 (E.D. Cal. 1993) (court applies sovereign acts
doctrine to quasi-regulatory agreement).
192. In interpreting such contracts, a court will typically find the sovereign acts doctrine
inapplicable, usually due to the direct impact of the government's regulation on contract
rights or, in the event of an impossibility defense, the fact that the government act was
foreseeable to the contracting parties. See supranotes 135-40 and accompanying discussion.
193. See, e.g., Resolution Trust, 34 F.3d at 984; Conoco, 35 Fed. Cl. at 335-36. This result is
due to the general conflict between the requirements of the sovereign acts doctrine, see supra
notes 99-112 and accompanying discussion, and the characteristics of the quasi-regulatory
contractual model, in which the subsequent exercise of sovereign power is often foreseeable
and has a significant impact upon underlying contractual rights. See supra notes 135-40 and
accompanying discussion.
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test, this doctrinal merging portends a potentially significant shift in the
interpretation of property rights arising under federal regulatory
contracts. 19 The effect of this shift on takings claims brought under the Fifth
Amendment will be discussed in the next section. The next subsection will
discuss a slightly different problem: the uncertainty remaining after Winstar
as to exactly what the "unmistakability" standard should be.
c. Winstar's UncertaintyRegarding the "Unmistakability" Standard
An additional problem with the Winstar opinion is that the Court
never arrives at a holding that describes what an "unmistakable"
government promise to waive sovereign authority should look like. The
confusion is due primarily to the inability of the Court majority's two
authors, Justices Souter and Scalia, to agree on whether the unmistakability
doctrine applies to the underlying contracts. As a result, both government
lawyers and private practitioners are left with ambiguous direction in
crafting future contractual arrangements that accurately reflect the true
intent of the parties.
Justices Souter and Breyer find that the government made a binding
promise to provide favorable accounting treatment to the thrifts based
primarily on language in one of the contractual documents stating that
resolutions adopted at the time of the thrift mergers (which confer the
favorable regulatory treatment) shall take precedence over contrary
regulations."' Justice Souter notes that this language "tilts in favor of
interpreting the contract to lock in the then-current regulatory treatment of
supervisory goodwill. " 196 As discussed above, however, the Justices do not
use the unmistakability doctrine to make this finding. Instead, their long
subsequent discussions as to why the doctrine should not apply to the
contracts in question lead to the inescapable conclusion that Souter and
Breyer do not believe that the
government's promises to be bound in the
7
future are "unmistakable.""9
In contrast, Justice Scalia characterizes the government's promise
to accord favorable regulatory treatment as an unmistakable waiver of its
sovereign right to change such regulatory treatment in the future." 8
According to Scalia, the unmistakability doctrine does not require a party
to show a further government commitment not to go back on its original

194. See supra,notes 160-77 and accompanying text.
195. Winstar,116 S. Ct. at 2450, 2476.
196. Id. at 2450.
197. Souter notes that "[tjo be sure, each side could have eliminated any serious contest
about the correctness of their interpretive positions by using clearer language." Id. at 2452,
n.15. In dissent, Justice Rehnquist notes that surely the unmistakability doctrine must have
a role to play in resolving a "serious contest" of contractual interpretation. Id. at 2482.
198. Winstar,116 S. Ct. at 2477 (Scalia, J.concurring).
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promise.' " Any other construction would, according to Scalia, make the
government's initial promise illusory.'
The discrepancy between the standards adopted by the Winstar
Justices leaves no clear guidelines as to what constitutes an unmistakable
promise by the government to be bound by the terms of the original
contract. In a later section, this article will attempt to set forth in basic terms
a theoretically defensible standard, bearing in mind that the standard itself
may depend to an extent on the sovereign power allegedly being
surrendered.' First, this article will discuss the impact of Winstar on
takings claims involving federally created property rights.
THE INTERPRETATION OF FEDERAL CONTRACT RIGHTS AFTER
W/NSTAR
The decision in Winstarleaves the interpretation of federal contract
rights in a state of flux. This is a result of 1) the Court's failure to distinguish
between quasi-regulatory and market participant government contractual
models; 2) the Court's holding that the unmistakability doctrine will not
apply in normal "damage" claims, the usual mode of relief brought by
parties seeking compensation for takings of property under the Fifth
Amendment; 3) mixed signals from the Court regarding the proper role of
the unmistakability doctrine in contract interpretation, including erroneous
inferences that the doctrine is merely a first step in applying the sovereign
acts doctrine; and 4) the Court's failure to come to an agreement regarding
the proper "unmistakability standard." How lower courts will apply
Winstar to federal contract disputes remains to be seen. It seems likely,
however, that Winstar, by eliminating the presumption of retained
sovereign power in quasi-regulatory contracts, will have a significant
impact on how courts approach Fifth Amendment takings claims alleging
injury to federally-created property rights. The first part of this section will
discuss this potential impact. The second part will present an approach to
federal contract interpretation that is better supported by precedent and
does not infringe upon the important government responsibility to exercise
sovereign power in providing for the general welfare.
1. The Impact of Winstar on Takings Claims Involving PropertyRights
Acquired Under Quasi-RegulatoryContracts
In order to understand Winstar'spotential impact on takings claims,
it is worthwhile to explore the nature of property rights arising under quasi-

199. Id.
200.
201.

Id.
See infra notes 294-306 and accompanying text.
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regulatory contracts and how Winstar may effect court decisions involving
claims that such rights have been injured as a result of the federal
government's exercise of sovereign power.
a. Natureof Quasi-RegulatoryPropertyRights
Quasi-regulatory property rights differ from "normal" property such as a fee simple estate - in that they are created through contractual-like
arrangements with the federal government.m The scope of the right is
accordingly delineated by the terms of the statutes and accompanying
agreements under which the right is created. In Bowen, for example, the
State of California had a "right" to withdraw from the social security
system, which was subject to the government's right to amend, alter or
repeal provisions of the statute and underlying agreement. Under the
Mining Law of 1872, miners have a "right" to explore for and develop
valuable mineral deposits on the public lands, subject to the government's
right to impose reasonable rules and regulations.' Water users in the west
have a "right" under federal water contracts to water allocations subject to
the government's right to alter such contracts consistent with the purposes
of the Reclamation Act.' Coal miners under the Mineral Lands Leasing
Act have the "right" to mine commercial quantities of coal under lease
agreements that are subject to the government's right to modify royalty
202. Court decisions often describe quasi-regulatory agreements in which underlying
rights are subject to the exercise of sovereign authority as something less than "contracts."
See e.g. National R.R. Pass. Corp. v. Atchison Topeka Santa Fe Ry. Co., 470 U.S. 451, 465-67
(1985). (reservations of sovereign power in agreements between government and railroad
are "hardly the language of contract"); Winstar II, 25 Cl. Ct. at 545 (in Bowen v. Public
Agencies Opposed to Soc. Sec. Entrapment, 477 U.S. 41, 52, 54-55 (1986) [no vested rights
were created since the basic elements of contract formation were absent]); Alpine Ridge
Group v. Kemp, 955 F.2d 1382,1386 (9th Cir. 1992) (asserted right in Bowen, 477 U.S. at 55,
was a benefit gratuitously conferred); Orrego v. United States Dep't of Housing and Urban
Development, 701 F. Supp. 1384, 1396-97 (N.D. Ill. 1988) (cites Bowen for proposition that
prepayment provision is simply part of a regulatory program over which Congress retained
authority to amend in the exercise of its power to provide for the general welfare).
Essentially, these decisions equate the term "contract" with an agreement that confers
unqualified, constitutionally protected rights on the private party. This section will
nevertheless refer to all quasi-regulatory agreements as "contracts" or "contractual
arrangements" without necessarily assuming that the underlying statutory schemes create
vested property interests protected under the Fifth Amendment. It is clear that the language
of the cases, as well as the value of non-vested contractual rights, support the notion that a
government contract may in fact be formed without necessarily conferring unalterable
vested rights. In the last analysis, whether one refers to an agreement between the
government and a private party as a "contract" or not, the unmistakability doctrine still
plays a role in determining the rights of the respective parties.
203. 30 U.S.C. § 22 (1994).
204. 43 U.S.C. §§ 371-573 (1994); see O'Neill v. United States, 50 F.3d 677,686 (9th Cir.
1995); Madera Irrig. Dist. v. Hancock, 985 F.2d 1397,1404,1406-07 (9th Cir. 1993).
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rates and readjustment time intervals.2w State student loan agencies have
the right to receive reimbursements for defaulted loans and other payments
by the federal government, subject to the government's right to amend the
terms of the guaranteed student loan program.' Many other examples may
be given, covering a wide range of contractual rights.2
Undoubtedly one of the most complex issues in federal contract
interpretation is the nature of the property interests that are created by the
various regulatory agreements entered into between the government and
private parties. Most court decisions interpret such federally-created rights
in the context of takings claims; parties argue that government actions have
extinguished their "rights" and thus taken "property" in violation of the
Fifth Amendment.m As a result, most judicial definitions of "property" turn
on whether the government may extinguish the right, through regulation
or otherwise, without paying compensation. If the government may not do
so, the right is said to be "vested" and considered to be a valid,
constitutionally protected "property interest."' In cases where courts find
that the government may eliminate the "right," no "property interest"
arises.
The issue of how Wlnstar effects the judicial interpretation of quasiregulatory contract rights in takings cases is one of the central themes of this

205. 30 U.S.C. §§ 181-287 (1994); Western Fuels-Utah, Inc. v. Lujan, 895 F.2d 780, 789
(D.C. Cir. 1990); see also Western Energy Co. v. Dep't of Interior, 932 F.2d 807 (9th Cir. 1991);
Trapper Mining Inc. v. Lujan, 923 F.2d 774 (10th Cir. 1991); Coastal States Energy Co. v.
Hodel, 816 F.2d 502 (10th Cir. 1987); FMC Wyoming Corp. v. Hodel, 816 F.2d 496 (10th Cir.
1987).
206. See Association of Accredited Cosmetology v. Alexander, 979 F.2d 859,867 (D.C. Cir.
1992); Rhode Island Higher Educ. Assistance Auth. v. Secretary U.S. Dep't of Educ., 929 F.2d
844, 850-51 (1st Cir. 1991); Great Lakes Higher Educ. Corp. v. Cavazos, 911 F.2d 10,16 (7th
Cir. 1990); Educational Assistance Corp. v. Cavazos, 902 F.2d 617, 629, n.20 (8th Cir. 1990);
Ohio Student Loan Comm'n v. Cavazos, 900 F.2d 894,901-02 (6th Cir. 1990); South Carolina
State Educ. Assistance Auth. v. Cavazos, 897 F.2d 1272,1275-76 (4th Cir. 1990).
207. See e.g. Federal Housing Admin. v. Darlington, Inc., 358 U.S. 84 (1958); Parkridge
Investors Ltd. Partnership v. Farmers Home Admin., 13 F.3d 1192 (8th Cir. 1994); Housing
Auth. of Fort Collins v. United States, 980 F.2d 624 (10th Cir. 1992) (regulation of low income
housing); Mitchell Arms, Inc. v. United States, 7 F. 3d 212 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (regulation of
firearms importation); Allied-General Nuclear Serv. v. United States, 839 F.2d 1572 (Fed. Cir.
1998) (regulation of nuclear power industry).
208. See e.g. Bowen v. Public Agencies Opposed to Soc. Sec. Entrapment, 477 U.S. 41, 49
(1986) (public agencies claim statutory amendment deprived them of contractual rights
without just compensation in violation of the Fifth Amendment); Western Fuels-Utah,Inc.,
895 F.2d at 788 (lessees argue that Congressional readjustment of royalty rate takes property
without just compensation); Carteret Say. Bank v. Office of Thrift Supervision, 963 F.2d 567,
583 (3rd. Cir. 1992) (thrift argues that abrogation of contract right to treat supervisory
goodwill as regulatory capital constitutes a taking without just compensation).
209. See, e.g., Lynch v. United States, 292 U.S. 571,579 (1934) ("Rights against the United
States arising out of contract with it are protected by the Fifth Amendment.").
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article and will be returned to in the next sub-section. At this point,
however, it is worthwhile to observe that the vested rights approach to
defining "property interests," while specifically appropriate for takings
cases, does not present the complete scope of contractual rights arising out
of quasi-regulatory contracts. A closer examination reveals at least three
contexts in which these federally created rights may have value and
importance to the right holder, while still not rising to the level of "vested"
property."'0
The first context addresses the nature of the right against third
parties. Water appropriations in California are a good illustration of "third
party" value. The government may exercise enormous regulatory control
over appropriative water rights; where the appropriation is found to be
wasteful or unreasonable, the right may be eliminated altogether.2" While
the extent of the government's regulatory power makes it less likely that
appropriative rights would be considered "vested" for purposes of takings
analysis, the rights are still exclusive as to third parties, and thus
tremendously valuable to the holder. This value is memorialized by strict
priority systems" such that, in times of shortage, junior water users may be
required to relinquish their water diversions in order for senior
appropriators to receive their full allotment.P 3
A second context addresses the "temporal value" of the right.
Temporal value can be characterized as the value of a contractual right for
the time it exists prior to modification by the government. In Western FuelsUtah, Inc. v. Lujan, for example, the court held that coal lessees holding
indefinite term leases did not have a vested right to continue to pay
royalties of 5 cents per ton of coal extracted, and thus no "property interest"
was taken when Congress raised the royalty rate to 12.5 cents per ton.
This holding, however, did not prevent the lessees from having enjoyed the
contractual right to mine coal at 5 cents per ton for many years prior to the

210. For purposes of this article, "vested property" will refer to property which is not
"qualified by' or "subject to" the exercise of sovereign power.
211. See, e.g., Joslin v. Marin Mun. Water Dist., 429 P.2d 889,898 (Cal. 1%7); CAL. CONSr.
art. X, § 2; CAL. WATER CODE §§ 100, 275 (West 1971); see also Coffin v. Left Hand Ditch Co.,
6 Colo. 443 (1882).
212. See, e.g., CAL. WATER CODE § 1450 (West 1971).
213. See, e.g., Joerger v. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 276 P. 1017,1026 (Cal. 1929); United States
v. State Water Resources Control Bd., 227 Cal. Rptr. 161,188, n.25 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986).
214. 895 F.2d 780, 789 (D.C. Cir. 1990); See also Western Energy Co. v. Dep't of Interior,
932 F.2d 807 (9th Cir. 1991); Trapper Mining Inc. v. Lujan, 923 F.2d 774 (10th Cir. 1991);
Coastal States Energy Co. v. Hodel, 816 F.2d 502 (10th Cir. 1987); FMC Wyoming Corp. v.
Hodel, 816 F.2d 496 (10th Cir. 1987).
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congressional amendment. 2s While the temporal value of this right did not
rise to the level of Fifth Amendment "property" when confronted with
federal legislation, it had undoubtedly been a valuable interest, subject to
sale or use as loan collateral, during the time of its existence."
A third context addresses the value of the right vis a vis
government actions to which the right is not subject. In a quasi-regulatory
contract, rights will not be considered "vested" property interests if they are
subject to the future exercise of the government's sovereign powers. The
same rights are constitutionally protected, however, from government
actions that are unreasonable or inappropriate to the public purpose
justifying their adoption."? In addition, contractual rights may be immune
from legislation or agency actions that do not arise out of the underlying
statute which created the contractual right in the first place. A good
example of this may be found in the 1872 Mining Act. 2 8 Under this Act,
miners who discover valuable mineral deposits obtain exclusive rights to
mine a claim, subject to reasonable rules and regulations."s As a result of
judicial interpretation, authorized federal regulations that render a mining
operation unprofitable extinguish the "property interest" in the miner's

215. The cases do not elaborate on how long the lessees held their leases prior to the
Congressional amendments in 1976. The 5 cents per ton royalty rate was part of the original

statute passed in 1920. Theoretically then, the lessees could have enjoyed 46 years of 5 cent
royalties, despite the "tenuous" status of this contractual right before the exercise of federal
sovereign power. The "temporal value' of a contractual right is protected from the
retroactive exercise of sovereign power by the holding in Sinking Fund Cases that the
government's reserved power does not include the right to 'unmake contracts that have
already been made... .' Union Pac. R.R. Co. v. United States, 99 U.S. 700, 721 (1878). See
Yankee Atomic Electric Co. v. United States, 33 Fed. Cl. 580, 584-85 (1995), rev'd on other
grounds, 112 F.3d 1569,1573-75 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (court finds that government assessment
against utilities for cleanup expenses did not constitute retroactive increase in the price of
the government's prior contractual agreements). See infra notes 326-33 and accompanying
discussion.
216. For a similar example in the framework of federal water rights, see Madera Irrig.
Dist. v. Hancock, 985 F.2d 1397,1403 (9th Cir. 1993). Madera presents an interesting example
of the temporal value of a non-vested contractual right. See infra note 327; see also Winstar,
S. Ct. at 2484 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (where government agreed to certain regulatory
treatment only for the short term, thrifts still received consideration).
217. United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 22 (1977). See also Home Bldg. &
Loan Ass'n. v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 438-39 (1934) (question is whether the legislation is
addressed to a legitimate end and measures taken are reasonable and appropriate to that
end); Union Pac. R.R. Co. v. United States, 99 U.S. 700, 721 (1878) (modifications of contract
must be consistent with object and scope of authorizing statute). See infra notes 307-33 and
accompanying text for a more detailed discussion of limits on federal power to modify
contractual rights under quasi-regulatory contracts.
218. 30 U.S.C. §§ 21-54 (1994).
219. 30 U.S.C. § 22 (1994); United States v. Locke, 471 U.S. 84 (1985).
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claim, without violating the Fifth Amendment.' In contrast, if the federal
government instead eliminates the miner's claim by declaring the lands off
limits to mining, the resulting withdrawal will be found to violate the
miner's rights under the Fifth Amendment, since the congressional power
of withdrawal is not incorporated into the statutory limits placed on the
property interest found within the unpatented claim.'
Each of these three contexts operate simultaneously to give value
to federal contractual rights that may nevertheless not be considered vested
"property" by a court addressing their validity in the face of the
government's exercise of sovereign authority. In California, federal water
rights created by the Central Valley Project (CVP) illustrate this principle.
Under a standard CVP water contract, a water user is entitled to a specific
annual allotment of water, which is enforceable against other consumptive
users in the system, according to the priority of the water right held by the
Bureau of Reclamation. ' CVP contracts may be modified by Congress
pursuant to amendments to the Reclamation Act or, arguably, pursuant to
valid exercises of sovereign authority under laws such as the Endangered
Species Act.' In the absence of such modifications, however, a water user
may continue to receive the benefits of the contract. In the event Congress
or the Bureau of Reclamation intentionally eliminates such benefits
pursuant to legislation that is outside the public purposes of the
Reclamation Act, the water user would presumably be entitled to
compensation under the Fifth Amendment.'

220. See 30 U.S.C. § 22 (1994); Michael Graf, Application of Takings Law to the Regulation of
UnpatentedMining Claims, 24 ECOLOGY L.Q. 57,112-115 (1997).
221. See Graf, supra note 220 at 119-21. Note that a different analysis might ensue if the
sovereign action was an unforeseeable event which otherwise satisfied the criteria for
excusing government liability under the sovereign acts doctrine. See infra notes 309-12 and
accompanying text.
222. See, e.g., United States v. State Water Resources Control Bd., 227 Cal. Rptr. 161,188,
n.25 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986); Brian Gray, The Modern Era in CaliforniaWaterLaw, 45 HASTINGS L.
249,279 (1994).
223. See infra notes 309-10 and accompanying text; O'Neill v. United States, 50 F.3d 677,
686 (9th Cir. 1995).
224. For example, if the Bureau of Reclamation pursuant to an amendatory statute or
regulations were to ship its water to urban users willing to pay more per acre foot, at the
expense of agricultural contract holders, a court could arguably find a constitutional taking,
since the Bureau's action would be outside the stated public purpose of the Reclamation Act,
to create a pattern of family held farms through the delivery of federally subsidized water.
See, e.g., Ivanhoe Irrig. Dist. v. McCracken, 357 U.S. 275,292 (1958); Peterson v. U.S. Dep't
of Interior, 899 F.2d 799, 803, n.8. (9th Cir. 1990). ( See also Union Pac. R.R. Co. v. United
States, 99 U.S. 700, 721 (1878) (amending statute must be consistent with purpose of authorizing statute). An even more difficult question is presented if the Bureau's action is taken
pursuant to a newly enacted separate statute establishing a different, but arguably equally
valid, public purpose of delivering water to cities and suburbs at the expense of agriculture.
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The realization that "non-vested" rights arising out of federal
government contracts may have great value to private parties forms a
response, in part, to judicial language, such as Justice Scalia's opinion in
Winstar,that characterizes government promises subject to the exercise of
future sovereign authority as "illusory" and agreements containing such
promises as more "regulatory" than contractual in nature.m Such a characterization ignores the "property-like" aspects of these contractual rights
over their period of existence vis a vis third parties and government actions
not taken in a sovereign capacity or otherwise unreasonable in light of the
public purposes underlying the contract in question.' For purposes of this
article, the characterization also offers an erroneous portrayal regarding the
effect of the unnistakability doctrine on quasi-regulatory contractual rights.
The unmnistakability doctrine subjects these rights, absent express language
to the contrary, to the future exercise of sovereign power. If one considers
such "conditional" rights to be valueless, one may thus adopt the view that
the mere application of the unnistakability presumption has the potential
to extinguish the private party's underlying "property" interest in the quasiregulatory contract.' This analysis presents a false dichotomy, for (as
discussed above) rights subject to future sovereign powers may still have
important "property-like" aspects.23 Notwithstanding its potentially misleading characterization, the "vested right" property approach understandably creates a disincentive for courts to apply the unmistakability doctrine
to interpret private contractual rights that judges may, on equitable
grounds, have no desire simply to eliminate.' This article will return to this

Another complicated issue is whether the government should be held responsible

as a quasi-sovereign delivering water under the federal CVP program, for unforeseen
sovereign acts that prevent the government from delivering the promised contractual
allotments. In other words, should the government be allowed to raise, in certain situations,
what amounts to a sovereign acts defense even if the government is contracting under the
quasi-regulatory government contractual model? Moreover, how should actions taken under
statutes such as the Endangered Species Act be treated in such an analysis? See infra notes
307-19 and accompanying text for a discussion (if not a resolution) of these difficult issues.
225. Winstar, 116 S. Ct. at 2477.

226. See Madera Irrig. Dist.v. Hancock, 985 F.2d 1397, 1405 (government like any other
contracting party may enter into a binding agreement subject to a qualified right of
modification or other avoidance of obligations) (citing Modem Sys. Tech. Corps v. United
States, 24 Cl. Ct. 699, 701, n.3, (1992) aff'd 980 F.2d 745 (Fed. Cir. 1192)).
227. This reasoning is based upon the theory that the "property" status of federal
contractual rights turns on whether the unmistakability doctrine subjects such rights to the

exercise of future sovereign power.
228.
229.

See supra notes 210-24 and accompanying text.
The various Winstar decisions illustrate the reluctance of the judiciary to presume

that the government may change the law where it appears to the court that such an
interpretation will eliminate the private party's initial contractual rights. See Winstar, 116 S.
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theme in the last section that discusses how the unmistakability doctrine
should be applied.'
b. Takings Law and Rights Under Quasi-RegulatoryContracts
The takings clause to the Constitution prohibits the taking of
private property for public use without payment of just compensation23
While the takings clause historically protected property from physical
invasion by the government,23 2 the twentieth century has seen the rise of
"regulatory takings" law, in which a party claims that government
regulation has reduced the value of a property interest so significantly as to
constitute the equivalent of a physical occupation.' The question of how
far a regulation may go before it requires the payment of just compensation
was first addressed by the Supreme Court in 1922,2 and has been the
subject of considerable debate ever since.' The most comprehensive, recent
Supreme Court takings decision is Lucas v. South CarolinaCoastal Council.2
In Lucas, the Court adopted a per se rule that a statute which deprives a
landowner of all economically viable use of his land requires compensation,
regardless of whether or not the statute was enacted for a legitimate public

Ct. at 2472 (it would have been madness for thrift to enter into agreements subject to
retention of sovereign power to change the law).
230. See infra notes 287-329 and accompanying text.
231.

U.S. CONSF. amend. V.

232. See, e.g., Loretto v. Telepromptor Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 434-435
(1982) (government action constituting permanent physical occupation of property constitutes automatic taking without regard to important public purpose of regulation or extent
of economic impact); Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. U.S., 28 F.3d 1171,1175 (Fed. Cir.1994).
233. A regulatory taking case is thus defined as an action in '[in which] the value or
usefulness of private property [has been) diminished by regulatory action not involving the
physical occupation of the property.' Hall v. City of Santa Barbara, 833 F. 2d 1270,1275 (9th
Cir. 1986).
234. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393,415 (1922).
235. See, e.g., Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374,384 (1994); Lucas v. South Carolina
Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992); First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County
of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304 (1987); Nolan v. Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 837 (1987);Key
stone Bituminous Coal Ass'n. v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470 (1986); Agins v. City of Tiburon,
447 U.S. 255 (1980); Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104,123-24 (1978).
236. 505 U.S. 1003 (1992). Two earlier decisions from 1987 had signaled the Supreme
Court' s conservative shift in takings cases, foreshadowing its decision in Lucas. In Nolan v.
Coastal Comm'n, the Court found that a coastal commission decision requiring a public
easement on a landowner's beachfront estate as a condition of approval for remodeling failed
to satisfy the requisite "nexus" between the condition imposed and the original purpose of
the building restriction and that the restriction was thus not a legitimate purpose under the
police power. 483 U.S. at 831. In FirstEnglish Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los
Angeles, the Court held that a claimant may recover damages for a temporary taking of
property during the time period in which a regulation ultimately found to be
unconstitutional is being challenged. 482 U.S. at 318-19.
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purpose?237 The Court stated an exception to its per se rule, however, where
the property interests proscribed by the regulation were "not part of [the
owner's] title to begin with."
The holding of Lucas emphasizes that an essential preliminary step
in takings analysis is to examine the scope of the underlying property
interest alleged to have been taken. In Lucas, the underlying source of the
fee simple property was state law. Thus, the scope of the property interest
could only be limited by "restrictions that background principles of the
State's law of property and nuisance already place upon land ownership." 9
After opining that the state's general police power authority to protect and
preserve its beaches did not likely fall within the narrower power to control
nuisances, the Court remanded the case back to the South Carolina
Supreme Court to determine whether the State's building prohibition had
"taken" the underlying property.'
In Lucas, the Court accepted as a finding of fact the ruling of the
South Carolina Supreme Court that the state beach protection ordinance
had completely eliminated all uses of the property alleged to have been
taken. Similarly, takings claims involving rights arising under quasiregulatory contracts typically assume that the government action has
eliminated the alleged property right.' Instead, as in Lucas, the question
becomes whether the asserted right is subordinated to the exercise of the
government power. In federal contract interpretation, courts will answer
this question by examining the language of the authorizing statute and
underlying contractual agreementY2 While the range of different
contractual rights arising out of such arrangements is as varied as the "wide
spectrum" 2" of statutory purposes, the end analysis is always the same; if

237. 505 U.S. at 1019-1024.
238. Id. at 1026. The Court also noted in a footnote that a landowner who does not suffer
total economic deprivation by a regulation may still have a takings claim depending upon
the economic impact of the regulation and the degree to which the regulation interferes with
distinct investment-backed expectations. Id. at 1019 n.8
239. Id. at 1028.
240. Id. at 1030; Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 438 U.S. at 145 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting)

("Nuisance exception to the takings guarantee is not coterminous with the police power
itself.').
241. 505 U.S. at 1030. The case was subsequently settled by the State's purchase of Lucas'
beachfront lot for $1 million.

242.

This result is usually due to the contracting party's characterization of the "interest"

eliminated by the government regulation as a 'property" right. See, e.g., Bowen v. Public
Agencies Opposed to Soc. Sec. Entrapment, 477 U.S. 41, 51 (1986) (state characterizes
contractual right to withdraw as 'private property'); see infra notes 320-25 and
accompanying text.
243. See cases cited supra note 95.
244. Winstar,116 S. Ct. at 2457.
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the right is subject to the government power alleged to have extinguished
the right, no taking will be found.m
c. Winstar's Impact on Takings Claims Involving Quasi-Regulatory
Contracts
Winstar changes the mechanics of federal contract takings claims by
significantly limiting the applicability of the unmistakability presumption
in interpreting property rights under quasi-regulatory agreements. Under
Winstar's remedy test, takings claims for just compensation arising out of
quasi-regulatory agreements will not act to block the effect of the
government action and thus the unmistakability doctrine will not apply.'
The Court's blurring of the distinctive roles of the unmistakability and
sovereign acts doctrines also has the potential to eliminate the
unmistakability presumption from the interpretation of quasi-regulatory
agreements2 4 Where the two doctrines are considered together, a court will
not apply the presumption in regulatory settings to which the assertion of
the sovereign acts doctrine is inappropriate72
The elimination of the unmistakability doctrine from the
interpretation of rights under quasi-regulatory agreements amounts to a
significant power shift away from the government's sovereign authority
and towards the property rights of private contractors. As discussed above,
the unmistakability doctrine creates a presumption that contractual rights
under federal contracts are subject to future sovereign authority, which can
only be rebutted by "unmistakable" language to the contrary. 9 Under
Lucas, a quasi-regulatory contractual right that is subject to the
government's sovereign power may be extinguished by the exercise of such
power without violating the Fifth Amendment.2w This is so because, unlike
the fee simple real property estate, the property interest contained within
the contractual right does not exist outside of the government's sovereign

245. See, e.g., United States v. Cherokee Nation of Okla., 480 U.S. 700,707 (1987); Bowen,
477 U.S. at 52; Peterson v. U.S. Dep't of Interior,899 F.2d 799,812-13 (10th Cir. 1990); See also

Mineral Lease cases: Western Fuels-Utah, Inc. v. Lujan, 895 F.2d 780, 789 (D.C. Cir. 1990);
cases, supra note 115; Student Loan Cases: Association of Accredited Cosmetology v.
Alexander, 979 F.2d 859,867 (D.C. Cir. 1992); cases, supra note 116; Housing cases Parkridge
Investors Ltd. Partnership v. Farmers Home Admin., 13 F.3d 1192,1199 (8th Cir. 1994); cases,
supra note 117.
246. See supra notes 171-74 and accompanying text.
247. See supra notes 192-94 and accompanying text.
248. See, e.g., Resolution Trust Corp. v. F.S.L.I.C., 34 F.3d 982, 983 (10th Cir. 1994);
Conoco v. United States, 35 Fed. Cl. 309, 335-36 (1996).
249. See supra notes 70-88; See also infra notes 294-306 and accompanying text for a more
detailed discussion of the actual unmistakability standard.
250. 505 U.S. at 1018-25 (property interests not part of owner's original title may be
eliminated through regulation).
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authority. The logic of this result has been followed by the many cases,
decided before and after Lucas, that have applied the unmistakability
doctrine to find no compensable property interest under various quasiregulatory contracts."'
The inevitable result of not applying the unmistakability doctrine
in interpreting such contracts will be that, in many cases, quasi-regulatory
contractual rights will no longer be "subject to" the exercise of the
government's sovereign powers. Under Winstar, these contractual rights
will thus rise to a level approaching that of the fee simple estate in Lucas,
ultimately superior in constitutional status to the government's police
power.' This conclusion is relatively straightforward when one considers
that, in the absence of the unmistakability presumption, the government is
treated as any other private party in its contractual dealings.5 In this event,
two generally applicable principles of contract interpretation will work
against the government's argument that it has contractually reserved the
future right to exercise its sovereign powers.
The first principle states that ambiguous language will be
interpreted against the party which wrote the contract.2 The second
principle holds that general "boilerplate" provisions in an agreement will
be treated with limited deference by a court and will always be overruled

251. See supra notes 95,158 and cases cited therein. In Great Lakes Higher Educ. Corp. v.
Cavazos, 711 F. Supp. 485,495 (W.D. Wis. 1989), the district court cited Bowen, 477 U.S. 41
(1986), for the proposition that "an amendment that changes the terms of agreements
expressly subject to statutory change does not violate the Fifth Amendment, even if it is
applied retrospectively."
252. The general rule of takings law that "economic rights" are subject to a slightly lesser
standard of Fifth Amendment protection will prevent such contractual rights from ever
rising to the same level of constitutional protection as the fee simple interest in real property.
See, e.g., Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council. 505 U.S. at 1026-29 (1992) (commercial
property rights subject to greater regulatory authority by state); United States v. Locke, 471
US. 84,105 (economic rights derived from mining claim subject to substantial government
regulatory authority); Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 64-66 (1979) (government retains
substantial power to regulate commercial property interests).
253. Winstar, 116 S. Ct. at 2473 (Breyer, J., concurring). See also Perry v. United States, 294
US. 330,352 (1935); Lynch v. United States, 292 U.S. 571, 579 (1934); Union Pac. R.R. Co. v.
United States, 99 U.S. 700, 719 (1878).
254. See United States v. Seckinger, 397 U.S. 203, 216 (1970); Hills Materials Co. v. Rice,
982 F.2d 514,516-17 (Fed. Cir. 1992); Fort Vancouver Plywood Co. v. United States, 860 F.2d
409, 414 (Fed. Cir. 1988); United Int'l Investigative Serps. v. United States, 33 Fed. Cl. 363, 370
(Fed. Cl. 1995) rev'd on other grounds, 109 F.3d 734 (Fed. Cir. 1997); Conoco Inc. v. United
States, 35 Fed. CL 309,326 (Fed. C1.1996). See also REsrATE ENT (SECOND)OF CONTRACTS § 206
(1981) (when contract language is ambiguous, that meaning is generally preferred which
operates against the party who supplies the words or from whom a writing otherwise
proceeds).
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by more specific contractual language.3 Taken together, these principles
spell trouble for the preservation of the government's sovereign authority
based on general provisions inserted into the agreement by the government.
As an example, numerous decisions such as Sinking Fund Cases, National
Railroad, and Bowen have used the unmistakability doctrine to interpret
general reservation language (that Congress reserves its right to amend,
alter or repeal the authorizing statute) as superseding more specific
promises found within the contractual agreements. Under normal principles
of contract interpretation, however, any of these cases could have gone the
other way.' Another example are the general provisions found in
government contracts that limit governmental liability. Private party
contract interpretation tends to interpret such provisions as "force majeure"
clauses, 5 7 which shield a party from liability only for unforeseen,
unanticipated events.' In highly regulated fields, the "force majeure"
interpretation would tend to hold the government responsible for
subsequent regulatory enactments, most of which would be arguably
foreseeable to the contracting parties.z '

255. See e.g, Hughes Communications Galaxy v. United States, 998 F.2d 953,957-58 (Fed.
Cir. 1993); Hills Materials Co. v. Rice, 982 F.2d 514, 517 (Fed. Cir. 1992); United States v.
Johnson Controls, Inc., 713 F.2d 1541,1555 (Fed. Cir. 1983); Hol-Gar Mfg. Corp. v. United
States, 351 F.2d 972, 979-80 (Ct. Cl. 1965); Conoco Inc., 35 Fed. Cl. at 322-23; United Int'l
Investigative Serus., 33 Fed. Cl. at 370.
256. See, e.g., Hughes Communications Galaxy, 998 F.2d at 957-58 (specific contractual
clause takes precedence in interpreting parties' intent over general clauses which
subordinate the contract to unspecified United States obligations, law and policy).
257. "Force majeure" is alternatively defined as an "act of God", an "irresistible force,"
or "an event that cannot be definitely foreseen or controlled." See, e.g., Moncrief v. Williston
Basin Interstate Pipeline Co., 850 F. Supp. 1495, 1508 (D. Wyom. 1995); Joan Teshima,
Annotation, Gas and Oil Lease Force Majeure Provisions:Construction and Effect, 46 A.LR. 4th
976 § 2(a) (1987).
258. See Eastern Air Lines, Inc. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 532 F.2d 957,990 (5th Cir.
1976) ("Exculpatory provisions which are phrased merely in general terms have long been
construed as excusing only unforeseen events which make performance impracticable.');
Moncrief, 850 F. Supp. at 1508 (force majeure describes an event that cannot be foreseen or
controlled). See also Nugget Hydroelectri, L.P. v. PacificGas & Elec., 981 F.2d 429, 432 (9th Cir.
1992).
259. See, e.g., Winstar, 116 S. Ct. at 2471 (there is no doubt that some changes in the
regulatory structure governing thrift capital reserves were both foreseeable and likely). In
one sense, the "force majeure" interpretation renders government's position similar to the
impossibility defense raised under the sovereign acts doctrine, i.e., the government should
be excused from liability only for sovereign acts that are contrary to the assumptions under
which the parties originally contracted. See, e.g., Commonwealth Edison Co. v. AlliedGeneral Nuclear Serv., 731 F. Supp. 850, 855 (N.D. Ill. 1990) (standard, boilerplate, catch-all
force majeure provision invokes a body of common law doctrine interpreting the term that
is largely indistinguishable from the doctrine of impossibility). See supranote 39.
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A good illustration of how the elimination of the unmistakability
doctrine from federal contract interpretation may enlarge the rights of
private parties against the government can be found in the satellite cases,
Hughes Communications?' and American Satellite.' The satellite cases arose
due to the government's decision, following the shuttle Challenger tragedy
in 1986, to eliminate commercial launches from NASA's space program.
Prior to that time, private businesses had contracted with NASA for
commercial launches of various products according to standard launch
service contracts.0 As a result of the Challenger crash, the President issued
a new order which effectively precluded most, if not all, of the plaintiffs'
commercial launches from occurring.' The plaintiffs brought claims for
breach of contract and Fifth Amendment takings against the government.
The claims courts found for the government, holding that contractual
provisions that subjected the parties to United States obligations, law and
published policy incorporated the government's sovereign powers into the
terms of the contract.' Accordingly, the plaintiffs' contractual rights were
subject to future policy changes regarding the U.S. space program and thus
no takings could have occurred.'
The appellate court reversed the claims court rulings based on the
reasoning that these general contract reservations were superseded by more
specific contractual language in which the government promised to provide
launch services according to United States policy signed by the President

260. Another case that illustrates this principle is Hills Materials Co. v. Rice, 982 F.2d 514
(Fed. Cir. 1992). In Hills, a contractor claimed that the government was responsible for
increased costs due to post-bid changes in regulations. The contractor relied on a contractual
provision that required the contractor to "[clomply with the standards issued by the
Secretary of Labor at 29 CFR part 1926

. .. .'

982 F.2d at 516. Based on this language, the

contractor argued that the term "issued" limited the company's general obligation under the
contract to compliance with the specific version of 29 CFR part 1926 in effect at the time bids
were submitted. Id. The court agreed, finding that the contractual provision referring to the
regulatory standard, though somewhat ambiguous, should be construed against the
government as drafter of the contract. Id.at 516-17.
261. See Hughes Communications Galaxy, Inc. v. United States, 998 F.2d 953 (Fed. Cir.
1993).
262. See American Satellite Co. v. United States, 998 F.2d 950 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
263. Hughes Communications Galaxy, 998 F.2d at 955. According to the court, the
government was promoting commercial use of its shuttle fleet by private industry to offset
the costs of its space program. Id.
264. Id. at 956.
265. See American Satellite Co. v. United States, 26 C. Ct. 146 (Ct. Cl. 1992); Hughes
CommunicationsGalaxy, Inc. v.United States, 26 Cl. Ct. 123 (Ct. Cl. 1992).
266. See American Satellite,26 C. Ct. at 158; Hughes Communications,26 Cl. Ct. at 140,145
(rights are subject to future policy changes).
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on August 6,1982.267 While the court found that the government's promise
satisfied the "unmistakability" standard,' there are reasons to doubt that
the court was applying anything other than normal principles of contract
interpretation to the launch service agreements. First, similar to Winstar, the
court considered the unmistakability doctrine only after it had already
determined that the government had breached the agreement by changing
the launch policy.5 Second, the court distinguished its holding from the
Supreme Court's decisions in Bowen and Merrion, noting that in contrast to
these cases, the plaintiffs did not actually seek to "enjoin the exercise of
sovereign power" but rather claimed only monetary damages arising out
of the government's breach.m On remand, the claims court considered and
rejected several additional defenses raised by the government based on
contractual provisions that allegedly limited the government's liability.'
According to the claims court, none of the provisions overcame the
government's contractual assumption of liability for future changes in
launch policy. 272

267. See American Satellite, 998 F. 2d at 952; Hughes Communications,998 F.2d at 957-58.
Under the 1982 policy, the plaintiffs' commercial payloads were scheduled for launch. Under
the new 1986 policy, the plaintiffs were advised that they would probably not be offered
launch services. Id. at 957.
268. See id. at 958. The court stated:
Under our interpretation of the contract, we have no trouble concluding
that Article IV obligates the government to provide launch priority and
scheduling in accordance with the August 6,1982, policy in language which
more than satisfies the "unmistakable termsr requirement. Id.
269. See Hughes Communications,998 F.2d at 958.
270. Id. at 958-59.
271. See American Satellite Co. v. United States, 34 Fed. Cl. 468, 479 (Fed. Cl. 1995)
272. Id. at 479. The government first argued that it should not be held liable based on
language in the contract which stated -All launch and associated services to be furnished by
NASA to the Customer under this agreement shall be so furnished by NASA using its best
efforts." Id. at 475. According to the government, NASA had used its "best efforts" but had
been unable to provide launch services due to the 1986 policy change. The court rejected this
argument for two reasons: 1) the contract allocated liability for such events (policy changes)
to the government; and 2) NASA and the federal government are indistinguishable for
purposes of government acts and thus the deliberate change in policy in 1986 undermined
NASA's claim that it used its "best efforts" to provide services. Id. at 475-76. Second, the
government argued that the 1986 policy change constituted a legal termination of the launch
agreement due to language which allowed NASA to rescind the contract based "upon a
determination in writing that NASA is required to terminate such services for Reasons
Beyond NASA's Control." Id.at 476-77 (phrase Reasons Beyond NASA's Control is from the
Launch Service Agreement). Such "reasons' were defined in the contract to include "acts of
the United States Government other than NASA, in either its sovereign or contractual
capacity." The government's straightforward argument was that the 1986 policy change was
an act of the United States, beyond NASA's control. The court rejected this argument
without much reasoning, noting only that policy changes subsequent to the execution of the
contract cannot excuse the government from its contractual obligation to perform in
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One might fairly argue that the satellite cases actually exemplify
how the unmistakability standard should properly be applied to quasiregulatory contracts; that where the government makes a specific promise
to provide services according to a specific legal regime, the government
should be held to its promise.' Another argument could be made that the
launch agreement falls more squarely into the "market participant," rather
than the "quasi-regulatory," model and thus the government could never
have retained authority to simply "change" the terms of the contract. 74
However one views the court's decision, the court's application of the
unmistakability presumption remains nevertheless suspect. The court
discusses the unmistakability standard only as an afterthought to its
contractual interpretation and then applies a pseudo-remedy test to
alleviate any concerns that its treatment of the doctrine has been too
cavalier.'m By downplaying the proper interpretive role of the
unmistakability doctrine, the court was able to find the government liable
for a change in policy caused by an unforeseen emergency-like event,
at 478. Finally, the government argued that the plaintiffs
accordance with the 1982 policy. Id.
had waived their right to bring a claim by agreeing to contract language which read '... the
Customer shall not make any claim against the United States Government. ..for Damage
or other relief ... for the non-performance or improper performance of Launch and
Associated Services.. ." Id. at 478. The government supported this argument by other
contractual language showing that, in order to further space exploration and exploitation,
both parties had agreed to forego recourse against one another in case of losses experienced
by either side. The court chose to frame this issue as "whether [this provision] should be
construed to apply when one party chooses not to honor the contract's obligations." Id. at
478-79. The court then held that the non-liability provisions only protected the government
against "non-willful" breaches of contract, which would not include willful changes in policy
regarding commercial launches. The court's ruling was influenced by its additional findings
that the non-liability defenses only applied to "[clertain risks of [Iliability" arising out of
"standard and optional shuttle Services such as launch and retrieval." The court interpreted
these findings as meaning that the government was only "protecting itself against risks of
failure associated with the "operational" aspects of the government's undertaking." Id. at
479-80.
273. As discussed above, this was the unmistakability standard adopted by Justice Scalia
in Winstar. See supra notes 47-49 and accompanying text. See infra notes 294-306 and
accompanying text for a discussion of an appropriate unmistakability standard.
274. This argument is bolstered by the court's language in Hughes that the government
offered commercial launches in order to raise money for the space program. See supra, note
263. Under a market participant approach, the government would assert, under the
sovereign acts doctrine, that the change in launch policy was a sovereign act, outside the
control of the government acting in its contractual capacity. See infra notes 364-66. The court
in Hughes rejected the government's sovereign act defense, however, on the grounds that the
launch agreement shifted responsibility to the government for changes in policy. 998 F.2d
at 958, n.8.
275. The remedy test applied by the Hughes court, though not precluding the application
of the unmistakability doctrine, may be properly viewed as the precursor to the test
ultimately adopted by Justice Souter in Winstar.
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despite the presence of numerous contractual provisions purporting to limit
the government's liability '
A potential response to the demise of the unmistakability doctrine
in federal contract takings jurisprudence is indifference. One might argue, in
other words, that courts do not need the unmistakability presumption to find
that limited liability provisions do in fact limit the government's liability' or
that contractual rights under quasi-regulatory contracts are still subject to
subsequent legislation.248 This was essentially Justice Breyer's concurring
argument in Winstar; that the government's authority to regulate for the
general welfare can be adequately protected by "the law applicable to
contracts between private individuals." ' While this assertion may be
debated, a larger question looms in regards to how courts will implement this
obligation to protect the government's sovereign power. A comparison of the

276. See also Conoco Inc. v. United States, 35 Fed. C. 309, 330-36 (1996). In Conoco, the
court addressed whether subsequent statutes imposing additional obligations on lessees had
breached off-shore oil and gas leases and taken the lessees' property rights arising out of the
lease contracts. The court interpreted the terms of the underlying leases without applying
the unmistakabiity doctrine. Instead, the court applied the doctrine only after finding the
government had breached the agreement by imposing the additional obligations and
delaying the approval of the lessees exploratory drilling proposals. In finding the
unmistakability doctrine unhelpful to prevent government liability, the court stated:
The terms of a government contract, like any other contract, do not change
with the enactment of subsequent legislation absent a specific contractual
provision providing for such a change. Id. at 336, quoting Wrnstar Corp., 64
F.3d 1531, 1547 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (emphasis added).
The court's language is, of course, exactly opposite to the rule enunciated by the
unmistakability doctrine, that government contracts are subject to subsequent exercises of
sovereign power in the absence of unmistakable language to the contrary. See supra note 27.
277. See, e.g, O'Neill v. United States, 50 F.3d 677,686 (9th Cir. 1995). In O'Neill, the 9th
Circuit applied the unmistakability doctrine to find that federal water contracts were subject
to the subsequent exercise of sovereign power by the government, and thus the government
could not be found liable for failing to deliver the contract's full water allotment due to the
implementation of sovereign acts, in this case the Central Valley Project Improvement Act,
Pub. L. No. 102-575, 106 Stat. 4706-31 (1992). Id. at 682-86. Prior to reaching this holding,
however, the court, applying normal principles of contract law, had already read a general
provision in the contract that limited government's liability for shortages due to "any other
causes" as precluding government liability. Id. at 684.
278. Justice Souter's opinion in Winstar characterized the Court's holding in Bowen as
having read "the terms of a state-federal coverage agreement to reserve the Government's
right to modify its terms by subsequent legislation .... "Winstar, 116 S. Ct. at 2456. Justice
Souter's observation that the unmistakability doctrine was merely an "alternative" basis for
the Court's decision in Bowen is not supported by the language of the opinion, which does
not distinguish between the application of the unmistakability doctrine and a
straightforward contractual reading. See supra notes 78-85 and accompanying text.
279. Winstar,116 S. Ct. at 2473.
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decisions in O'Neill, ' Peterson,' Hughes Communications," and Conoco,2 as
well as the numerous contradictory opinions (including Winstar) that have
interpreted forbearance agreements affected by FIRREA, hardly inspires
confidence. These cases demonstrate that a rule of general contract
interpretation does not result in decisions that transcend how individual
judges feel about the relative benefits of government regulation and the
respective equities of the contracting parties. The next section will discuss
possible ways in which a greater consistency in federal contract interpretation
may be achieved.
2. FederalContractInterpretationAfter Winstar
This section presents a comprehensive framework in which courts
may interpret rights and obligations under the wide variety of agreements
entered into between the federal government and private parties. The
purpose of this framework is to establish basic principles that lead to more
consistent judicial decision-making while simultaneously striking an
appropriate balance between the worthy societal goals of 1) preserving the
government's regulatory authority and 2) protecting private parties from
government actions that attempt to manipulate the potential advantages
conferred by the unmistakability presumption. The Winstar opinion
attempts to resolve the inherent tension between these goals through its
formulation of the "remedy test," which eliminates the unmistakability
doctrine from federal contract interpretation except in cases where a private
party attempts to enjoin - or avoid - the operation of the sovereign power.
As discussed extensively above, the remedy test, unsupported by law or
precedent, ultimately fails to achieve its stated objective, to preserve the
exercise of the government's sovereign authority.' The basic framework

280.

O'Neill, 50 F.3d at 686.

281. Peterson v. U.S. Dep't of Interior, 899 F.2d 799, 808 (9th Cir. 1990).
282. Hughes Communication Galaxy, Inc. v. United States, 998 F.2d 953, 958 (Fed. Cir.
1993).
283. Conoco, Inc., 35 Fed. Cl. at 335-36.
284. See, e.g., Winstar Corp. v. United States, 64 F.3d 1531, 1547 (Fed. Cir. 1995)
(government made binding promise to provide favorable regulatory treatment in the future);
Winstar Corp. v. United States, 994 F.2d 797, 813 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (government made no
binding promise to provide favorable regulatory treatment in the future). See also Transohio
Say. Bank v. Director, Office of Thrift Supervision, 967 F.2d 598 (3d Cir. 1992); Carteret Say.
Bank, FA v. Office of Thrift Supervision, 963 F.2d 567 (3rd. Cir. 1992); Far West Fed. Bank v.
Director, Office of Thrift Supervision, 951 F.2d 1093 (9th Cir. 1991); Guar. Fin. Servs. Inc. v.
Ryan, 928 F.2d 994 (11th Cir. 1991); Franklin Fed. Say. Bank v. Director, Office of Thrift
Supervision, 927 F.2d 1332 (6th Cir. 1991). See also cases cited supra note 170.
285. In other words, in the real world of government agreements and regulation, the
threat of monetary damages against the government is indistinguishable from the threat of
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presented in this section rejects the remedy test in favor of a blanket
presumption, applicable to all government contracts, that the government
retains its sovereign powers unless surrendered in unmistakable terms. The
next subsection will outline this framework. The subsection following will
discuss the application of the basic framework principles to some of the
recent cases, including Winstar.
a. Basic Framework For InterpretingSovereign Power in Federal
Contracts
The framework presented in this part is based on the recognized
dual roles of the federal government as a sovereign authority and as a
private contractor. These different roles are not set aside when the
government enters in contractual arrangements. Instead, the wide variety
of government agreements reflect a similar range of government contractual
capacities, from quasi-regulator to pure market participant. ' The need to
distinguish the quasi-regulatory and market participant models of
government contracts from one another is brought into further focus when
one examines the respective roles of the unmistakability and sovereign acts
doctrines in interpreting government contracts. In short, the principles
underlying the sovereign acts doctrine - that the government as contractor
should be treated like any other private party - are not applicable to
contracts falling within the quasi-regulatory model, in which the
government enters into contracts more as a sovereign than as an ordinary
market participant. Thus, a necessary first step in establishing a coherent
analytical framework of federal contract interpretation is to distinguish
between quasi-regulatory and market participant contracts.
For purposes of this framework, some basic principles may be used
to distinguish between the two contractual types. First, is the contract part
of an overarching regulatory scheme in which the government is using its
contractual power to promote a specific public purpose, as opposed to the
mere purchase of needed goods and services? Second, is the contract the
type of agreement normally entered into by private parties or is the nature
of the contract instead derived from the government's unique position as
sovereign!' Third, was the contract formed through a standing contractual
offer voluntarily accepted by the private party, without any bargained-for

legislative enjoinment. In both instances, the effective exercise of sovereignty is blocked. See
supra note 175.
286. See, e.g., Schwartz, supra note 120 at 674-97; Griffith, supranote 120 at 305-16.
287. As Professor Schwartz notes, "[Bowen] suggests a distinction between conventional
contracts that have private analogues... and uniquely governmental contracts that are
integrally intertwined with a regulatory or social service program of the government ...
See Schwartz, supra note 120, at 686.
288. See id. at 686, 689.
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consideration, or was the contract instead created through a more specific
formation process, i.e. a competitive bidding procedure or individual
negotiation.' While additional factors may aid a court in evaluating the
nature of the government contract, the purpose of this framework is not to
establish rigid boundaries of separation. Instead, a court should use these
factors to gain insight into how the sovereign doctrines may be applied in
interpreting rights under the underlying agreement." °
(1) Interpretationof Quasi-RegulatoryModel Contracts
For purposes of this analysis, the important aspect of quasiregulatory contracts is the essentially sovereign role played by the
government in formulating and entering into the agreement with the
private party.2" As a result, the sovereign acts doctrine, which assumes the
government acted in a purely contractual capacity when it entered into the
agreement, does not readily apply. In the quasi-regulatory model, the fusion
of the government's roles as contractor and legislator does not necessarily
render the government liable for its sovereign acts," as is the case under

289. See, e.g., WnstarCorp., 64 F.3d at 1546; Winstar Corp. v. United States, 25 Cl. Ct. 541,
545-46 (1992).
290. One may imagine, of course, particularly difficult cases, a few of which will be
discussed below, where government contractual agreements seem to fall into both model
categories simultaneously. In these cases, the best approach may be simply to apply both
interpretive approaches; the different results should be sufficiently instructive to inform the
decisionmaker as to how to proceed. See infra notes 355-70 and accompanying text.
291. A confusing aspect of this assertion are the many cases holding that the government
acts in its "proprietary" rather than "sovereign" capacity when it enters into various
agreements which this article would describe as quasi-regulatory. See, e.g., Alabama v.
Texas, 347 U.S. 272, 273 (1954) (in disposing of and administering the public lands, the
United States acts in a "proprietary' role); accord United States v. Midwest Oil Co., 236 U.S.
459,474 (1915). See also Sun Oil Co. v. United States, 572 F.2d 786, 818 (Ct. Cl. 1978) (United
States acts in proprietary role when it enters into leases with private companies to explore
for and develop offshore oil and gas resources); Utah Int'l, Inc. v. Andrus, 488 F. Supp. 962,
969 (C.D. Utah 1979) (BLM regulations defining commercial quantities test under the Mineral
Lands Leasing Act constitute actions taken by sovereign in its proprietary, as opposed to
regulatory, role). Generally, the purpose of the "proprietary-sovereign" distinction drawn
in these cases is to show that rights arising out of such "proprietary" agreements are
contractual in nature. See, e.g., Sun Oil, 572 F.2d at 818. Thus, these holdings do not
ultimately conflict with the quasi-regulatory/market participant approach, which attempts
to refine further the different models of government agreements that confer contractual
rights on private parties.
292. For a different view, see Note, Contracts- FinancialInstitutionsReform, Recovery, and
Enforcement Act- FederalCircuit HoldsFederal Government Liablefor Breach of Thrift Contracts,
Winstar Corp. v. United States, 64 F.3d 1531 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc), cert. granted,116 S.
Ct. 806 (1996), 109 Harv. L. Rev. 1162, 1167 (1996) (where government contracts in its
sovereign capacity as a regulator or lawmaker, the government should be liable for direct
breaches of the contract's terms). The problem with this approach is that it fails to take into
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the market participant model. Instead, liability flows from the terms of the
agreement and the authorizing statute, as set forth by the government as
sovereign authority. It is in this interpretive context that the unmistakability
doctrine plays a role, requiring a court to find that the quasi-regulatory
agreement is subject to the sovereign's continuing authority to alter the
contract's terms, pursuant to valid sovereign acts, unless the sovereign has
waived that authority in unmistakable language.'
(a) UnmistakabilityStandardfor Quasi-RegulatoryContracts
Case law provides a confusing array of factors and tests to
determine whether the government has made a binding contractual
promise.' To some degree, one may slice through this heavy precedent by

account that contracts entered into by the government in its sovereign capacity are
nevertheless subject to the exercise of future sovereign authority. See, e.g., Bowen v.Public
Agencies Opposed to Soc. Sec. Entrapment, 477 U.S. 41, 52 (1986). In fact, the argument is a
classic example of the difficulties that arise when attempting to apply the principles of the
sovereign acts doctrine to quasi-regulatory agreements.
293. See cases cited supra note 27.
294. In one category of decisions, courts find no unmistakable waiver on the grounds that
express statutory reservations of sovereign power overcome the government's express
promises to perform. See, e.g., Bowen, 477 U.S. at 53; National R.R. Passenger Corp. v.
Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 470 U.S. 451, 467-68, n.22 (1985); Union Pac. R.R. Co.
v. United States, 99 U.S. 700, 720 (1878). In a second, courts find no unmistakable waiver,
even in the absence of an express statutory reservation, where the government's promise to
perform is merely implied. United States v. Cherokee Nation of Okla., 480 U.S. 700, 707
(1987) (no express promise to surrender navigational easement in contract); Merrion v.
Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 148 (1982) (no express promise to surrender taxation
power in contract). See also Peterson v. U.S. Dep't of Interior, 899 F.2d 799, 808 (9th Cir. 1990)
(congressional failure to expressly reserve power to amend statute does not mean it
unmistakably surrendered its power to do so); Manigault v. Springs, 199 U.S. 473,480 (1905)
(obligations under contract do not prevent government from exercising powers necessary
for public good); Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n. v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398,435 (1934) (reservation
of essential attributes of sovereign power is read into contracts as a postulate of the legal
order); Veix v. Sixth Ward Bldg. & Loan Ass'n, 310 U.S. 32, 38 (1940) (all contracts made
subject to paramount authority to safeguard the vital interests of the people). A third group
of cases finds waivers of sovereign power where the underlying contract or statute makes
specific reference to a particular legal regime under which the contractual rights of the
parties shall be determined. Wnstar, 116 S. Ct. at 2450 (contractual provisions appear to lock
in then-current regulatory treatment); American Satellite Co. v. United States, 998 F. 2d 950,
952 (Fed. Cir. 1993); Hughes Communications Galaxy, Inc. v. United States, 998 F.2d 953,957
(Fed. Cir. 1993) (launch agreements commit government to provide launch services
according to 1982 Presidential policy); Conoco Inc. v. United States, 35 Fed. C. 309, 335
(1996) (statute under which lease agreements executed subjects lease operations to specific
existing laws). Among cases in this category, only Justice Scalia's opinion in Winstarand the
satellite decisions (Hughes and American Satellite) characterize the government's waiver as
"unmistakable." Finally, decisions within each of these categories place different degrees of
emphasis on contractual provisions that attempt to limit the government's liability. See, e.g.,
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observing that the waiver of the sovereign's implied right to alter the terms
of a quasi-regulatory agreement is in essence simply a promise by the
sovereign not to change the law that applies to the underlying contract."s
What does such a promise look like? The key to this question begins with
the recognition that not all government promises are equal. While some
require the government simply to perform a contractual obligation, others
go further, requiring the government to perform an obligation according to
a specific set of legal parameters. In Winstar, for example, the thrifts argued
successfully that the government promised to provide them a specific
regulatory treatment, which was to take precedence over other regulations
promulgated by the agencies.3 In the satellite cases, the court found that
the government had promised launch services according to specific policy
set forth in a 1982 Presidential directive.w In Conoco, the court interpreted
plaintiff's offshore lease agreements to incorporate only specifically
enumerated future regulations.2m Each of these promises related specifically

O'Neill v. United States, 50 F.3d 667,682-86 (9th Cir. 1995). American Satellite, 998 F. 2d at
952; Hughes, 998 F.2d at 957-58.
295. Some courts, without distinguishing between quasi-regulatory and market
participant contracts, have characterized this promise as simply a contractual allocation of
risk to the government for the possibility of future changes in the law. See, e.g., Winstar,116
S. Ct. at 2460-61, 2476; Hughes 998 F.2d at 958-59. While both interpretations result in
government liability, it is conceptually difficult to imagine that the government, contracting
as a sovereign under the quasi-regulatory model, assumes a "risk" that its sovereign acts,
over which it presumably has control, will cause damages to its contractual partner. See infra
notes 335-38 and accompanying discussion regarding the unmistakability standard for the
government in its role as contractor under the market participant model.
296. Winstar, 116 S. Ct. at 2450.
297. American Satellite, 998 F. 2d at 952; Hughes, 998 F.2d at 957-58.
298. Conoco, 35 Fed. Cl. at 322. In Conoco, the lease agreements were issued under the
authority of the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1331-56 (1994). (OCSLA).
Each lease agreement stated that it was issued pursuant to 1) OCSLA; 2) all regulations
issued pursuant to OCSLA and in existence upon the Effective Date of the lease; 3) all
regulations issued pursuant to OCSLA in the future which provide for the prevention of
waste and conservation of the natural resources of the outer continental shelf and the
protection of rights therein; and 4) all other applicable statutes and regulations. Conoco, 35
C. Ct. at 317. The government argued that the statutory amendments subsequently passed
by Congress as part of the Outer Banks Protection Act of 1990, codified at 33 U.S.C, §
2753(c)(1), were incorporated into the terms of the lease by the "all other applicable statutes
and regulations" lease language. Id. at 320-21. The court disagreed, observing that the
drafters knew how to specify, and thus put the lessees on notice of, specific future legislation
when they desired, as indicated by the lease language specifically subjecting the leases to
future regulations issued pursuant to OCSLA for environmental protection. Id. at 322. The
court then held that the general provision relating to all other applicable statutes did not
include legislation enacted subsequent to the lease execution based on the general rule that
"[wihere certain things are specified in detail in a contract, other [terms] of the same general
character relating to the same matter are generally held to be excluded by implication." Id.

(citing GROVER C. GRISMORE, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW Or CONTRACTS, § 105, at 164, (1947)). In
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to the sovereign authority alleged to have been surrendered.' In
comparison, many other government promises, such as a promise to deliver
a fixed amount of water or to charge a particular royalty rate on a
renewable mining lease, make no mention of the sovereign power which
authorize the promise in the first place.3 In contrast to Winstar,in which
the "very subject matter" of the contracts was regulation,' such express
promises to perform do not by implication waive the government's right to
exercise its reserved sovereign power? As a result, ordinary governmental
contractual promises, even when expressly stated, should not be considered
an unmistakable waiver of sovereign authority.m Such a characterization
defeats the purpose of the unmistakability doctrine, to prevent the implied
waiver of governmental power.
In the absence of an unmistakable waiver, the quasi-regulatory
contract remains subject to future exercises of the government's sovereign
power. If the court finds an unmistakable waiver, however, a second
question then arises whether such waiver is overcome by statutory or
contractual language purporting to reserve the sovereign authority or
otherwise limit the government's liability. While there is no simple answer
to this question, one may reliably proceed according to the common law
rule that specific contractual language supersedes more general
provisions.' Thus, a government commitment to a specific legal regime

making these rulings, the court never applied the unmistakability doctrine based on its
holding that the doctrine's only role was to determine the availability of the sovereign acts
defense. Id. at 339-40. See supra note 191 and accompanying text. Despite its erroneous
failure to apply the doctrine (the case was decided before Winstar) the court's contractual
interpretation is sound, illustrating how normal principles of contract interpretation may be
used to determine whether a surrender of sovereign power was in fact unmistakable.
299. This approach is consistent with Justice Scalia's opinion that the unmistakability
doctrine does not require that a contract explicitly waive Congress' power to legislate in the
future in order to constitute an unmistakable surrender. Winstar,116 S. Ct. at 2477; See also
Statesman Sav. Holding Corp. v. United States, 26 Cl. Ct. 904, 921 (1992).
300. See, e.g., O'Neill v. United States, 50 F.3d 677, 686 (9th Cir. 1995); Western FuelsUtah, Inc. v. Lujan, 895 F.2d 780, 789 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
301. Winstar,116 S. Ct. at 2476 (Scalia, J., concurring).
302. United States v. Cherokee Nation of Okla., 480 US. 700,707 (1987) (court refuses to
find implied contractual waiver of navigational easement); Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe,
455 U.S. 130,148 (1982) (court refuses to find implied contractual waiver of taxation power).
303. Moreover, this conclusion should not depend on whether the authorizing statute
expressly reserved the right of future amendment or repeal. See, e.g., Peterson v. U.S. Dep't
of Interior, 899 F.2d 799,808 (1990) (no requirement that Congress expressly reserve the right
to repeal, amend or alter legislation to preserve its fundamental right to do so); cases cited
supra note 68.
304. See cases cited supra, note 255.
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should take precedence over the general language of statutory reservationo
or boilerplate provisions limiting the government's liability.' A more
difficult question is presented when reservation or liability limitation
language is also relatively specific. In such a case, it seems logical to
conclude that, where waiver and reservation share a general level of
specificity, the result is ambiguous and the alleged surrender of sovereign
power clearly not "unmistakable."
(b) InterpretiveChallenges under the Quasi-RegulatoryModel
Unfortunately for practitioners, the interpretation of rights under
federal contracts proves the rule that legal disputes involving actual parties
are never as neat as the models formulated to solve them. Courts will,
undoubtedly, face numerous challenges in applying the basic model to the
actual interpretation of quasi-regulatory contracts. Most of these challenges
center around two basic issues.
The first issue concerns the nature of the government act that effects
the underlying contractual agreement. The quasi-regulatory model
envisions such an act to be a sovereign legislative or regulatory enactment,
which directly amends the statute and underlying agreement on which the
private party's rights are based. Under this formula, the government act
modifies the terms of the contract without "taking" property, since the
private party does not possess any property interests existing outside
federal sovereign authority. Western water law provides another example
in this regard. In California, Central Valley Project water contracts are
typically executed pursuant to the Reclamation Act and all amendatory or
supplementing acts.' The 1992 Central Valley Project Improvement Act
(CVPIA) amended the Reclamation Act to require, among other things,
reductions in the amounts of fresh water diversions in order to enhance
imperiled fish and wildlife populations?' Under the basic framework
described above, these amendments should act directly on the terms of the
contracts, modifying, for example, the amount of annual water delivery
owed under the water contracts, according to the amended, controlling
statute.

305. This language typically reserves the right to "repeal, alter, or amend" the statute in
question. See Bowen v. Public Agencies Opposed to Soc. Sec. Entrapment, 477 U.S. 41, 53
(1986); National R.R. Passeng. Corp. v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 470 U.S. 451,
467-8, n. 22 (1985); Union Pac. R.R. Co. v. United States, 99 U.S. 700, 720 (1878).
306. American Satellite Co. v. United States, 998 F. 2d 950, 952 (1993); Hughes
Communications Galaxy, Inc. v. United States, 998 F.2d 953, 957-58 (1993).
307. See, e.g., O'Neill v. United States, 50 F.3d 677,686 (9th Cir.1995).
308. Central Valley Project Improvement Act, Pub. L. No. 102-575, 106 Stat. 4706-31
(1992).
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A more difficult question is presented when sovereign actions affect
the government's contractual obligations without specifically amending the
underlying statutory. What happens, for example, if the same reductions in
water deliveries are required instead under the Endangered Species Act
(ESA), 30 9 a statute with no direct amendatory authority over the
Reclamation Act. While the government would be similarly required to
reduce water deliveries to its private contracting partners, it is unclear
whether the ESA requirements would be properly characterized as having
altered the terms of the underlying contract (and thus squarely within the
quasi-regulatory model) or instead as having prevented the government
from performing on its unmodified contractual obligation.
One approach to this question would be to assume that, as long as
the amending statute was consistent with the purposes of the statute under
which the quasi-regulatory contract was executed, the amendments should
be incorporated into the contracts terms.3" If instead the narrower standard
(only direct amendments to the Reclamation Act may modify the
underlying water contracts) were adopted, a second question arises: should
a court allow the government to defend by asserting the sovereign acts
doctrine, despite the true fiction that would be required to treat the Bureau
of Reclamation, the administrator of the CVP water system, as just another
private contracting party.11 There are, of course, no easy answer to these
questions. That does not mean, however, that the answers are not still
important. If the government is required to defend its contractual
nonperformance due to ESA mandated water reductions under the
sovereign acts doctrine, it will be required to show that the listing of the
endangered species was an unforeseen event, contrary to the assumptions
2
of the parties at the time of contracting?' Given the growing awareness of
the environmental impacts of water diversion on the Delta's ecosystem,
however, this showing of unforeseeability may become increasingly
difficult to313make, particularly with regards to more recently executed water
contracts.

309.

16 U.S.C. § 1531-44 (1994).

310. Union Pac. R.R., 99 U.S. at 721 (the alterations must be reasonable and consistent
with the object and scope of the authorizing statute). Note that such incorporation would be
impermissible for contracts already executed, in which consideration had been exchanged.

Id.
311. See, e.g., Yankee Atomic Mec. Co. v. United States, 112 F.3d 1569,1574-77 (Fed. Cir.
1997) (government may raise sovereign acts defense to claim that special cleanup assessment
was actually a retroactive price increase on completed contracts for purchase of uranium).

312.

See supranotes 99-112 and accompanying text; RESrATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS

§ 261 (1981) (impossibility defense).
313. The federal government has responded to this problem in two different ways. First,
the CVPIA, which amends the Reclamation Act under which all water contracts are executed,

specifically incorporates the water reduction requirements of the ESA into its terms. See 16
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Another related question is what constitutes a "sovereign act" for
purposes of the quasi-regulatory model? Under Winsta?'sformulation of the
sovereign acts doctrine, a sovereign act must be "public and general" 314 and
not have the "substantial effect of releasing the government from its
contractual obligations."31 ' These parameters, designed for the market
participant model, are less appropriate for quasi-regulatory agreements. 316
Instead, the limits on the government's sovereign authority must be found
in the limits courts have always placed on government sovereignty, that is,

U.S.C. § 3402(b)(2) (secretary required to dedicate and manage 800,000 acre-feet of CVP yield
for various ecological purposes including meeting obligations as may be imposed under the
Federal Endangered Species Act). This approach allows the government to argue that ESA
mandated water reductions constitute de-facto amendments of Reclamation Act water
contracts and thus do not give rise to a breach of contract on the part of the government
requiring the sovereign acts defense.
The second approach has been to incorporate environmental requirements under
the ESA and other related statutes directly into new water contracts as they come up for
renewal. Negotiation between the Madera Irrigation District and the United States broke
down over the government's insistence that the new contracts include the following
language:
The United States and the Contractor further agree that the provisions of
this contract are subject to modification by the United States, after public
meetings and discussions with the Contractor,.., in accordance with the
results of the final EIS and ESA consultation.., and ESA and NEPA.
Madera Irrig. Dist. v. Hancock, 985 F.2d 1397,1405 (9th Cir. 1993). The Ninth Circuit upheld
the inclusion of these provisions by observing that "the government has not 'surrendered
in unmistakable terms' its power to impose any environmental laws on the contractual
relationship, so the required clause is not necessarily violative of Madera's contractual
rights." Id. at 406. The court's reasoning illustrates how the government may inject external
requirements from outside statutes (such as the ESA) into a quasi-regulatory agreement by
inserting amendatory language that directly incorporates the statutory terms.
314. 116 S. Ct. at 2463 (citing Horowitz v. United States, 267 U.S. 458,461 (1925)).
315. 116 S. Ct. at 2467.
316. See supra notes 185.-94 and accompanying discussion. There are several reasons for
this. First, regulatory enactments that effect quasi-regulatory contracts do not technically
"release" the government from its contractual obligations; instead such obligations are
already qualified by the government's retained authority of sovereign power. As is true for
any regulation, subsequent legal changes may have a "substantial effect" on quasiregulatory contracts, but this fact alone should not render the government actions invalid.
Under the market participant model, a court may plausibly infer that a government act
which substantially releases the government from its contractual obligations is more akin
to a government action taken in its contractual capacity. The resulting fusion of the
government's roles as contractor thereupon precludes the availability of the sovereign acts
doctrine as an excuse for breach. Under the quasi-regulatory model, however, the fusion of
the government's roles as a sovereign contractor and legislator is already assumed. Finally,
the "public and general" requirement of the sovereign acts doctrine should not have any
independent force, as applied to quasi-regulatory contracts, beyond emphasizing that the
subsequent legal change must be pursuant to authorized statutory authority, that is, not
selectively applied.
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whether the legislation has a "legitimate public purpose. " ' 7 The greater the
impact of the legislation on the existing contract, the more scrutiny a court
should apply in evaluating the reasonableness and necessity of the
government's stated purpose."'8 Such heightened scrutiny has allowed
courts, for example, to invalidate legislative actions which repudiate the
government's financial obligations to its contractual partners without
providing compensation. 9 The preference to "spend the money to promote
the public good rather than the private welfare of its creditors" is,
accordingly, not a sufficient public purpose justifying the severe impact to
the government's contractual partners.'w
The second issue around which interpretive challenges are sure to
arise under the quasi-regulatory model is the nature of the impact to the
private party's contractual rights. At the outset, it is clear that the
measurement of a given "impact" on a contractual right due to government
legislation is a tricky proposition. This is because such rights, in contrast to,
say, a fee simple estate, may always be defined in terms sufficiently narrow
to allege a complete extinguishment of an alleged property interest and thus
a compensable taking under Lucas.3' In Bowen, for example, the property
interest alleged to have been taken was the narrow right to withdraw from
the social security system, which right had been completely eliminated by
Congress' amendment of the Social Security Act.3' The elimination of the

317. United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 22 (1977). See also Home Bldg. &
Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398,438 (1934) (question is not whether the legislative action
affects contracts directly or indirectly, 'but whether the legislation is addressed to a
legitimate end and the measures taken are reasonable and appropriate to that end."); Union
Pac. R.R. Co. v. United States, 99 U.S. 700, 721 (1878) (legislative alterations must be
reasonable and be made in good faith).
318. Energy Reserves Group v. Kansas Power & Light Co., 459 US. 400, 411 (1982); Allied
Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus, 438 U.S. 234, 245 (1977).
319. United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. at 29; See also Perry v. United States,
294 U.S. 330, 350-51 (1935); Norman v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co., 294 U.S. 240, 304-05
(1935). For purposes of this article, these debt repudiation cases may also be distinguished
from the quasi-regulatory model by the fact that the government, when it borrows money
and contracts to repay it with interest, is not acting in a sovereign capacity. United States
Trust, 431 U.S. at 25 n.23. Instead, these cases fall more squarely within the market
participant model. See infranotes 355-63 and accompanying discussion.
320. United States TrustCo. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. at 29. See also Lynch v. United States,
292 U.S. at 571, 580 (1934) (Congress does not have the power to repudiate its own debts
simply in order to save money); Alpine Ridge Group v. Kemp, 955 F.2d 1382,1386 (9th Cir.
1992); Yankee Atomic Elec. Co. v. United States, 33 Fed. Cl. 580, 585 (Fed. C. 1995)
(legislation plainly directed at undoing a contractual liability previously assumed by the
Government is an impermissible exercise of sovereign power).
321. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council. 505 U.S. 1003,1018-24 (1992).
322. Bowen v. Public Agencies Opposed to Soc. Sec. Entrapment, 477 U.S. 41, 51 (1986).
See supranotes 78-85 and accompanying text.
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state's withdrawal right, however, did not terminate the state's overall
participatory interests in the Social Security System, including the most
important interest of all, the right to receive social security payments. As an
analogy, one may consider the overall group of "rights" conferred upon a
private party by a quasi-regulatory contract as similar to the "bundle of
rights" contained within a fee simple estate. In this situation, each
individual contractual right is analogous to the different "use interests"
contained within the fee simple, many of which may be eliminated through
valid exercises of the police power without violating the Fifth Amendment
to the Constitution.m
This illustration is useful to show that the modification of many
contractual rights - the right to pay a certain royalty amount324 or the right
to prepay on a government low income housing loan,3" for example - may
be considered to be something less than the complete extinguishment of a
property interest. In the end, however, the approach one adopts in
measuring contractual rights is not ultimately determinative. As discussed
above, under the quasi-regulatory model the retention of sovereign
authority means that validly enacted sovereign acts, reasonable and
necessary for a legitimate public purpose, may completely extinguish a
party's entire interest in the underlying contract without violating the Fifth
Amendment.' Given this fact, an important question is whether there are
any limitations on the government's ability to simply eliminate rights on
which the private party has come to rely.
Some clues in answering this difficult interpretive question may be
found in the oldest of the unmistakability decisions, Sinking Fund Cases, in
which the Supreme Court characterized the reserved sovereign power as
follows:
[In amending the underlying contract, Congress] cannot undo
what has already been done, and it cannot unmake contracts
that have already been made, but it may provide for what
shall be done in the future, and may direct what preparation
shall be made for the due performance of contracts already
entered into.

323. Lucas, 505 US . at 1016-19 and n.7; Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438
U.S. 104, 123-24 (1978); see also Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980); Keystone
Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470 (1987).
324. Western Fuels v. Logan, 895 F.2d 780,789 (I.C. Cir. 1990).
325. Parkridge Investors Ltd. Partnership v. Farmers Home Admin., 13 F.3d 1192 (8th
Cir. 19%4).
326. See supranotes 248-50 and accompanying text.
327. Union Pac. I.R. Co. v. United States, 99 U.S. 700, 721 (1878).
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Many of the quasi-regulatory unmistakability decisions fit well within this
characterization. Typically such contracts - such as the social security
agreements in Bowen, the water contracts in O'Neil, or the mining leases in
Western Fuels - are of indefinite, or long, term with continuous exchanges of
consideration between the parties. When Congress alters the terms of such
agreements, it is providing "for what shall be done in the future" and
directing "what preparation shall be made for the due performance of
contracts already entered into," all reasonable exercises of the reserved
power?"
A harder question is how to interpret the limitation that Congress
cannot undo what has "already been done" or unmake "contracts that have
already been made."3 ' In Bowen, the Court holds at one point that the
"conditional" nature of the state's alleged property interest is in part
derived from the absence of any independent consideration paid by the
state for the right to withdraw from the social security system.3 Bowen thus
appears to leave open the possibility that government's acceptance of
independent consideration for the alleged contractual right may create a
binding promise, even in the absence of an unmistakable waiver of
sovereignty. The presence of independent consideration, however, merely
begs the question of contractual intent; i.e. was the consideration provided
to permanently bind the government to its stated promise, or rather to
328. The Ninth Circuit's decision in MaderaIrrig. Dist. v. Hancock is a good example of
this principle. In Madera,the water users argued that an increase in water fees on renewable
water contracts constituted an unconstitutionally retroactive alteration of property rights
based on the allegation that the rates had been increased in order to recoup the prior
subsidies provided by the federal government. 985 F.2d 1397, 1402-03 (9th Cir. 1993). In
rejecting this claim, the court observed:
Madera got its water during the forty year term and need pay no more for
the old water than the price to which it agreed. Were it to buy no more
water, it would owe no more money for the operations and maintenance
expense .... The price of the new water will be calculated in such a way as
to recoup a subsidy previously granted, as though the subsidy were a debt,
but the subsidy is not owed like a debt. Madera has no obligation to repay
it. Id. at 1403.
329. See also Bowen v. Public Agencies Opposed to Soc. Sec. Entrapment, 477 U.S. 41, 55
(1986) (Congress may not deprive a party of the fruits actually reduced to possession of
contracts lawfully made) (citing Union Pac. R.R. Co. v. United States, 99 US. 700, 720 (1878)).
One possible interpretation would be to characterize such language as an affirmation of
Congress' ability to enter into binding regulatory contracts pursuant to an unmistakable
waiver of its reserved sovereign powers. This was clearly not the approach intended by
Sinking Fund Cases, which held that Congress had reserved its sovereign powers in executing
the contracts. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 99 U.S. at 719-20.
330. Bowen, 477 US. at 55. See also Alpine Ridge Group v. Kemp, 955 F.2d 1382,1386 (9th
Cir. 1992) (court distinguishes plaintiffs' claims from those in Bowen by finding that the
plaintiffs have "bargained-for contract rights, supported by independent consideration.");
see also cases, supra note 202.
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preserve the benefits of the government's promise until such time that the
promise was altered by a subsequent sovereign act?3' If the consideration
can be traced to a specific exchange of performance - royalties for mined
coal or payments for water deliveries for example - then the performance
received by the non-federal party may be legitimately characterized as
vested property interests, immune from the effects of subsequent,
retroactive legislation.3 2 Winstar presents a slightly more complicated
scenario, in which the consideration provides the government with the full
benefit of the contractual bargain, while the government's performance
obligation - in this case to provide favorable regulatory treatment - is
ongoing. While the various opinions in Winstar do not elaborate on this
point, it is clear the Justices in the majority were uneasy with simply
allowing the government to withdraw its contractual promise after already

331. As noted by Justice Rehnquist's dissent in Wmnstar, "[i]f the government agreed to
let the losses acquired by [the thrifts] as supervisory goodwill in the short term, but made
no commitment about their regulatory treatment over the long term, [the thrifts] still
received consideration." 116 S. Ct. at 2484. The idea that consideration might be paid for
such a conditional government commitment highlights the "temporal value" of such
contractual rights, as discussed supra at notes 213-15 and accompanying text. A full
discussion on the constitutionality of retroactive legislation is beyond the scope of this
article. See, e.g., Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. R. A. Gray & Co., 467 U.S. 717,729-30 (1984)
(retroactive application of a statute is constitutional if supported by a legitimate legislative
purpose and furthered by rational means); Fisch, supranote 139.
332. See Yankee Atomic Elec. Co. v. United States, 33 Fed. Cl. 580, 586 (Fed. Cl. 1995),
rev'd on other grounds,112 F.3d 1569 (Fed. Cir. 1997). In Yankee Atomic, the Federal Claims
court reviewed a congressional statute which authorized the Secretary of Energy to collect
a special annual assessment from utility companies which had previously utilized enriched
uranium,produced by the government, as a fuel in the operation of their nuclear plants. The
purpose of the statute was to help defray the unforeseen cleanup costs of nuclear
contamination. The utilities sued, claiming that the statute constituted an unlawful attempt
to rewrite the terms of previously executed contracts in which the government had charged
the utilities a fixed, per-unit price for its uranium enrichment services. 33 Fed. Cl. at 583-84.
The court agreed, noting that "the assessment is an add-on to the price previously paid to
the government" and that, "by imposing the assessment... the government dishonors the
very promise it had earlier made: that the price to be charged for its services would not
exceed the contract-stated maximum." Id. at 585.
The appellate court reversed, holding that the assessment statute was a general
sovereign act that did not directly affect the completed contracts between the government
and the utilities. The court noted that the language of the contracts did not preclude the
government's sovereign authority to levy a general assessment for cleanup costs that were
not considered at the time the contracts were entered into. Because the assessment did not
alter the previously agreed upon price for enriched uranium, the government had not
violated any contractual obligations. See 112 F.3d at 1574-80.
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having received the full benefit of the contractual bargain, the bailout of the
insolvent thrifts.m
(2) InterpretationofMarket ParticipantModel Contracts
In the market participant model, the government enters into
contracts, similar to any other private party, for the purchase and sale of
products or services necessary to maintain the government's day to day
operation. Thus, this model is perfectly suited for the sovereign acts
doctrine, which assumes that the government's public and general
sovereign acts are not attributable to the government as contractor.33 The
more interesting question under this model is the role the unmistakability
doctrine plays, if any, in interpreting rights under market participant
contracts. One might plausibly argue, for example, if the role of the
government contractor under this model is analogous to a private market
participant, why should the government be allowed any presumption that
puts the government in a favorable position vis a vis its private contractual
partner in determining liability under the federal contract?
The response to this argument may be stated simply. In market
participant contracts, the unmistakability presumption merely ensures, in
the absence of express language to the contrary, that the government shall
be treated like any other private party in regards to sovereign acts which
hinder or block contractual performance. When a court is asked to determine liability for contractual breach, the unmistakability presumption confers no advantage on the government in its fictitious role as a private party.
Both parties may argue that they bear no responsibility for the occurrence
of the sovereign act; the terms of the contract determine who prevails. The
next two subsections will discuss the unmistakability standard and the
mechanics of the sovereign defenses under the market participant model.
(a) Unmistakability Standardfor Market ParticipantContracts
The uninistakability standard for market participant contracts,
while similar to the standard for quasi-regulatory contracts described
above, differs in concept due to the distinct roles played by the government
under the different contractual models. When the government contracts in
its role as a sovereign under the quasi-regulatory model, its waiver of
sovereign authority takes the form of a promise not to change the law.

333. In this respect, Winstar is probably a good model for government practitioners
regarding the probable hostility with which the judiciary will greet quasi-regulatory
agreements that do not in some way protect private party reliance on government promises
that are subsequently withdrawn through the exercise of sovereign power.
334. See supra notes 95-108 and accompanying discussion.
335. See supra note 295 and accompanying discussion.
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When the government contracts in its role as market participant, its waiver
of sovereign authority takes the form of a promise to assume contractual
responsibility for its acts as a sovereign, over which it presumably has no
control. As is true under the quasi-regulatory model, if the government
confers contractual rights on a party according to a specific legal regime, the
government will be liable for sovereign acts which alter that legal regime
and consequentially hinder or block contractual performance.' Under the
market participant model, however, such liability derives not from the
government's breach of its promise to maintain a certain legal regime, but
instead as a result of the government's assumption of risk for legal acts of
the sovereign beyond the control of the government in its contractual
capacity.'
In the absence of an unmistakable waiver of sovereign authority,
the government as market participant may of course simply assume liability
for the efets of random sovereign acts, such as rises in the price of supplier
goods or delays in delivery. Unlike a general waiver, however, such
contractual assumptions of risk need not be unmistakable. Instead, courts
will interpret such provisions as they would any other risk allocations
negotiated between two private parties.?
(b) Mechanics of Sovereign Defenses under Market ParticipantModel
Upon reflection, it becomes dear that the role of the unmistakability
doctrine in interpreting routine "market participant" contracts does not
confer any advantage to the government. A judicial finding that the
government did not waive its sovereign authority merely allows the
government to raise the sovereign acts doctrine and have its contractual

336. See supra, notes 294-306 and accompanying discussion. The government might also
unmistakably waive its sovereign authority through straightforward provisions allocating
liability to the government for sovereign acts that hinder or block performance. Note that
the government might arguably make an unmistakable promise not to alter the specific legal
regime governing a particular contract, while at the same time making no such promises as
to general sovereign acts that do not directly affect the contract terms. See, e.g., Yankee
Atomic, 112 F.3d at 1580 (unmistakable promise not to change price of uranium was not
unmistakable promise against a future assessment for cleanup costs).
337. This conclusion implies that the Justices in Winstar, in finding that the government
had "assumed the risk of future regulatory change," were treating the forbearance
agreements as "market participant," as opposed to "quasi-regulatory" agreements. Winstar,
116 S. Ct. at 2457-58.
338. Under the second requirement of the impossibility defense, for example, a court
must examine the contract to establish whether its language or circumstances indicate that
the parties actually allocated the risk of the alleged unforeseen event. Winstar, 116 S. Ct. at
2473; REsrATEm NT (SEcOND) OF CoNTRACrs § 261 (1981); see supranote 35.
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obligations adjudicated in the same manner as a private party.' While
conferring no advantage, however, the application of the unmistakability
doctrine to market participant contracts serves a valuable role in retaining
the government's latitude to enact sovereign laws for the general welfare.
This is particularly true where the sovereign act hinders or blocks the
performance of the private contracting party.3 In these situations, the
unmistakability doctrine prevents the government from assuming
responsibility, absent clear and express contractual language, for damages
caused by the sovereign act." In this respect, it should be noted that most
government purchase and sale contracts, in fact, do allocate these types of
risks with such express provisions.' Thus, the concern of the Winstar
justices, that the application of the unnistakability doctrine to "routine
supply contracts" would result in "compromising the government's
practical capacity to make contracts," seems unjustified.' 3
A different concern is the appropriateness of Winstar's test for
determining whether a sovereign act is sufficiently "public and general" to

339. See Jones v. United States, I Ct. Cl. 383, 384 (1865) (in this court the United States
appear simply as contractors; and they are to be held liable only within the same limits that
any other defendant would be in any other court).
340. Where the public and general sovereign act prevents the government's contractual
performance, the unmistakability presumption is only marginally important; in these cases
the government must still show that the occurrence of the act was unforeseeable and not
otherwise allocated as a risk under the terms of the contract. RESTATEmENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS § 261 (1981). Both of these inquiries will be conducted under normal contract
principles of interpretation.
341. Hills Materials Co. v. Rice illustrates how a court's failure to apply the
unmistakability doctrine to a market participant contract may result in government liability.
Hills Materials Co. v. Rice, 982 F.2d 514 (Fed. Cir. 1992). In Hills, the court interpreted
ambiguous provisions against the government, as drafter of the contract, in finding the
government responsible for cost overruns experienced by the private contractor as a result
of government regulations. 982 F.2d at 516-17. The court then rejected the government's
sovereign acts defense on the grounds that the government had affirmatively assumed
responsibility for the acts, despite the fact that the contractual risk allocation was susceptible
to different interpretations and thus hardly "unmistakable.' Id. at 516 n.2.
342. See, e.g., 48 C.F.R. § 249.110 (1997) (prescribing provisions which may be inserted
into government contracts in order to allocate risk in the event the government terminates
performance of work). See also G. L. Christian & Assocs. v. United States, 312 F.2d 418,
423-24 (Ct. Cl. 1963); Schwartz, supra note 120 at 694-97; Spiedel, supra note 108 at 520-25.
343. Winstar, 116 S. Ct. at 2459. Justice Souter's concern regarding the effect of the
unmistakability doctrine on the government's ability to enter into routine contracts appears
to stem from the opinion's failure to make a distinction between the doctrine's application
to market participant, as compared to quasi-regulatory, agreements. In other words, under
Souter's approach, the application of the unmistakability doctrine to market participant
contracts would allow the government to change the contract's terms, similar to the quasiregulatory model, instead of simply allowing the government to raise the sovereign acts
doctrine as a defense. See supra notes 59-145 and accompanying text.
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warrant application of the sovereign acts doctrine.3" According to Justice
Souter, an act will not be considered "public and general" if it "has the
substantial effect of releasing the Government from its contractual
obligations...." " The "substantial effect" test asks whether the
government's act has a direct impact upon the government's contract
obligations or whether the impact is instead indirect or merely incidental to
the accomplishment of other legitimate sovereign purposes.3 " While the test
has been justly criticized for being difficult to apply, and for inviting
inevitable inquiries into legislative intent,347 the question remains whether
the test is necessary to prevent the government from gaining unfair
advantage under certain contractual scenarios. In some cases, where the
government is still required to meet the requirements of commercial
impossibility to avoid liability, the substantial effects test is arguably
unnecessary. In Winstar,for example, Justice Souter's finding that FIRREA
had a direct, substantial effect on the government's contractual
obligations' " was largely superfluous since the contracts' treatment of the
applicable regulations prevented the government from successfully arguing
that the change in law was unforeseeable nor addressed by the contracts'
terms.35

One may imagine, however, how the absence of a substantial effects
test might in other situations allow the government to avoid appropriate
responsibility for the effects of its sovereign actions. This possibility is
particularly high where the sovereign act hinders or prevents the
performance of the private party; in that case the government will be under

344. See, e.g., The Supreme Court- Leading Cases, 110 HARV. L. REV. 345 (1996).
345. Winstar, 116 S. Ct. at 2467.
346. Id. at 2466-67.
347. The Supreme Court-Leading Cases, supra note 344 at 353-54. WInstar, 116 S.Ct. at 248283 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
348. See The Supreme Court-Leading Cases, supra note 344 at 353-54.
349. FIRREA was arguably a "public and general" sovereign act, since it applied to the
entire savings and loan industry and was passed in order to stave off an even more serious,
predicted financial crises. Fin. Insts. Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989
(FIRREA), Pub. L. No. 101-73, 103 Stat. 183 (codified as amended in scattered sections of
U.S.C.). See, e.g, Winstar, 116 S. Ct. at 2483 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) ("FIRREA made
enormous changes in the structure of federal thrift regulation."). FIRREA was entitled "an
act to reform, recapitalize, and consolidate the Federal deposit insurance system, to enhance
the regulatory and enforcement powers of federal financial institutions regulatory agencies
and for other purposes." Winstar, 116 S. Ct. at 2483 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting, quoting
FIRREA, 103 Stat. 183 (1989)). The stated purpose of FIRREA is, in part, to provide affordable
housing mortgage finance and housing opportunities for low and moderate income
individuals by restoring the viability of the thrift industry. Toscano, supra, note 9 at 470.
350. Winstar, 116 S. Ct. at 2469-72. RESrATEEN (SEcOND) oF CoNTRACTs, § 261 (1981).
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no requirement to meet the impossibility standards. 3sI Instead, the
foreseeability of the "public and general" act will prevent the private party
from having its performance excused, thus rendering it responsible for any
resulting damages. 2 It is true, of course, that the real possibility of such
occurrences is alleviated significantly by the ability of the parties to allocate
such contractual risks through standard clauses and provisions.' For this
reason, and because of the real shortcomings in implementation, as referred
to above,& the significant effects test is probably not ultimately appropriate
as a factor for determining the availability of the sovereign acts defense.
b. Application of Basic Framework Principles
The purpose of the basic framework is to set forth models of
analysis from which courts may choose when addressing the government's
sovereign defenses in federal contract interpretation. For many contracts,
the most difficult call is whether the agreement falls within the quasiregulatory or market participant model of analysis. In some respects, a
court's determination of which model is not as important as the consistency
of analysis once a model is chosen. The most directed criticism of recent
court decisions involving the government's sovereign defenses is usually
attributable to the failure to distinguish between regulatory and market
models of government contracts. Where a government contract falls in the
gray zone, somewhere between quasi-regulatory and market participant,
a court is probably best advised to apply both models in interpreting
underlying rights and obligations. Only where the different models produce
opposite results will a court be forced to make a binding determination as
to the nature of the underlying contract.
A short run through some of the more confusing "sovereignty"
cases illustrates this principle. Two early Supreme Court decisions, Perry v.
United States and Lynch v. United States, have continuously challenged
those attempting to establish the boundaries of retained federal

351. See, e.g., Jones v. United States, 1 Ct. C. 383, 384 (1865) (government has no
responsibility for sovereign act that increases cost of performance for private party); Deming
v. United States, 1 Ct. Cl. 190 (1865).
352. See Tony Downs Foods Co. v. United States, 530 F.2d 367,372 (Ct. Cl. 1976). In Tony
Downs, a poultry supplier sued to recover increased costs it had incurred as a result of the
government's termination of the national price freeze for certain products. The court first
held that the government bore no responsibility for the price freeze, which the court
characterized as "an exercise of sovereign power." Id. The court then rejected the poultry
supplier's impossibility defense based on its finding that the lifting of price controls "cannot
legitimately be viewed as unforeseeable or beyond reasonable anticipation." Id.
353. See supranote 342.
354. See supra note 347.
355. Perry v. United States, 294 U.S. 330 (1935).
356. Lynch v. United States, 292 U.S. 571 (1934).
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sovereignty. 7 In Perry, the Court held that the government's refusal to pay
bondholders in gold according to the terms of the bond notes was an
impermissible repudiation of the government's obligation to honor its own
debts.35' Perry's holding was in part based on Lynch, in which the Court held
that Congress could not simply repeal its contractual obligations to pay
benefits under the government's War Risk Insurance program.3" While
neither Perrynor Lynch fall comfortably within either of the two contractual
V ' analysis
models discussed,
under either model conforms to the Court's
ultimate decisions. Under the quasi-regulatory model, a court would likely
find that the government's preference to relieve its own financial obligations
was not a sufficiently valid public purpose to warrant the significant impact
on the parties right to receive payments according to the contracts' terms. ' 1
Under the market participant model, a court would likely hold that the
government's role as contractor was not sufficiently distinct from its role in
enacting the repealing legislation, thus precluding the assertion of the
sovereign acts defense.' In Perry, one could additionally argue that the

357. See, e.g., Schwartz, supra note 120 at 675-83. Toscano, supra note 9 at 455-58; K.
McKay Worthington, Note, Is your government contract worth the paper its written on? An
examination of Winstar v. United States, 1 Columbia Bus. L. Rev. 119, 125-29 (1996).
358. Perry, 294 U.S. at 349-54.
359. Lynch, 292 U.S. at 577-78.
360. Perryarguably falls within the market participant model based on the language of
United States Trust, which states that the government does not act as a sovereign when it
borrows money and contracts to repay it with interest. United States Trust Co. of New York
v. New Jersey, 431 US. 1, 25 n.23 (1977), citing Murray v. Charleston, 96 U.S. 432,445 (1878).
Conversely, Lynch falls more within the quasi-regulatory model due to the overarching
public purpose and regulatory-like structure of the War Risk Insurance program.
361. United States Trust, 431 U.S. at 29. This was essentially the holding in Lynch, in which
the Court noted that "the due process clause prohibits the United States from annulling [I
[the policies or contracts] unless indeed, the action taken falls within the federal police
power or some other paramount power.' Lynch, 292 US. at 579. Note that the serious impact
to the government's contracting partners as a result of the government's actions may
heighten the scrutiny a court will apply to the government's alleged public purpose. Energy
Reserves Group, Inc. v. Kansas Power & Light Co., 459 US. 400,411 (1982); Allied Structural
Steel Co. v. Spannus, 438 U.S. 234, 245 (1977). One might also argue in Perry that the
government's obligation to repay the bond "in United States gold coin of the present standard
ofvalue," constituted an unmistakable waiver of its sovereign authority to change the terms
of payment. Perry,294 U.S. at 348 (emphasis added) (the term "present standard of value"
establishes a standard of the government's obligation in contrast to any purported
performance that amounts to a "lower standard of value"). In Lynch there was no arguable
waiver, save for the payment of independent consideration through monetary premiums.
Lynch, 292 U.S. at 577 (insurance policy subject to all amendments to original act).
362. This holding could be made on the grounds that 1) the government legislation had
direct, significant effects on the government's contractual obligations; or 2) the government's
repeal of its bond and insurance obligations were not public and general acts, but instead
acts aimed clearly at specific government contracts. The fact that one could make a credible
argument that the government repeals were in fact "public and general" acts illustrates the
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government's specific promise to pay in gold was either an unmistakable
allocation of liability for any change in the gold standard or, at the least, an
indication that the parties had contemplated the possibility of such a
change, thus precluding a defense based on impossibility.'
The satellite cases," which also involve contracts arguably fitting
under either model, further illustrate the convergence of result under the
two distinct analytical approaches. A court might, for example, characterize
the launch agreements as quasi-regulatory contracts entered into for the
purpose of regulating commercial space activities. Under this model, the
court could characterize the government's promise to provide launch
services specifically according to 1982 policy as an unmistakable waiver of
its right as sovereign to alter the terms of the agreement. Conversely, the
Court could characterize the agreement as essentially market driven, and
interpret the government's promise as an express assumption of contractual
liability for actions of the sovereign that change launch policy.' Note that
under this approach, sovereign actions that did not explicitly alter launch
policy but still acted to block government performance on the contract - for
example, the government's closure of the launch site due to an impending
hurricane - might excuse the government's non-performance, notwithstanding the explicit waiver contained in the contract.3"
The forbearance agreements in Winstar are also illustrative of
contracts that fall near the mid-point of the regulatory-market spectrum.
The agreements were not contracts that might have been entered into
between private parties; instead they conferred specialized legal treatment
on the thrifts as part of an overall regulatory approach to save the savings
and loan industry from bankruptcy. On the other hand, the agreements
represented bargained-for exchanges of consideration motivated primarily
by the government's desire to avoid the potentially enormous expenses that
could result from the insurance commitments of the FSLIC. The ambiguous
nature of these contractual arrangements is clearly one cause of the
inconsistent reasoning behind the court decisions that interpreted them. 7

potential importance of the "substantial effects" test in preventing the government from
exploiting its rights under the sovereign acts doctrine. See supra notes 344-354 and
accompanying text.
363. Winstar,116 S. Ct. 2432,2471-72. RrATEmENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 261 (1981).
364. See supra notes 26076 and accompanying discussion.
365. This is probably the better model of analysis, given the court's observation that the
commercial launch program was implemented as a way to offset the costs of the space
program. Hughes Communications Galaxy, Inc. v. United States, 998 F.2d 953,955 (Fed. Cir.
1993).
366. This result might also be theoretically possible under the quasi-regulatory model.
See supra notes 309-12 and accompanying text.
367. See cases cited supra note 170.
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As is true with the cases described above, however, the 'result
reached by the Court in Winstar, that the government is liable for the
damages caused to the thrifts due to the change in regulatory policy, may
be arrived at under either model of analysis.m Under the quasi-regulatory
model, the government's promise of specific legal accounting treatment
may be treated as an unmistakable promise by the sovereign not to change
the law. Under the market-participant model, the government's promise
can be characterized as an unmistakable assumption of risk by the
government should the legal framework be changed by the sovereign. In
this model, the unmistakable waiver means that the government has
waived its right to raise the sovereign acts doctrine as an excuse for breach.
If Justice Souter's opinion were to be characterized as having found such an
unmistakable risk allocation, Winstar should not have even addressed the
government's sovereign acts defense.' Of course, Souter's opinion never
identifies the government promise as "unmistakable," and thus, to the
extent the forbearance agreements are considered to be market-participant
contracts, the Court is correct in addressing the sovereign acts doctrine.
Souter's opinion demonstrates, in fact, how a contractual allocation may not
be "unmistakable" for purposes of deciding whether the government has
waived its right to raise the sovereign acts defense, but still be sufficiently
clear to preclude the government from avoiding liability once it is treated
as just another private party under common law principles of contract
interpretation. 370
CONCLUSION
The government's sovereign defenses derive from historical lines
of analysis which correspond to two different traditional government roles,
one as sovereign regulator and the other as market participant. To make
sense of the precedent standing behind the sovereign doctrines (and to
apply the doctrines today in a coherent framework), it is thus necessary to
interpret federal contracts under distinct analytical models that represent
these two different governmental roles.

368. One may of course quibble with the Court's factual and legal interpretations as to
whether the contracts contained unmistakable promises which bound the government. The
purpose in this paragraph is to show how an analysis might flow given different findings.
369. This was the approach recommended by Justice Scalia. Winstar, 116 S.Ct. at 2477
(Scalia, J., concurring) (sovereign acts doctrine is avoided whenever government makes an
unmistakable promise that none of its sovereign acts will incidentally disable it or the other
party from performing one of the promised acts).
370. Winstar, 116 S.Ct. at 2463-72. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRAC"S § 261 (1981) See

supra notes 338-40 and accompanying text.
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The unmistakability doctrine holds that the government will not be
presumed to have waived its sovereign authority to make laws and
regulations when it enters into contracts with private parties. When the
government enters into "quasi-regulatory" contracts, the unmistakability
doctrine retains the government's authority to alter the terms of future
contractual performance, absent an express government promise to be
bound by a specific legal regime. When the government enters into
"market-participant" contracts, the unmistakability doctrine similarly
retains the government's right to deny legal responsibility for public and
general sovereign acts, absent express contractual language which assumes
such liability.
Under the sovereign acts doctrine, the government is treated as a
private party in determining liability for the effects of public and general
sovereign acts which hinder or block contractual performance. Because the
purpose of the sovereign acts doctrine is to allow the government to assert
defenses, such as commercial impossibility, that would be available to a
private party, the doctrine is well suited for interpreting liability under
market participant contracts, in which the government contracts in a quasiprivate capacity. For the same reason, however, the sovereign acts doctrine
is not appropriate for determining rights under quasi-regulatory contracts,
in which the government acts in an essentially sovereign capacity, entering
into contractual arrangements in order to promote a greater regulatory
objective. Instead, courts determine rights under these contracts by asking
whether the alleged property interest is "subject to" or instead "vested"
against the implied reservation of sovereign authority.
The Winstar decision fails to distinguish between the regulatory and
market models of government contracts. Instead, Justice Souter's opinion
relies on a less meaningful distinction, which limits the presumption of
reserved sovereign authority to claims that effectively block, or exempt a
party from the operation of, the government's exercise of sovereign power.
While this article has pointed out many problems with the "remedy test,"
one stands out above all the others; the remedy test does not preserve the
presumption of retained sovereignty in exactly those quasi-regulatory
agreements for which the presumption is most appropriate. This conclusion
is confirmed by considering the mechanics of a takings claim, the preferred
remedy under quasi-regulatory contract right disputes. In a takings action,
the party specifically does not seek to enjoin the government's right of
eminent domain, a reserved, inalienable power under 19th century contract
clause cases. Instead, takings claims seek just compensation, a pure damage
remedy which, under the remedy test, will never require the invocation of
the unmistakability presumption.
The different Winstar opinions also blur the relationship between
the unmistakability and sovereign act doctrines, implying in parts of the
decision that the unmistakability presumption merely serves to retain the
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government's right to disclaim responsibility for its own sovereign acts.
Like the adoption of the remedy test, this doctrinal merging has the effect
of eliminating the unmistakability presumption from the interpretation of
quasi-regulatory contracts. Such a shift in federal contract law has serious
adverse consequences for the government's ability to regulate the activities
of its contractual partners without running afoul of the Fifth Amendment's
takings prohibitions. Unhappily, Winstar neither acknowledges nor
discusses the implications of such a shift. If such a contraction of federal
regulatory power is indeed warranted, Winstar does not tell us why that
should be so.
In addition to identifying some consequences of WVnstar's precedent
on federal contract interpretation, this article has set forth a basic
framework in which courts should interpret rights and obligations under
government contracts. The framework does not guarantee specific results.
As always in contract interpretation, ultimate decisions on the merits,
particularly in hard borderline cases such as Winstar, will be left to the fact
finder. The framework has the potential, nevertheless, to establish
consistent rules of interpretation which may be applied to the different
contractual models. Consistent interpretation, a relatively rare commodity
in recent decisions involving the government's sovereign defenses, allows
parties to draft contractual provisions with greater certainty and to enter
into the reliable binding commitments at times necessary to effectuate the
public purpose of the regulatory contract.3' Unfortunately, Winstarachieves
quite the opposite result, setting forth a divergent set of opinions based on
confusing and at times contradictory analysis. For this reason, Winstar
deserves to be overhauled, as quickly as the next federal contract
interpretation case can reach our nation's highest court.

371. An example of how the need for binding government commitments in the regulatory
field may create new government contract policy is provided by the "No Surprises"
Statement adopted by the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service and the National Marine Fisheries
Service in regards to Habitat Conservation Plans under the Endangered Species Act. H.R.
Rep. No. 97-835. The Statement provides that Habitat Conservation Plans entered into
pursuant to 16 U.S.C. § 1533 may not be subsequently modified by the government except
at the government's own expense. The impetus of the Statement is the political realization
that "the major benefit from the HCP process from the perspective of the development
community or land manager is certainty.' (emphasis added). The stated purpose of the policy
is to "provide assurances to non-federal landowners ... that no additional land restrictions
or financial compensation will be required from an HCP permittee for species adequately
covered by a properly functioning HCP in light of unforeseen or extraordinary
circumstances.'

